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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

by

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(A.B., Cornell, 1912; A.M., M.R.E., Boston, 1920)

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

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INTRODUCTION

Thomas Hill Green lived and did his work at Oxford approximately fifty years ago; yet his influence still abides and has spread far beyond the confines of Oxford, and of England. Among the master minds which England produced in the nineteenth century, we find many men more famous, but few who have rendered a higher service. When the claims of naturalism seemed about to monopolize philosophy, and in engulfing idealism to destroy all philosophic foundation for faith in God and duty, Green was one of the few clear-thinking men of the times who could meet the challenge and supply a rational basis for faith. In his somewhat secluded life as a college professor, he influenced thousands through his teaching and his works, and established ethics and religion upon an idealistic foundation which could command the respect of thinking people.

The study of the relations between Green's ethics and his philosophy of religion is of timely interest, for most of the problems which confronted Green are with us still. The same philosophic tendencies which threatened fifty years ago to destroy idealism are today making their attacks in new forms and with renewed vigor. As it was Green's task to point out that ethics, religion, and science all rest upon an underlying unity of life which precludes the possibility of contradiction, so it must be ours

in the present day to counteract the claims both of an obstinate dogmatism which scoffs at reason and a presumptuous materialism which scoffs at faith.

In examining Green's philosophy we shall attempt neither to defend nor to attack his views, but to evaluate and criticize them with the hope of finding in them suggestions for the better guidance of our own thinking. Green himself states admirably the true ~~and~~ function and spirit of criticism at the beginning of his Introduction to Hume where he says, "A process which looks like pulling a great philosopher to pieces, may be the true way of showing reverence for his greatness. It is a pharisaic way of building the sepulchre of philosophers to profess their doctrine or extol their genius without making their spirit our own...We best do reverence to their genius, we most truly appropriate their spirit, in so exploring the difficulties to which their enquiry led, as to find in them a suggestion of a theory which may help us to walk firmly where they stumbled and fell".[1] It is in this spirit that we shall attempt to make a critical analysis of Green's philosophy.

In examining Green's thought we shall first attempt by a sketch of his life and personal characteristics to become acquainted with the man himself. We shall then briefly summarize his main philosophical principles to serve as a basis for further discussion. An examination will next be made of the principal works which have

[1] Works, vol. i, p. 5.

been written about Green, in order to see what results have been obtained by previous investigators and what place he occupies in philosophic literature. We shall then examine in detail Green's metaphysical, ethical and religious principles; and in evaluating and criticizing these principles we shall also try to pass judgment in some measure upon the views advanced by others regarding his philosophy. Finally the deductions which can be drawn from Green's thought regarding the inter-relations of ethics and the philosophy of religion will be brought together and evaluated. In examining these relations it will be necessary to consider the common metaphysical basis of ethics and religion as well as the direct bearing of the one upon the other. In conclusion, we shall summarize the outstanding merits and limitations of Green's philosophy and state his essential contributions to the problem of the relation between ethical theory and religious thought.

I. Green's Life and Personality.

1. Biographical data.

Before attempting to examine the work of Green, the philosopher, we must first become acquainted with Green, the Christian gentleman. In philosophy, as in personal contacts, we can best appreciate what one says when we know the personality that lies back of the words. But, biography, with its lists of names and dates, is of value only in so far as it helps us to a more intimate knowledge and sympathetic understanding of the man himself. Therefore we shall merely touch upon the main events of Green's life, and then shall pass to a more detailed study of his personal characteristics.

Thomas Hill Green was born April 7, 1836 at Birkin, a village of Yorkshire, England. His father, who was the rector of the village church, was obliged to assume the entire charge of Green's childhood training on account of the early death of the boy's mother, and many of Green's later religious and intellectual interests may be attributed to the influence of his preacher father. At fourteen Green was sent to Rugby, where he failed to distinguish himself and was generally regarded as rather dull, lazy and peculiar. He asserted a good deal of mental independence but was never brilliant and had few intimate friends. At nineteen he entered Balliol College, Oxford, and after principally

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idling away his time the first two years, it was through the influence of his college tutor, Benjamin Jowett, that he awoke from the mental lethargy which had characterized him. It was Jowett's influence, joined with a natural aptitude for independent and serious thinking, which established him upon his philosophical career. The essays which have been preserved from his college days indicate unusual maturity, especially in his grasp on political and religious theories.

Upon graduation in 1860, Green was honored with an invitation to remain at Balliol as lecturer in history, and was elected a fellow in the college. As his taste lay in the field of philosophy rather than history, he supplemented his income by taking private pupils in philosophy. His college work was later transferred from history to philosophy, yet he seems still to have been dissatisfied with it and oppressed by the feeling that he was not accomplishing anything. During this period his translations of Baur's Geschichte der christlichen Kirche and Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, though never completed, added materially to his mental growth and satisfaction. The vacations of 1862 and 1863 were spent in Switzerland and Germany. He took considerable interest in European politics as well as in the Civil War in America, in which he ardently favored the cause of the northern states.

In 1864 he accepted a royal commission to assist in an investigation of the endowed grammar schools of England and Wales. This investigation formed the basis of his educational theory and he became deeply interested in the subject because of its practical importance, but he seems not to have enjoyed the work of investigation. He says of it at the time that he is constantly haunted by the feeling that he ought to be finding out something that he is not finding out, and that he will go back to Oxford with more contentment from having tried other work and found it wanting.[1]

On his return to Oxford in 1866 he was given a responsible position on the faculty as a college tutor, and when Jowett was made master in 1870, Green was obliged to assume what he characterizes as "practically the whole subordinate management of the college".[2] While he always chafed against unnecessary work, the duties of his office were performed with painstaking accuracy of detail.

In 1871, he married Miss Charlotte Symonds, with the result that from this time on his life was brighter and more settled. Though he was later afflicted with ill health, the stimulus and encouragement of his wife made him more social in his nature and better satisfied with his achievements.

While continuing his work at Balliol with increasing success, and producing in 1874 his Introduction to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, he also took a prominent part in current political

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. xlvi.
[2] Ibid., p. lxi.

issues. The subjects of social reform which chiefly attracted him were education, temperance, and the parliamentary elections; and in each of these he labored vigorously for better legislation. He might perhaps have been elected to Parliament had he been willing to relinquish teaching.

In 1878 he was elevated to the chair of Whyte's professor of moral philosophy at Oxford, a position which he held until the time of his death four years later. In this capacity he was enabled to develop his principles, and especially his ethical theory, more systematically than formerly. His best known work, the Prolegomena to Ethics, and also the Principles of Political Obligation, are taken almost wholly from lectures prepared in connection with this work.

Green's death occurred on March 26, 1882 after a brief illness. The Prolegomena to Ethics was left incomplete, and the religious addresses on The Witness of God and Faith unpublished, at the time of his death. Had his life been spared longer, his thought would doubtless have attained much greater perfection of form, for his best works were written in his last years. But the main ideas of his later works are all foreshadowed in the earlier, and it is doubtful whether he would have been able to give the world any essentially new contributions which are not

found in the works which he has left. His death, however, was deeply felt at Oxford, for it cut short a successful teaching career in which he was exerting a far-reaching and thoroughly wholesome influence.

2. Personal characteristics.

a. Ethical characteristics.

Having traced the principal stages of Green's comparatively uneventful life, we shall now give further attention to certain definite personal traits at which we have already hinted. Nettleship in his Memoir (p.29) says that the strongest elements in Green's nature were "the sense of public duty and the sense of religious dependence".[1] If to these we add the mental independence which made him a profound thinker, we may readily see why his attention was drawn so largely toward ethics and religion, and why he endeavored to establish a sound metaphysical basis on which both could rest.

We have noted the sense of dissatisfaction which attended most of his earlier efforts. This was doubtless due to the presence of two opposing tendencies in his nature, an unusually strong sense of duty and a constitutional dislike for work. While his conscience drove him to his tasks and made him perform them

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. xxix.

punctiliously, he was unable to feel the zest from his labors which comes to one who thoroughly loves his work. It was this conflict of tendencies which made him, as a monitor at Rugby, a staunch upholder of discipline while the exercise of authority was extremely distasteful to him; and later when tutor of Balliol it made him feel heavily the burden of his responsibilities. In his professional work he was constantly reproaching himself with his ignorance of philosophical literature, yet he never overcame his natural repugnance to wide reading.

The same opposing tendency is found between his interest in civic reform and his dislike for official position. We have noted that his personal dissatisfaction with the work as investigator in the School Inquiry Commission was joined with a profound interest in the subject of investigation, a sound educational theory, and zealous efforts to promote reform. In the field of politics likewise he was doubtless more successful as a lecturer upon political theory and its problems than he would have been as a Member of Parliament. This does not indicate that he was not practical, but rather that his function was that of the practical thinker instead of the practical administrator. The charge, so frequently raised against philosophers, that they do not serve society, receives an excellent rebuttal in Green's case, for he served society far more as a thinker than he could have done in

any official capacity.

But in spite of his dislike for unnecessary work and for the annoyances of official position, his sense of duty was predominant. This was evident in his childhood, when he played foot-ball, not because he liked it but because he thought he ought to; and later in his professorial work his intellectual intensity was joined with a most patient and careful attention to small college duties. In his lectures he was accurate with regard to details of fact, and in sifting out his own theories he was never satisfied to accept a principle until he had vindicated it from every angle by exhaustive reflection.

This predominance of his sense of duty had several significant effects upon his philosophy; (1) it turned his attention especially to ethics, with a predisposition against hedonism, (2) it aroused his interest in the problems of practical ethics, (3) it ensured maturity and accuracy in the product of his thought. These effects we shall later observe in more detail.

b. Religious characteristics.

Of Green's intense religious interest little need be said. He made no parade of his religion; yet his conviction of the reality and indwelling presence of God was the dominant

factor both of his philosophy and his personal life. In the idea of an eternal spirit revealing itself in all the better life of man he found a bond of union between the human and the divine; and on the unifying force of this idea he based his interpretation of the problems of politics, morality, and theology.

Green was by no means orthodox in his religious views. In fact, some have speculated (unnecessarily, it seems) as to whether or not he should be called a Christian. He had little patience with religious dogma and rejected the belief in miracles. But it is difficult to conceive how one can read his religious addresses, especially those on The Witness of God and Faith, without feeling the intensity of his personal religious convictions.

Green's attitude toward the established church was one of tolerant disapproval. He disliked its ecclesiasticism, disagreed with a good many of its tenets, and expressed considerable sympathy with the non-conformists; yet he never deemed it advisable to withdraw from the church. He felt that instead of being deserted, it should be reformed by being made more democratic and liberal. He seems in his youth to have given some consideration to entering the ministry, but he refrained from doing so partly because of his democratic antipathy to ecclesiastical privilege and partly because of a feeling of natural inaptitude for the work.

The relation of Green's religious convictions to his philosophy was so intimate as to be almost inseparable. While, as we shall see, he wavered between theism and pantheism, he had little patience with anti-theistic views. He seems in his personal life to have been almost wholly untouched by the pain of religious doubt. While many of his utterances savor strongly of mysticism, religion made its appeal to his intellectual and practical rather than to his emotional nature. He recognized religion as a fundamental fact of the universe, and worked out his philosophy to accord with it.

c. Intellectual characteristics.

Green from his earliest years displayed a love of mental independence which remained with him through life and made him the profound thinker that he was. At Rugby, we find him rebelling against the ordinary routine of studies and saying, "If I cram myself with the ideas of others, my own all vanish".[1] While he was usually behind in his work and won few prizes either at Rugby or Oxford, he displayed an unusual maturity and independence of judgment on matters outside the range of ordinary school interests. Many of his later views on politics, ethics and theology may be found in embryo in the utterances of his college days.

While Green was neither quick nor brilliant in the

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. xiii.

superficial sense, he made up in intensity for what he lacked in alertness. This is nowhere better illustrated than in his teaching method, for while his lectures were seldom enlivened by illustrations, they were carefully thought through and written out, with every problem sifted to the bottom. The aversion to wide reading previously noted was due not simply to his dislike for work, but in large measure to his love for grappling with knotty problems himself instead of accepting second-hand conclusions.

Green's attitude toward art is indicative of the unadorned intensity of his mental grasp. While he ascribed to the arts their due place in the unity of life, the only ones in which he felt a personal interest were those of language. These he liked because of their appeal to his intellectual nature rather than because of their aesthetic charm.

Green's attitude toward science is typical of the fairness of his mental outlook. While he felt keenly the dangers arising from a slavish deference to science in the naturalistic philosophies, he never set himself in opposition to the scientific view-point. His conception of the fundamental unity of life ascribed to science a harmonious yet not dominating place in his philosophy.

Of his attitude toward philosophy we shall later have

much more to say. But it may be pointed out in this connection that it was through philosophic speculation that Green attained the strength and repose of soul which comes to men of more emotional temperament through religious mysticism or artistic imagination. Thinking not only was his chief joy; it also meant to him a form of spiritual communion with the divine.[1]

d. Social characteristics.

Green in his social contacts had many friends but few satellites. An habitual reserve made it difficult to become acquainted with him, and he lacked the magnetic qualities which charm and dazzle. But while he did not make many intimate friends, his associates invariably liked him for his sympathetic human interests, and admired and respected him for his solid worth. Even in his school days, his presence was sufficient to uplift the moral tone of his surroundings. As a teacher, he exerted a quiet but powerful influence, for although a rigid upholder of discipline he seldom failed to secure the confidence and good-will of his pupils. His conversation, which was dignified and seldom devoted to trivial subjects, was enlivened by a keen though quiet sense of humor. The impression which he gave to his associates was that of remarkable strength and steadfastness of character.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. lxvi.

Green's social interests were characterized by a profound sympathy for the poor and unfortunate. He was himself plebian in his tastes, and revolted against everything which savored of aristocracy. It was this sympathy for the middle and lower classes which impelled him to work so zealously for political and educational reform by which to secure for them greater opportunities.

The quiet strength and kindly sympathy of Green's character have left their impress upon his writings. In his utterances upon ethical questions, especially upon the problems of practical ethics, there is beneath the theory an undergirding of personal conviction which gives added solidity to his doctrines. Nettleship quotes the testimony of an Oxford colleague who says of him, "His strength lay in a rare combination of deliberative, analytic, and systematizing power, and of all with force and steadfastness of character.....His individuality sought and found expression in a congenial philosophy, and was intensified by so doing and strengthened for the work of life." As we proceed, we shall attempt to see in what respects his philosophy was typical of the quiet strength which characterized his personality.

Works, vol. iii, p. lxiii.

II. Summary of Green's Philosophical Principles.

Before attempting to discuss in any detail Green's philosophy, it will be advisable briefly to survey the general principles which are characteristic of his thought. We shall consider in turn the outstanding concepts of his metaphysics, his ethics, and his philosophy of religion.

1. Metaphysical principles.

Green may be styled a personalistic neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian. While he is more commonly considered a disciple of Hegel than of Kant, both strains are so blended in his thought as to be inseparable. He effects a synthesis of the outstanding contributions of both without adopting the views of either in entirety. He agrees with Kant in emphasizing the activity of the mind in knowledge, but he rejects the "thing in itself". Again, he agrees with Hegel in regarding the world as a unitary whole, but he does not make it consist merely of an absolute system of thought.

Both of these elements are evident in his epistemology. He rejects the sensationalism of Locke and Hume, and devotes much attention in his earlier works to pointing out the fallacies in

their associational psychology. He does this principally on a Kantian basis by showing that empiricism in leaving out the "synthetic unity of apperception" affords no bond of union by which to bring together the various elements of our conscious experience. But he also follows Hegel in his conception of the world as a system of universal relations which are knowable because of the relation of each part to the unity of the whole. His criterion of truth is Hegelian, for he believes that it is possible to distinguish between truth and error, not by vividness of "feelings" (i.e. sensations) but by the coherence of elements within an "unalterable all-inclusive system of relations".

The major motif of Green's metaphysics lies in his doctrine that "all reality lies in relations" and that "only for a thinking consciousness do relations exist". This statement, repeated with endless variations, expresses his conviction of the fundamental unity and self-conscious basis of the universe. The Hegelian side of this doctrine appears in his belief that the "spiritual principle" which extends through man and nature is but another phase of the "eternal consciousness" which establishes this all-embracing system of relations. However, Kantian elements are evident in his treatment of the relation of the categories to the system. For instance, time has no meaning except as a series of

successive relations, but these relations do not exist except for a thinking subject who has the power to grasp the idea of successive events in a unified whole. Again, space implies certain relations of outsideness and separateness, but two objects could not be recognized as separate save for an underlying unity which is found only in consciousness.

The element of Green's metaphysics which is most pertinent to the present study is his conception of the relation of the finite self to the infinite. We find that throughout his works he wavers between theism and pantheism. The pantheistic element is found in his theory of the cosmos as a single eternal activity or energy, communicating itself to man and making possible the participation of man in the larger life of the universe. Neither knowledge nor goodness would be attainable by man, were it not for the life of God which reveals itself, though never completely, in nature and in human consciousness. This partial participation of man in the life of God makes our experience a continual self-contradiction between what we are and what we may become, and it is through the overcoming of this contradiction that man rises toward perfection. Thus in moral endeavor, as in the quest for truth, man seeks to manifest the "possible" self by realizing his divine potentialities. This reproduction of the eternal consciousness in the life of man is possible because the finite self

is not merely temporal, but has a timeless element. The eternal consciousness uses man's animal organism as its "vehicle".

However, this is not the only side of Green's philosophy. He repeatedly assumes the metaphysical separateness of finite selves in his theory of man as a "self-objectifying" and "self-distinguishing" consciousness. By this he means that man has the power of consciously formulating ends for himself (without being merely a passive element in the whole) and that he is able to perceive and maintain his separateness from nature and from other selves. Green is more clearly personalistic in his conception of the relation of finite centers to each other than in their relation to the infinite; for while he devotes much space to an epistemological demonstration of the divine existence, he speaks largely in negatives of the divine nature. Yet, as we shall see, much of his philosophy proceeds on the assumption that God is not a mere unifying principle, but that he is a self-conscious person, analogous to finite persons but with completeness of perfection, who not only unifies but sustains the universe of relations and who affords an objective ground for the realization of moral values by finite persons. The divine immanence occupies a very important place in Green's thought, and in his conception of God as an indwelling spirit theism merges with pantheism.

This union of personalistic theism with pantheism colors Green's whole metaphysical system. His attitude toward the problems of unity and plurality, and of identity and difference, centers about his basic conception of an all-embracing consciousness of which man and nature are related elements. Just as the state could not

exist without both identity and separateness of interests, so the universe must be regarded as a system in which the diversity of the parts is overcome by the unity of the whole. But this system must be conscious, for an ultimate unconscious unit would require a further conscious unit to correlate with the rest of the system, and in consciousness alone do we find "a manifold which is united without ceasing to be a manifold".[1]

Green's explanations of the problems of change and of causality take a similar turn. A changing thing "takes its character from relation to the thing or system of things of which it is an altered appearance, but which in itself is always the same".[2] Causality likewise is more than a mere uniformity of antecedence and consequence; it is determined by a complex of relations in a self-conscious universe which though changing in its manifestations is unchanging in its essence.

In regard to physical nature, Green like other idealists maintains that it exists only for and in relation to a thinking subject. He regards nature as both finite and infinite, for while it is determined not by the finite but by the infinite consciousness, this infinite consciousness is itself reproduced in man; and it is through this unity of man with God that we are able to apprehend God's manifestation of himself in nature. Nature could not exist, nor could we have knowledge of it, were not the universe a system of intelligible relations of which God is the source.

[1] Works, vol. ii, p. 16.
[2] Works, vol. i, p. 127.

2. Ethical principles.

It is in Green's best-known work, The Prolegomena to Ethics, that we find the most completely developed statement of his ethical theory. In summarizing his ethical principles we shall attempt to reproduce, though not always in order, the main tenets laid down in the Prolegomena.

The first book of the Prolegomena entitled "The Metaphysics of Knowledge" appears at first glance to be a treatise on metaphysics rather than ethics. Its purpose, however, is to establish the possibility of ethics. In it Green shows that ethics can not be a natural science because man himself is not a natural (i.e. material) product of physical forces, but is on the contrary a spiritual being endowed by the eternal consciousness with the power of free moral activity. The "spiritual principle in man, (which means the power of conscious activity in doing as well as knowing) is made the ground-work of Green's theory. Man possesses a "self-objectifying" consciousness; i.e., he is able by virtue of the spiritual principle with which he is endowed to place before himself conscious ends and to identify himself with these ends in ethical activity. Accordingly, man looks forward to a moral ideal (not backward to natural changes), and in his conduct expresses a motive consisting of an ideal of personal good. The ground of assurance for the realization of

the ideal lies in the fact that the eternal consciousness reproduces itself in man and makes moral progress possible by establishing an objective end or goal toward which man is developing.

In the second book entitled "The Will" Green gives a more detailed discussion of freedom. He develops the idea that man may be said to be free in two senses: (1) as a spiritual being unexplainable by natural forces, and (2) as a free cause. It is on this basis that he builds up his idea of action as determined by motive, in which he is opposed both to determinism (necessitarianism) and to voluntarism (arbitrary free will). The motive he defines as "that object with which the man identifies himself as his good or satisfaction". Among various "solicitations" (arising perhaps from natural wants) one desire is chosen which determines conduct. But this motive is not itself a natural phenomenon, though it may have a natural origin, because the choice lies in the man himself. The motive, being self-determined, is free because the man is free. "The will is simply the man, and any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is."[1]

The third book, which deals with the moral ideal, brings out clearly the relation between Green's theory of self-realization and the objectivity of values. The motive which actuates conduct, he says, implies an end or ideal which exists for us as a

[1] Prolegomena, p. 173.

possibility but which exists as a reality in the eternal consciousness. This moral ideal must always consist in a state of personal well-being, i.e., must aim at the development of human character toward its highest and best. While "the abiding satisfaction of an abiding self" is involved in this ideal, it is impossible to regard either mere pleasure, or absorption in the infinite, as the true end of moral conduct. If it be charged that this conception of the moral ideal as personal well-being gives us no definite clue to its nature, it must be answered that the facts of experience give content to our ideal of personal worth. The struggle for the better shows us the direction of the best.

Closely interwoven with Green's conception of the moral ideal is his theory of moral progress. Moral goodness he says consists in conscious self-direction toward a progressively-unfolding moral ideal. In this theory of the end of moral endeavor he draws a distinction between his own position and that of both Kant and Mill. Green maintains that the distinction between good and bad will lies in the <u>end sought</u> while Kant makes goodness of will depend upon its formal character and Mill rests it upon the pleasurable effects produced. The explanation of all development, Green says, lies in the end toward which

the development is directed, and this must be an ideal of personal worth realized in and for the eternal mind. This conception requires belief in personal immortality for its completion; and since the ideal is not only personal but social, it implies development toward an ideal society (a whole, not an aggregate) in which perfection of human capabilities may be realized according to the divine plan.

The latter part of the Prolegomena, in which Green compares the Greek conception of virtue with his own, and discusses the practical aspects of the moral ideal, does little more than to emphasize the position already established. He ends with a trenchant criticism of hedonism, in which he admits the practical value of utilitarianism but shows that pleasure forms no valid criterion of the good unless it is interpreted to mean "the well-being of the self" and is thus virtually translated into a form of self-realization. His conclusion is that the ultimate good, or perfection, of man will be a desirable conscious life, pleasant but not pursued as pleasure.

Green's political theory may be regarded as a corollary to his ethical principles. This is most fully stated in his Principles of Political Obligation and will later be discussed in more detail. But it may here be noted that it has its basis in his theory of the moral ideal. Green holds that the life of "the

good neighbor and the honest citizen"[1] depends upon the effort of the individual and of society to develop human capabilities to their fullest and most harmonious realization. He makes a good deal of the importance of the "removal of obstructions" to the free development of personality, and for this reason he favors state interference in so far as this is necessary to ensure to every individual the possibility of self-realization to which he is entitled. However, he regards duties as more fundamental than rights, and holds that the basic human rights must be preserved, not for the sake of enjoyment, but for the sake of enabling man to serve the common good. His conception of civil liberty is very closely related, for he holds that true freedom consists in self-realization and service rather than in the enjoyment of privileges. He carries his belief in the objectivity of values into his political theory by regarding the eternal consciousness as the true source of social institutions. In treating the political life of man as a progressive spiritual revelation, he rests his theory of progress upon a basis which is both ethical and religious.

[1] Works, vol. i, p. 371.

3. Religious principles.

Green wrote comparatively little upon subjects distinctly religious or theological. He has left no great work upon the problems of religion, as he has in the field of ethics; and most of his religious utterances are confined to miscellaneous articles and addresses. These include the fragment on Immortality; his essay on Christian Dogma; extracts from Biblical lectures dealing with the Conversion of Paul, Justification by Faith, and the Incarnation; a fragment on the text, "The word is nigh thee"; and two Oxford chapel addresses entitled The Witness of God and Faith. The last two give the fullest statement of his own religious experience and convictions, which he seems seldom to have discussed from natural reticence and an over-conscientious scruple lest his practice should not square with his words. But while Green is not primarily a philosopher of religion, his whole metaphysical and ethical theory is undergirded with religious postulates.

The connecting link between his metaphysics and his religion lies in his conception of self-consciousness. Consciousness reaches its highest forms in intelligence and love; and as the self reaches out, from a metaphysical stand-point, to grasp a unified view of the world through the understanding, so the religious nature seeks through love to establish a unity of spirit

with the object which it loves. As the self, metaphysically, harmonizes unity with plurality and identity with change; so the self, religiously, finds in love the force which unites self-satisfaction with self-surrender. While this harmony, in the best of us, is but partial, we may conceive of God as a completed self-consciousness, a being of perfect understanding and perfect love, whose life is an eternal act of self-realization through self-sacrifice.

Green's conception of the eternal consciousness which reproduces itself in man and is the basis of his intellectual and moral life, is likewise fundamental to his conception of religion. The key-note of Green's religious belief is found in the text, "The word is nigh thee". The God whom we worship is not far off, but is the immanent God who lives in our moral life, whom we serve in serving brethren, and in communion with whom we triumph over sin and suffering and have assurance of eternal life.[1]

The connection between faith and the moral life, in Green's view, is as intimate as the connection between religion and metaphysics. The final justification for the belief in God, he says, is found in the moral nature of man. As the desire to understand is an evidence of a real world to be understood, so the desire to be better is an evidence of an absolute best; and this best or "possible" self is God. If it be charged that

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 221.

according to this conception God does not actually exist but is merely the name for an empty ideal, we must remember that in any development the result which is being developed is the true reality, and that an all-perfect God is more real than our partial and incomplete selves. And if it be charged that this conception identifies God with man, it may be said in reply that in self-consciousness we have identity joined with difference, for we may conceive of God as present in the highest life of man yet maintaining his own divine existence. Just as goodness increases with the effort of man to identify his life with the "completer self" which is the life of God; so sin consists in the willful limitation of one's interests and activities to his present fragmentary self.

Green's attitude toward historical criticism is not surprising in view of the foregoing. Since true religion consists of the life of God in the soul of man, no amount of Biblical or historical criticism can shake its sure foundations. Green was strongly influenced by the work of Baur (whose Geschichte der christliche Kirche he translated) and he made no hesitation in rejecting Biblical evidence which did not seem to him to square with the claims of science, philosophy or true religion. He rejected the belief in miracle, and maintained that the essence of Christianity does not depend, as commonly held, upon the miraculous birth, death or resurrection of Jesus. The essence of

Christianity to Green was "a Christ within us, a continuous resurrection". Thereby we find the true basis of religion; not in historical evidence, but in our own potential unity with God and our efforts to realize this unity in our lives.

Green's attitude toward the supernatural can not be stated without a definition of the term. A supernatural event, as something contradicting the order of nature, he believed to be impossible; for the reason that the world, to be knowable at all, must be regarded as one continuous system in which everything that happens is an element of the system. But if the term supernatural be interpreted to mean "transcending physical forces", then Green's whole system rests on a supernatural foundation. He points out that our knowledge of nature, like our knowledge of God, rests ultimately on an act of faith, for we "know in part" but have faith that our partial knowledge reaches out toward the reality of a complete whole. Thus if a belief in the supernatural means that the full explanation of any natural event can not be given by any human intellect, the belief is true; but if it means that God "uncreates himself" by annulling the natural order in which he reveals himself, the idea must be rejected as self-contradictory.

To this false antithesis between God and nature, Green attributed the growth of most of the dogmas regarding the person of Christ, To him the incarnation meant, not a past miraculous

event, but an eternal process by which God reveals himself and embodies himself in the heart of every truly religious person. This eternal spirit he believed to be manifested in an exceptional way in the life of Jesus of Nazareth; but while he did not himself reject the historicity of Jesus, he held that belief in the historical Jesus is not essential to an acceptance of the Christ of faith. He believed the true message of Christianity to rest upon an immanent and "glorified" Christ such as is presented to the religious imagination by the Pauline epistles and the fourth Gospel, rather than upon the historical Christ of the synoptics. While somewhat unclear in his statement of the person of the historical Jesus, he alludes to his view as a "modified unitarianism".

From the intensity of Green's emphasis upon the divine immanence, it is easy to conceive of him as a religious mystic. Whether this term may be correctly applied to him depends again upon its definition. Certainly he was no visionary dreamer, nor was he given to religious ecstasies. Religion to him took the form of practical service and philosophic speculation rather than emotional experiences. Yet there was in all his work a pervading religious consciousness which in a true sense may be termed mystical. To him religion was not something ecstatic or stormy or mysterious, but something which reaches to the very foundations

of man's being. While he had little patience with creeds, he regarded all creeds as worthy of respect and reverence. Prayer to him was "incipient action"; and in communion with the indwelling God he found the pathway to the truest service of mankind.

III. Reviews of Works on Green.

Before attempting to evaluate the merits and limitations of Green's philosophy, it will first be profitable to examine what his critics have said about him. While, as we shall see, a good many articles and some books have been written about Green, the literature dealing with his thought is probably less extensive than in the case of any outstanding thinker of the past century. His critics have centered their attention very largely upon his Prolegomena to Ethics, and by far the greater part of the adverse criticism is directed against his metaphysics as stated in the first hundred pages of the Prolegomena. Had he left this section unwritten, it is probable that his works would have received comparatively little comment.

In reviewing the works that have been written on Green and his philosophy, we shall for the sake of convenience group them as being mainly biographical, expository, metaphysical, ethical, political or religious. As a detailed discussion of the merits and limitations of the various aspects of Green's thought will be introduced in a later section, criticism of the specific problems raised in these articles will be largely postponed until they can be brought together and evaluated in the light of Green's entire system. It is the purpose of this section to state (as briefly as is consistent with thoroughness) what others have thought and written regarding Green.

A. Works Mainly Biographical.

As the material found in the biographical works dealing with Green has been largely included in the sketch which we have given of his life and personality, we shall here attempt to indicate only the general characteristics of these works. They are on the whole very interesting, for Green was himself one of the most interesting men of his times.

The best known and most comprehensive work dealing with Green's life is R. S. Nettleship's Memoir, published in the third volume of Green's works. Nettleship gives an intimate and apparently accurate account of Green's personal and professional life. This is made more vivid by numerous excerpts from the testimony of friends who knew Green personally at various stages of his career. While the work is mainly biographical, it also contains an excellent exposition of Green's views on metaphysics, religion, ethics, politics, and education. Nettleship, in his treatment both of Green's life and his philosophy, is thoroughly sympathetic and appreciative without being blind to Green's faults. The Memoir justly holds first rank among all the works which have been produced dealing with Green.

Another biographical work dealing with Green, which thirty-five years ago created a furor which is still commonly remembered even by people of unphilosophical interests, is Mrs. Humphrey Ward's Robert Elsmere, (Murray, London, 1888). It is somewhat

unusual to find a philosopher figuring in a novel, but in this story T. H. Green appears as Henry Grey, the Oxford professor who exerted a powerful influence over the life of Robert Elsmere. It is to Green that the book is dedicated. It presents an admirable picture of the beginnings of the conflict between the traditional and modern views of theology, for it portrays Robert Elsmere, a young clergyman of deep consecration and much intellectual acumen, as being forced by his conscience to leave the church because he can not accept its traditional theological tenets. While Professor Grey is a minor character, the reader is given a clear view of Green's insistence upon the rationality of religion, of his friendly interest in his students, and especially of the influence of his lay sermons. Numerous quotations appear which obviously are taken from The Witness of God and Faith.

A third source of biographical information regarding Green is James Bryce's Studies in Contemporary Biography (Macmillan, London, 1903). This work deals with the most distinguished Englishmen of the nineteenth century, and the chapter on Green is especially interesting in view of the fact that it is written from the standpoint of a fellow student who was intimately acquainted with Green in his undergraduate days as well as in his later career. Bryce indicates that while Green was far from orthodox in his own religious views he exerted over

his students a strong and inspiring religious influence.

Other biographical articles of less importance may be briefly mentioned. Several appeared as obituaries at the time of Green's death in 1882. Among these we may note one by Nettleship entitled "Professor T. H. Green, In Memoriam" which was published in the Contemporary Review (41) 1882; an anonymous article in The Spectator (55) 1882 on "The Late Professor Green"; and an article by Noah Porter in The New Englander and Yale Review (50) 1889 entitled "The Late Professor Green of Oxford". We find also in Macmillan's (46) 1882 some anonymous verses on T. H. Green, apparently written by one of his students. The only other biographical article of any importance (aside from those found in the encyclopedias) is one entitled "Thomas Hill Green", by John W. Chadwick in The Unitarian Review (31) 1889, which appeared on the publication of the third volume of Green's works.

B. Works Mainly Expository.

In discussing the expository works dealing with Green's thought, we shall as in the case of the biographical treatments restrict our consideration to the main characteristics of each. We find these works considerably more numerous than those of the preceding group.

With the exception of Nettleship's Memoir, probably the best known work dealing exclusively with Green is The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green by W. H. Fairbrother (Methuen & Co., London, 1896). The book is written, the author says, "to set forth a simple plain exposition of the philosophic teaching of T. H. Green", for the reason that Green's own thorough and exhaustive treatment, joined with his somewhat labored style, makes his works difficult reading. From the standpoint of clearness Fairbrother succeeds in his task, but the book fails to give an adequate and comprehensive account of Green's philosophy. The author apparently knows nothing outside of the Prolegomena, for there is scarcely any mention of Green's other works. We find in Fairbrother not only the expositor but the evident devotee, for he strongly champions Green's views regardless of their merits. We shall examine the work further in evaluating the charges of Seth and Balfour against Green which Fairbrother attempts to refute.

Three works by Edward Caird afford a commendable exposition of Green's philosophy. The first of these is an article entitled "Professor Green's Last Work" in Mind (8) 1888, which consists of a review of the Prolegomena and gives an excellent summary of this work. While on the whole Caird is in sympathy with Green's position, he points out the fact that Green greatly weakened his system by failure to give a positive and constructive statement of the nature of the self and of the moral ideal. Another summary of Green's philosophy by the same author is found in Caird's preface to the fifth edition of the Prolegomena (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906). The chief point of interest here is Caird's comparison of Green with Kant in which he shows that though differing in regard to the possibility of proving the divine existence, they are in agreement regarding the moral postulates of theistic faith. A third discussion of Green by Caird is found in his preface to the Essays in Philosophical Criticism edited by Seth and Haldane. This volume, representing various currents of idealistic thought in England, is dedicated to Green as being typical of the original yet synthetic spirit of the followers of Kant and Hegel.

Another expository article of considerable value is one by John Dewey on "The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green" in the

Andover Review for April, 1889. This is almost entirely free from the hostile criticism found in Dewey's other articles dealing with Green's philosophy(to be discussed in the section on ethical works). Here Dewey (quoting Caird) commends Green for the distinctness with which he lived by conviction rather than impulse, and he calls him one of the leading prophets of the last half-century.

We find also among the expository articles dealing with Green two by S. Alexander entitled "Works of Thomas Hill Green" (Vol.I and Vol. III) which appeared in The Academy in 1885 and 1889. These, as the title suggests, consist of reviews of Nettleship's editions of Green's published works. The first article, aside from its distinctly expository content, presents a criticism of Green's psychology, in which Alexander thinks Green has erred in excluding neural processes from states of consciousness. In the second article, Alexander charges Green with having confused psychology with metaphysics, and also makes the observation that Green was guilty of the fallacy of language. He thinks that from studying Kant and Hegel so extensively, Green laid an undue emphasis on the self aspect of "Selbstbewusstsein".

Brief expositions of Green's thought are found also in some of the histories of philosophy and in other general works.

Of these the most important are the article by G. S. Brett in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, and the section devoted to Green in A. K. Rogers' English and American Philosophy Since 1800 (Macmillan, New York, 1922). These will be considered later in connection with the metaphysical works. Aside from these, none of the general works devote more than a very few pages to Green.

Among the histories of philosophy, we find that Windelband compares Green with Spencer and mentions him as the chief modern opponent of a naturalistic theory of ethics. Falckenberg makes a brief mention of Green, noting especially the social aspects of self-realization. Thilly brings out the synthetic character of Green's philosophy by referring to it as "an attempt to do justice to the opposing tendencies of his time--to rationalism and empiricism, religion and science, pantheism and theism, Greek culture and Christianity, the theory of perfection and Utilitarianism, libertarianism and universalism". Weber and Cushman do not include Green at all.

If we examine the more specialized histories of philosophy covering the period in which Green lived, we find that he usually receives some attention although not so much as his

importance merits. James Seth in English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy (J.M.Dent & Sons, London, 1912) gives a concise summary of Green's thought. A more constructive statement is given in W.R.Sorley's History of English Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, London, 1920). He comments upon the fact that Green's appeal to "Englishmen under twenty-five"[1] to close their Mill and Spencer and open their Kant and Hegel marks an epoch in English thought. Sidgwick in his History of Ethics (Macmillan, London, 1902) devotes about a page to Green's ethics. G.S.Fullerton in A Handbook of Ethical Theory (Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1922) makes numerous references to Green. J.T. Merz in his History of European Thought in the 19th Century (Blackwood & Sons, London, 1914) draws an interesting comparison between Green and Lotze, showing that they agree in regarding reality as a system of relations and the world of ideals as a real factor in the universe. Merz believes that Green was not influenced in his theory by Lotze; but he overlooks the fact that Green translated a considerable part of Lotze's Logic, as well as Book I and Book II, Chapter 3 of Lotze's Metaphysics. These translations were left incomplete because of Green's death. Bosanquet in his editorial preface to the Logic (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888) makes the statement:[2] " Professor Green, who first definitely proposed it, not only executed an important part of the translation, but intended to take upon himself the task of revising and editing the whole, which was not entrusted to the present editor until after Professor Green's death". Thus it is evident that the connection between Green and Lotze is much more direct than Merz assumes.

[1] Works, vol. i, p. 371.
[2] Lotze, Logic, vol. i, p. v.

C. Works Mainly Metaphysical.

1. Seth, Andrew: Hegelianism and Personality (Blackwood & Sons, London, 1887)

2. Balfour, A.J.: Green's Metaphysics of Knowledge (Mind (9) 1884)

3. Fairbrother, W.H. : The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green (Methuen & Company, London 1896)

These three works will be discussed together for the reason that Seth and Balfour in their criticisms of Green's metaphysics cover substantially the same ground, and Fairbrother in connection with his exposition of Green's philosophy takes up the charges raised by both and refutes them jointly. We shall attempt to compare these opposing views.

Seth classifies Green as a neo-Kantian, and discusses him as typical of the English movement to combine the philosophy of Kant with that of Hegel. Green's refutation of the empiricism of Locke and Hume Seth regards as "victorious and conclusive", but in Green's own system, which centers in the assertion of a Self or Spiritual Principle as necessary to the existence of knowledge and morality, almost everything is left vague. Only in the Prologomena is any definite indication given that this principle is to be interpreted as a universal or divine Self, and the nature and possibility of the relation existing between the human and divine is nowhere explained.[1] This ambiguity, Seth says, is due to its source in the

[1] Hegelianism and Personality, p. 4.

Kantian philosophy read in the light of the Hegelian system.[1]

Seth then proceeds to show that the Kantian theory, taking the fact of knowledge as it finds it without inquiring into its genesis, can only yield a theory of knowledge and not a metaphysic of the universe. Green's fundamental error, Seth thinks, is that he transforms a legitimate theory of knowledge into an unwarranted ontology. That is, he takes the "consciousness in general" which Kant intended only as a pure abstraction, and converts it into a "universal consciousness" having metaphysical existence. Logical identity of type is transformed into numerical identity of existence; and the unity of the form of knowledge becomes One Subject who is the real Knower in all finite intelligences. In thus hypostasizing an abstraction, neo-Kantianism goes back to the method of Scholastic Realism.[2]

The outcome of this doctrine Seth discusses in his concluding chapter, though in it he deals merely with Hegeliamism and neo-Kantianism in general without specific reference to Green. He shows that the unification of consciousness in a single self destroys the reality of both God and man. While it is true, he says, that each self has a universal aspect in that it is an element in an all-inclusive system, it is nevertheless a mistake to infer "that it is one universal Self which thinks in all so-called thinkers", for each self is "a unique existence which is perfectly impervious to

[1] Hegelianism and Personality, p. 5.
[2] Ibid., pp 29, 30.

other selves." Though the self is, in knowledge, a principle of unification, it is in existence, or metaphysically, a principle of isolation.[1]

While this theory deprives man of his selfhood by reducing him to an object of a universal Thinker, it also leaves the universal Thinker without any true personality. For it makes him simply an abstraction; and "if we are to keep the name of God at all, subjectivity -- an existence of God for himself, analogous to our own personal existence though transcending it -- is an essential element in the conception.[2]

Furthermore, the question of man's immortality is left as ambiguous as that of the parsonality of God, since the Self about which assertions are made in this theory is not a real but a logical self. If it is only the Absolute Self which is to survive, such immortality can be of little direct concern to us.[3] Religion itself, which is the self-surrender of the human will to the divine, demands that finite selves be more than a mode or efflux of the divine.[4]

Balfour in Mind, January 1884, makes charges against Green which are so similar to those of Seth that Fairbrother refutes them together. He calls Green's metaphysics a "simplified Kantianism purged of things-in-themselves"; says that it establishes only a formal unity "in which it is as correct to say that the world

[1] Hegelianism and Personality, pp. 215-217.
[2] Ibid., p. 222.
[3] Ibid., pp 224-227.
[4] Ibid., pp. 217-218.

created God as that God created the world"; and charges Green with giving us theological mysteries instead of philosophical conclusions because he has failed to explain the supposed relation existing between the human self and God.

Fairbrother in his defense of Green against the Seth-Balfour attack maintains that most of the arguments they use against Green are in reality reproductions of his doctrine and would have been cordially indorsed by him. He charges Seth in particular with misrepresentation of Green's position; but apparently he has read Seth "with a chip on his shoulder" and too little attention to what Seth actually says, for numerous statements made by Seth about Hegelianism in general are misconstrued as specific charges against Green.

The first point at issue between them centers about the question as to whether or not Green was a pantheist. Both sides agree that pantheism is an undesirable doctrine, but disagree regarding Green's position. Seth and Balfour find in Green, as in Hegel, certain pantheistic tendencies which obscure the individuality of finite selfhood. Fairbrother, however, warmly resents the implication, and quotes a passage from the Prologomena which seems, as clearly as Seth's own words, to demand the reality and separateness of finite selves. He speaks of a "curious misunderstanding common to all the metaphysical (at least) criticism of Green's

Prolegomena, p. 208.

teaching, viz., that he is pantheistic", and says that Seth in his criticism reproduces the very doctrine the Prolegomena was written to teach us.[1] The critic, he says, must have turned plagiarist.

But Fairbrother misquotes Seth in order to refute him. He represents Seth as saying that Green's philosophy is a "thoroughgoing pantheism".[2] This statement, if made, could not be maintained, for Green's personalistic bent makes him far from being a consistent or thoroughgoing pantheist. But as a matter of fact, Seth nowhere makes this statement. What he does say is that Green's philosophy is a type of neo-Kantianism, that the latter has affinities with Scholastic Realism, and that "the ultimate goal of Realism is a thoroughgoing pantheism".[3] But that Green himself reaches this point is nowhere stated, and he even admits that much of Green's theory of the universe may be substantially true.[4]

Furthermore, Seth's concluding chapter, in which he shows that Hegelianism leads to a denial of the personality of God and individual immortality, is interpreted by Fairbrother as being leveled directly against Green. But Green's name is nowhere mentioned in this chapter. Seth may have meant to imply that Green's system would lead to these conclusions, but he does not say so; and Fairbrother appears unduly sensitive in leaping to Green's defense where no attack has been made.

Another major bone of contention between Seth and

[1] The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green, p. 162.
[2] Ibid., p. 169.
[3] Hegelianism and Personality, p. 218.
[4] Ibid. p. 30.

Fairbrother lies in the question as to whether Green took over the Kantian theory of knowledge and converted it into a ready-made ontology. Seth says that he did,[1] and regards the illegitimate transfer from "consciousness in general" to "universal consciousness" as being his fundamental error. Fairbrother, however, says "the phrase neo-Kantian is in the highest degree unfortunate",[2] for Green's doctrine is not borrowed from Kant but is the result of independent investigation. The self from which Green starts, he says, is neither logical nor ontological, but simply "his own self", and in order to explain it and its attributes he is "driven step by step with irresistible cogency to the cosmos, and from that to God". Thus the universal Knower of which Seth complains is not Green's starting-point but his conclusion.[3]

A third point over which Fairbrother disagrees with Seth and Balfour is the question as to whether Green gives an adequate and consistent treatment of the relation between the divine and human selves. Fairbrother says it is unwarranted to charge a philosopher with lack or omniscience, provided he is correct as far as he goes; and he challenges his opponents to find any gap or inconsistency in Green's position. In fact, Fairbrother makes the astonishing statement that Green's is the only modern philosophy which is complete in the sense of covering all the ground, and consistent with itself throughout.

[1] Hegelianism and Personality, p. 21.
[2] The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green, p. 168
[3] Ibid., p. 169.

4. Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth: The Idea of God (Oxford University Press, New York, 1917).

This author in this work devotes to Green several pages of the chapter entitled "Idealism and Mentalism". His standpoint here is practically the same as that indicated in his book on Hegelianism and Personality and need not here be repeated in detail. There is, however, a point of special interest in the fact that in this chapter he considers Green in comparison with Berkeley. He regards both as advocates of "mentalism". The epistemological basis from which each proceeds leads only to the establishment of "the empty form of the Ego",[1] which is of no metaphysical value. Green's theory of relations, Pringle-Pattison maintains, gives no real explanation of the world of nature, for it is simply a hypostasized form of Kant's "synthetic unity of apperception". While Berkeley regards nature as the effect in finite centers of an abstract will, Green dissolves nature into an abstract system of thought relations. Pringle-Pattison objects to both conceptions, and agrees with Bradley in protesting against the dissolution of the world into "some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories". Pringle-Pattison's criticism is interesting in view of the fact that Berkeley's empiricism and Green's attack upon empiricism lead eventually, in his opinion, to the same formal mentalistic conclusion.[2]

[1]The Idea of God, p. 199.
[2]Ibid., p. 203.

5. Townsend, H.G., : The Principle of Individuality in the Philosophy of T.H. Green, Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 10 (Longmans, Green & Co. New York, 1914).

Townsend's examination of Green's philosophy is limited wholly to his metaphysics. He approaches the problem from this angle for the reason that Green's ethics can not properly be understood without first grasping the metaphysical foundation on which his ethical theory rests. In order to clear up misconceptions which have distorted many interpretations of Green's ethics, Townsend (in his doctor's dissertation written at Cornell) attempts to analyze and elucidate Green's metaphysics.

The treatise is written from a neo-Hegelian stand-point, and its phraseology and method savor strongly of Bosanquet. His position is, however, more personalistic than that of Bosanquet. His work appears to be done with great accuracy and thoroughness; and forms a penetrating (though not entirely lucid) exposition of Green's system. Its chief weakness seems to me to be found in an over-zealous acceptance of Green's theories, for while he does not treat Green with such adulation as Fairbrother, he fails to point out any flaws in his system. His own views are stated as being so nearly identical with those of Green that in the following discussion we may treat them jointly.

Townsend in his opening chapter discusses the problem and method of Green's metaphysics. He maintains that Green's

starting-point was identical with that of Kant (though with some disparity of result) in asking the question, "How is knowledge possible?" He shows that Green sharply distinguished between metaphysics and psychology, and that many errors in interpreting him have arisen from reading into his system psychological connotations which do not belong there. Green, he says, regarded psychology merely as an empirical science like biology or physics, and as such accepted its data without question. But instead of raising the psychological question, "What are the facts?" he raised the metaphysical question, "What do we mean by a fact?" Thus he is not concerned with the individual processes of knowing, but rather with what is implied in the fact of our knowing at all, or in the fact of there being a world for us to know.[1]

This conception of his problem leads Green, Townsend says, to revolt against a subjective method, and to begin with a study of the object of knowledge. Experience Green defines as "matters of fact recognized as such", and he departs from Hegel in beginning with the object known rather than the knower. But it must be noted that he regards this object as the object of thought, (not a hypothetical object independent of thought), and he thus from the outset commits himself to an idealistic stand-point. In asking, "How is experience possible?" he means significant experience, i.e. conscious

[1] The Principle of Individuality in T. H. Green, p. 6 f.

or intelligent experience, and since all knowledge professes to be knowledge or reality, all inquiry into the object of knowledge will be equivalent to an inquiry into the nature of reality as apprehended by thought.

Since Green begins with the object, rather than the subject of knowledge, Townsend follows the same method, and discusses next the individuality of the object. He says (in typically Hegelian language) that the true end of philosophy is to determine the concrete universal, i.e., the individual as an organic union of the universal and the particular.[1] This he says Green found at the end of his philosophy in the individual person, but reached this conclusion only after an exhaustive consideration of individuality per se. This, it may be noted, is in direct opposition to the Fairbrother's statement that Green's starting point was the facts of his own individual consciousness, from which he worked out his conception of the world and God.

Townsend discusses and vigorously defends Green's conception of reality as a system of internal relations. To the objection commonly raised, that before we can have relations there must be something to relate, he replies that the "end terms" or things which are related, turn out upon examination to be themselves made up of relations, and so on ad infinitum. Thus existence itself becomes a relation, and Green is justified in adopting

[1] The Principle of Individuality in T. H. Green, p 18.

Aristotle's view that "the indeterminate is the same as non-being".[1] The object of knowledge is real because it is capable of definition; i.e., it is determinate and related. Everything is real which has qualities and relations of its own, and the unrelated does not exist.

Townsend applies the theory of relations to the "concrete universal". He shows that an object (i.e. the object of knowledge) is individual in so far as its relations distinguish it from other objects; yet it is universal because constituted by a universal series of relations which give it its intelligible properties. An object becomes more individualized in proportion as its relations become more determinate; and this process takes place, not by its being named or placed in a class as is done by the formal logicians, but by having its implicit relations made more explicit through added meaning.[2]

In the chapter on the implications of objectivity, Townsend brings the theory of relations a step nearer to selfhood. He shows that since the objective world is made up of relations, relation implies meaning (i.e. the recognition of these relations) and all meanings must be meanings for somebody, or judgments. The self, thus introduced as an epistemological necessity, is from this point on more prominent in Townsend's discussion.

Townsend in reproducing Green's epistemology gives an excellent discussion of the nature of the judgment. His main

[1] The Principle of Individuality in T. H. Green, p. 21.
[2] Ibid., p. 34.

propositions are (1) that judgment is the simplest component of knowledge; (2) that judgment is a process of individualization in which the object of knowledge becomes more determinate; and (3) judgment is the germ of all knowledge, and though never complete is capable of infinite development toward an ultimate system of knowledge. In this last proposition he agrees with Bosanquet that we must distinguish between relativity and relativism in knowledge, for while all judgments are hypothetical (incomplete and finite), they rest on a categorical (complete and infinite) basis of reality.

Townsend then takes up the discussion of a "spiritual principle" which he has previously kept in the background, although Green himself introduces it much earlier. In order to have any judgment or meaning at all with regard to the related objects of knowledge, it is necessary to postulate a unified and timeless self which grasps them together as a whole. Consciousness is not a fact nor a sum of facts, but a principle through which all facts derive their meaning. Green's statement is given succintly in the words, "No one and no number of a series of related events can be the consciousness of the series as related."[1]

In the chapter on the individuality of the subject, Townsend develops quite explicitly his own (and Green's) theory of consciousness. Objectivity requires a principle of organization which is not itself one of the objects but is that through which objects are possible. Furthermore, this inseparable element is a

[1] Prolegomena, p. 21.

non-spatial, non-temporal self which combines unity with plurality and is therefore the true "individual".

In demonstrating the non-spatial and non-temporal character of consciousness Townsend's accounting is satisfactory, but he seems to misinterpret Green in regarding consciousness also as non-causal.[1] He quotes Green as saying that the source of the categories can not be brought under the categories, and that accordingly we can not apply the categories of substance or causality to consciousness. Green, though he rejects the possibility of any miraculous breaking of the chain of natural causation, certainly does not deny to the self the power of free causality in initiating action. However, Townsend's main point in the discussion of causality is a commendable one, for he apparently intends principally to show that consciousness is not simply non-causal but non-caused; i.e., that it is not itself merely a link in the chain of natural causation and therefore can not be explained in mechanical terms.

6. Laurie, S.S.: "The Metaphysics of T.H. Green", Philosophical Review (6) 1897.

This article has for its task the demolition of Green's metaphysics, and especially his theory of relations. It has scarcely a good word to say for Green, and yet, rather strangely,

[1] The Principle of Individuality in T. H. Green, p. 61.

after rejecting all of Green's metaphysics the author says at the end that he accepts Green's ethics. (The latter however is not discussed.) The flaws which Laurie points out in Green's metaphysics are in most cases real difficulties, but he is much stronger in destructive than in constructive criticism, for after pointing out the errors in Green's position he seldom has a more satisfactory solution to offer.

He opens his attack by reference to Green's rather unfortunate statement, "The very question, 'What is the real?' is misleading because it implies that there is something else from which the real can be distinguished."[1] Green is apparently trying to show that "the work of the mind" is real (though it may not have objective reality), but it sounds as if he were trying to break down the distinction between reality and illusion. Laurie says, and I think justly, that if we can not legitimately ask the question "What is the real?" , neither do we have a right to ask "Is there a system?"

Laurie's main attack however is upon the theory of relations. Green's fundamental fallacy, he says, lies in confusing a related series of events with a series of events <u>as related</u>. Experience gives us a series of events in relation to each other, but does <u>not</u> give them to us, as Green assumes, with

[1] Prolegomena, p. 26.

their relations constituting their nature. Green is self-contradictory in maintaining that the "singleness and severalty" of things are the very condition of there being a relation, and at the same time claiming that without relations there would be nothing left. Laurie denies the possibility of harmonizing unity with plurality on this basis: for, he says, the qualities of an acorn are either separate or fused; and if separate, no relations are possible to make it an object, while if fused, no singleness of parts is possible. The solution of the difficulty is hinted at, though not developed, by Laurie in his statement that unity with manifold is possible only through a relating act of finite intelligence, but he does not give Green due credit for the significance of this solution as it appears in his philosophy.

He attacks Green's conception of thought as it appears in the relational theory. Quoting Green's statement that "thought is the active unifying energy of a self-distinguishing subject", Laurie says that Green practically abolishes thought by reducing it to "unifying principle of relations",[1] since this unifying activity is found, not as thought, but as a simple reflex in the lower animals. Laurie tries to show that a unifying principle of relations need not be self-conscious, since a dog, though conscious of objects, is not a "self-distinguishing subject". But it seems

[1] The Metaphysics of T. H. Green, Phil. Rev. (6) 1897, p. 124.

to me that he misses the point of Green's definition, which excludes animal reflexes by limiting thought to self-conscious activity. It is furthermore questionable to base any argument upon animal psychology.

Laurie points out what seems to me the most serious difficulty in Green's relational theory in showing that it abolishes the category of substance. Both the finite self and God, Laurie says, would be "simply a complex whorl of knots tied without a string"[1] if it were possible to have relations without any elements to be related. It may readily be admitted that relations are necessary in a world which exists either for God or man, but these must be relations of something which has a real existence of its own.

In discussing Green's conception of God, Laurie stresses the errors in his monistic pantheism, but overlooks his personalistic elements. If due consideration had been given to this aspect of Green's thought, most of the objections noted would have been met. But Green's view is criticised on the score that it makes God simply an abstract unifying principle of relations. He is the finite self universalized and deprived of all real character. Laurie's objections to Green's monistic pantheism may be summarized as follows: (1) It is only an hypothesis based on an argument from analogy. (2) The analogy itself rests on a faulty analysis of

[1] The Metaphysics of T. H. Green, Phil. Rev. (6) 1897, p. 125.

finite minds. (3) Green's idea of God does not meet the demands of reason or emotion. (4) Finite selves are affirmed but a system of relations with a monistic center can not yield free finite selfhood.

7. Knox, Howard V. : Green's Refutation of Empiricism. Mind (25) 1900

This article, like Laurie's, is decidedly antagonistic to Green. Its attack is directed both against his epistemology, and his metaphysics. While at some points it overlaps Laurie's discussion, its particular point of attack is the dualism in Green's conception of conciousness.

Knox objects to the idealistic identification of thought and reality, and says that Green in his effort to overcome the dualism of thought and reality, falls into a worse predicament; namely, "an irremediable dualism of two aspects of thought",[1] By this he means Green's conception of consciousness as being both a temporally conditioned function of the animal organism and also a non-temporal communication of the eternal consciousness which makes the animal organism its vehicle.[2] While Green defends himself against the charge that this gives us a double consciousness by saying that it is really one consciousness looked at from two different points of view, like a shield having two sides, Knox

[1]Green's Refutation of Empiricism, Mind, (25) 1900.
[2]Prolegomena, p. 78.

refuses to accept his defense. He maintains that Green repeatedly contradicts himself as to whether the consciousness he is talking about is in time or out of time. He gives as an example Green's assertion (previously quoted) that there can be no unreal in the work of the mind,[1] in which he evidently means "thought in time" and yet bases the force of his assertations on his conception of thought as non-temporal. Such confusion, Knox says, not only obliterates the distinction between thought and reality, but also between reality and illusion, and so between truth and error.

The outcome of this duality, Knox claims, is to make psychology impossible by eviscerating consciousness of its content. He upholds this position by reference to Green's statement, "A transition from one state of consciousness to another may properly be called a phenomenon, but not so the consciousness itself of relations or related facts."[2] In this passage Green is emphasizing the fact of an abiding self which binds together the transient states of consciousness, but Knox attacks the admission of the phenomenal character of the states and says that if this be true, we have a transition from nothing to nothing, and therefore no consciousness.

Knox claims also that this duality makes knowledge of nature impossible. He seeks to establish this view by attacking Green's distinction between a "series of related events" and a "consciousness of series as related". Knox says that this estab-

Prolegomena, p. 26.
Ibid., p. 65.

lishes an absolute difference between thought and its object (when the object is a series of events) and so is contradictory to the rest of Green's theory.

Knox's conclusion is that this confusion of the temporal and non-temporal aspects of consciousness involves a hysteron proteron far more serious than that with which Green charges empiricism. For, he says, Green makes the ego necessary only for establishing the continuity of consciousness[1] and so considers only the temporal aspect of thought. Yet in order to find a metaphysical justification for the eternal consciousness, he turns around and makes thought itself non-temporal. The root of the difficulty, Knox says, lies in the substitution of eternity of thought for continuity of consciousness. By making consciousness unmeaning and rendering psychology and knowledge of nature impossible, he thus makes philosophy itself impossible.

8-9. Sidgwick, Henry: Green's Metaphysics, (Mind (9) 1884)
_____ The Philosophy of T.H.Green, (Mind (25) 1900)

These articles cover substantially the same ground, but as the latter is the more complete we shall follow the order presented there in reviewing them. This article consists of a lecture delivered by Professor Sidgwick shortly before his death, and has the distinction of being his last public utterance. It contains

[1] Prolegomena, p. 37.

some pleasing personal reminiscences which show that the two men, though opposed to each other in philosophy, were nevertheless on terms of personal friendship. One item of some philosophical interest is the fact that Sidgwick was told by Green shortly before his death that he had gotten away from Hegel in his later years, and that Hegel then seemed to him "like a strange Wirrwarr".

Of Green's philosophy, Sidgwick says he finds in it a fundamental lack of coherence between his Spiritualism and his Idealism. These terms, being interpreted, apparently refer to Green's personalism and his absolute idealism. Sidgwick mentions Berkeley as a type of the former; Hegel of the latter: and says that according to spiritualism, "reality is conscious beings", while according to idealism, "reality is thought or thinking activity."

In stating Green's philosophy Sidgwick says that in his earlier works Green regards nature as a "single, unalterable, all-inclusive system of relations", i.e. he advocates Hegelian idealism. But in the Prolegomena this system of thought relations "implies something other than itself as a condition of being what it is". That is, it presupposes the activity of a thinking consciousness not itself conditioned by the system of relations, and thus his philosophy becomes spiritualism. This combination of idealism and spiritualism Sidgwick says is not thinkable, and he

maintains that Green himself does not succeed in thinking it.

As an outgrowth of this disparity of conceptions, he finds Green regarding man as a dualism (not of mind and matter) but of the finite and eternal consciousness. This leads to a confusion in the idea of God which is fatal to Green's ethical system. For Green says man is a "reproduction or realisation of the Divine Mind". Sidgwick says that these terms, apparently used as synonyms, are in reality vastly different in significance. For if man is seeking to realize God, then God is only potential and man is the true reality; while if man is seeking to reproduce God (as implied in Green's ethics) then God is an ideal already completely realized.

Sidgwick, like Laurie, attacks Green for making God simply a unifying principle having no character. His metaphysics, he says, give God no function except to synthesize the manifold of nature; while his ethics call for a God having a "preferential will" realized in man's choice of virtue. But if God's function is simply to unify the manifold of nature he does this for sinners as well as saints. Thus God is deprived of ethical value.

Furthermore if God has no character except to unify the manifold of nature, he not only has no ethical value, but he lacks metaphysical value also; for he becomes merely a hypostasized logical element. Sidgwick says also that it is not necessary to

posit a unity to combine the manifold, for according to Green himself, we can not conceive the manifold out of its relations.[1] Sidgwick gives no consideration to the argument that the very impossibility of conceiving the manifold out of its relations, f from an epistemological standpoint, makes it necessary to find a metaphysical basis for the manifold.

10. Sturt, Henry: Idola Theatri (Macmillan, London, 1906)

The subtitle of this book is "A criticism of Oxford thought and thinkers from the standpoint of Personal Idealism". This indicates in a general way the character of the book, although the author's own system is not advanced very prominently. The three idola theatri which he thinks have played havoc with Oxford thought are Intellectualism, Absolutism, and Subjectivism. After a critical examination of German idealism he devotes a chapter each to Green, F.H.Bradley, and Bosanquet to show in what respects they have erred by following Kant and Hegel too closely.

In the fifty pages which he devotes to Green, he has scarcely a good word to say for him, in spite of the fact that both Sturt and Green may be classed as personal idealists. He marshals more evidence against Green than has been brought together by any other writer who has analyzed Green's philosophy.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 77.

The first charge which he raises is that in making God merely a universal relative consciousness, he has failed to make him intelligent or moral. Thus he has not established Christian theism. Any relation to be valuable must be teleogical, and Green's Eternal Consciousness, as simply a unifying principle based on feeling and perceiving, is not teleogical.

His second criticism is that Green has not shown the world to be adapted for a sphere of moral action. This he bases on Green's assertion that "whatever anything is really it is unalterably"[1] and shows that on this assumption nature must be static, and a static nature is no sphere for moral endeavor.[2] Green was inconsistent, he says, in insisting both on the reality of nature and the unreality of time or change.

Sturt next attacks Green's conception of the self on several different grounds. First, he says Green has failed to make man a son of God. "A static Deity, a changeless consciousness whose function it is to be the sustainer of changeless relations, can not be imagined to reproduce itself in finite consciousness."[3] Furthermore it is impossible to give any intelligible meaning to the self that is reproduced. "If it is only the 'synthetic unity of apperception' then that has no significance for morals: if it is the empirical self, there is an unbridgeable chasm between the reproducer and the reproduces: for one is timeless and the other a creature of time".[4]

[1] Prolegomena, p. 30.
[2] Idola Theatri, p. 236.
[3] Ibid., p. 238.
[4] Ibid., p. 238.

Next Sturt raises the charge that in making God and nature static, he has made man static also. That is, if the essential element in man is not the empirical but the timeless self, he has created an "epistemological monstrosity". Following Kant's influence he has separated the synthetic consciousness form the empirical stream, and made the former changeless or out of time entirely.[1]

The next charge is directed against Green's view of the motives impelling men to action. In allowing the influence of "animal wants" in determining motive, Sturt says he makes a concession to naturalism for which his theory has no consistent place. Again he is inconsistent with the doctrine of the changelessness of the self, in making self-satisfaction, which requires change, the summum bonum.

Green's treatment of freedom next comes in for criticism. He gives, according to Sturt, a purely formal freedom, based on the view that the human consciousness, as a reproduction of the Eternal, is a source of relations and therefore not subject to them, i.e., it stands outside the causal sequence of phenomena. But Sturt says,[2] "There is nothing satisfactory in such static-epistemological formulae as that man is free 'in virtue of his character as knowing',[3] or as self-distinguishing,[4] or as self-objectifying".[5] He admits of course that Green believed in a free

Idola Theatri, p. 240.
Ibid. p. 244.
Prolegomena, p. 85
Ibid., p. 92 f.
Ibid., p. 125.

will, just as he did in theism, but maintains that he never found an adequate philosophic formula for it.

The arguments above noted constitute the body of Sturt's objections to Green's intellectualism, and are summarized by the author as follows: The static intellectualism of this metaphysic prevents Green from giving a satisfactory account (a) of God as intelligent and holy, (b) of the world as a sphere of moral action, and (c) of man (i) as son of God, (ii) as creature of change, (iii) as stimulated to action and (iv) as free.

However, this is not all that he has to say against Green. The last fifteen pages of the chapter are devoted to accusations of subjectivism, with the evils which follow from it. He admits that Green in his ethics is not entirely subjectivistic, but regards this element as inconsistent with the impersonal subjectivism of his metaphysics which he acquired from Hegel.

His first charge, in this new attack, is that Green is strongly solipsistic in his treatment of perception. This he bases upon Green's assertion that the object of thought has no existence independent of consciousness.[1] "He seems to pass from the proposition that objects can only exist for consciousness to the proposition that objects can only exist in the consciousness."[2]

The impersonal element also appears, according to Sturt, in his doctrine of the Spiritual Principle in nature, which he

[1] Prolegomena, pp. 66-76.
[2] Idola Theatri, pp. 246.

derived from Hegel with some modifications. "For Hegel nature is real because part of God's mind; for Green nature is real because present to God's mind".

The Spiritual Principle itself next comes in for criticism. According to Sturt it does not establish either the objective reality of nature, or the spirituality of nature. It does not establish objective reality, he says, because the reality of nature must be personally verified by each individual and by others within his "universe of discourse", and "if Green had wished to maintain that relations are, by reason of their presence to God's mind, real for men, he should have proved that God can enter the human universe of conversation: God must talk to and act upon men after the manner of the Old Testament".[1]

Of Green's conception of the spirituality of nature, Sturt says (with some justice) that to say that nature is constituted by spirit is not equivalent to saying that nature itself is spirit. In this he regards Green's position as superior to Hegel's for he (Green) did not try to make every object a part of God's mind. But, making finite persons the reproductions of the eternal consciousness, Green lacks the consistency of the Hegelian position which regards the universe as homogenously spiritual throughout. Green, he says, does nothing more than re-establish the old-fashioned "argument from design"; and he renders no assistance

[1] Idola Theatri, p. 250.

to theism by a parallelism of finite and infinite which detracts from the incomprehensible superiority of the world consciousness.[1]

But Green's subjectivism is not confined to his metaphysics; it appears likewise in his ethics. For moral action in general is directed toward the attainment of some personal good, the vicious man differing from the virtuous only "in supposing that his good lies in such conduct as from man's nature cannot possible lead to the good".[2] Sturt regards self-realization, equally with egoistic hedonism, as being a form of self-regarding ethics.

Sturt's final criticism deals even more specifically with Green's self-realization, or self-satisfaction, theory as he calls it. He maintains that this is inconsistent with Green's own emphasis on objective interest, as it appears in his doctrine of the common good. The third book of his ethics, though superior to the theory on which it rests, Sturt regards as never being fully reconciled with the subjectivist doctrine to which Green adheres <u>in form</u> throughout.

Again, Sturt considers Green's insight superior to his system in what he says of the moral nature of God. In arguing that the moral relation of man to God is exactly parallel to the intellectual relation, Green implies that the moral attributes of God must be reproduced in, or at least parallel with, the moral

[1] Idola Theatri, p. 252.
[2] Ibid., p. 253.

attributes of men. But if all moral activity is regarded as a quest for self-satisfaction, the element of love is there only by accident. "If the divine virtue consists in perfect self-satisfaction it cannot act as a stimulant to the moral aspiration in man."[1]

A final thrust is found in the charge that if the eternal consciousness is reproduced in man, the divine self-satisfaction must be reproduced too, and this is impossible because experience shows enjoyment to be the most incommunicable thing in the world.

Whether Sturt's article is to be considered a very clever piece of sophistry or a discriminating detection of flaws commonly overlooked depends largely on the point of view from which we interpret Green's thought. Most of Sturt's charges, I feel, are unjust to Green's intention and cannot be sustained with reference to a synoptic view. Yet Green undoubtedly makes many statements, inconsistent with his real intention, which afford a basis for this severe arraignment.

[1]Idola Theatri, p. 257.

11. Haldar, Hiralal: "Green and his Critics". Philosophical Review (3) 1894.

We have here a somewhat novel source of criticism, for the author writes from Berhampur College, Bengal, and both the name and the place indicate that he represents the Oriental viewpoint. His main contention is the same as that of Seth and numerous others, i.e. that Green has made a metaphysic out of Kant's epistemology. But his solution differs somewhat in that he writes from a Hegelian standpoint and claims that Green erred by not following Hegel closely enough.

He points out, first, that Green and the neo-Hegelians have done a real service to philosophy by showing the difference between psychology and epistemology; i.e. they have shown that while psychology deals with the fact of knowledge and its growth in the individual mind, epistemology deals with the possibility of knowledge. The latter was Green's starting-point, as it was Kant's.

However, Haldar maintains that Kant's method of determining how experience is possible has only a negative value, for while he has shown that the categories are necessary in interperting the raw materials of sense, he has not shown "how two such dissimilar elements as sense and understanding can combine in order to produce knowledge". He asks "what mysterious power

is there in the understanding to transform the dark chaos of sense into the beautiful cosmos of the world of our experience?"

Haldar charges against Green and the neo-Hegelians in general that they have failed to answer this question. He says that while Green says in the Prolegomena that there is no hard and fast distinction between sense and understanding, he nevertheless speaks repeatedly of feelings being converted into felt things by the relating activity of the self without anywhere explaining how this is possible.

Haldar's own answer to the question is found in the Hegelian ontology. He says,"If Idealism is to be a tenable theory at all, it must endeavor to show that Reason underlies the objective world, not by imagining the self to direct its relating activity upon a hypothetical manifold of sense, but by demonstrating the fundamental laws of nature to be nothing but thought-forms and categories of the mind".[1] So Haldar thinks that if Green had held to the Hegelian dialectic instead of regarding it as an aberration (as stated in his review of Caird's Introduction to Philosophy to Religion[2]) he would have strengthened his position and would have escaped the charge of subjectivism.

[1] Green and his Critics, Phil. Rev. (3) 1894, p. 172.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 143.

12. Calderwood, H.: "Another View of Green's Last Work," Mind(10)1885

Professor Calderwood's article forms a sequel to the series of articles in Mind by Caird, Balfour, and Sidgwick, called forth by the publication of the Prolegomena. He criticized it from the standpoint of the Scottish philosophy and objects particularly to its Hegelian elements. In this respect, the standpoint is quite the reverse of the preceding paper. It seems to have been Green's fate to have satisfied neither the friends nor the enemies of Hegel.

Calderwood makes the rather interesting observation that while Green draws so largely upon Hegel in the Prolegomena he does not once mention his name. The reason which Calderwood ascribes is that Hegelian philosophy was falling into such disrepute that Green felt it would add no support to his system to claim affinities with Hegelianism.

The main charge which Calderwood brings against Green is that in attempting the unification of all things, he has overlooked the demands of the moral life in order to favor an intellectualistic conception. It is seldom that a philosopher ventures to express an objection to "unification", for most of them are ready to "unify" if they can do it in their own way. But Calderwood says, "there is no escape from the duplex-aspect

of existence: dualism asserts itself; and Hegelianism is unable to support its claims as a theory of existence".[1] He bases this argument, rather strangely, on the very same ground as that which Haldar urges against Green in favor of Hegelianism, i.e. the disparate character of sense and understanding on the Kantian hypothesis. Calderwood syas, "All being said that can be said concerning the cosmos and the eternal spiritual principle which 'makes the world', the separateness of the sensitive life and the self-distinguishing life remains".[2] Assuredly, in philosophy one man's meat is another man's poison!

Calderwood continues his objections to unification in his discussion of "the freedom of man as intelligence". Green says, "In virtue of his character as knowing, man is a free cause".[3] Calderwood maintains that this gives an inadequate account of man's relation both to nature and to God. For the mind which knows is not the author of nature, any more than it is the author of its own being; and furthermore " unification with that Intelligence which is above us, is no more possible than unification with Nature which is beneath".[4] At this point he expresses his objections to the thoery of the reproduction of an eternal consciousness on the ground that it is an attempt "to make imperfection an expression of perfection; or in another aspect, to involve the Absolute in a struggle to express itself through

[1]Another view of Green's Last Work, Mind (10) 1885, p. 78.
[2]Ibid., p. 78.
[3]Prolegomena, p. 90.
[4]Another View of Green's Last Work, Mind (10) 1885, p. 80.

imperfect media".[1]

But Calderwood's most serious objection, from an ethical standpoint, is directed against Green's account of freedom of the will and obligation to do the right. Calderwood says that under acdoctrine of the unification of all things it is impossible to reach a theory of moral obligation, for an injunction to conform to the moral law is as unmeaning if man is a "reproduction of an eternal consciousness", as it is if he is "simply a result of natural forces."

Calderwood raises several objections to Green's conception of motive. Briefly summarized, they are as follows: (1) In defining motive as an end which a self-conscious being presents to himself, moral distinctions are untouched, i.e. it is an ideal without content. (2) To define motive as an ideal of <u>personal good</u> is to confound self-realizing with self-seeking, and reduce morality to self-interest. (3) Self-realization is not inclusive enough, for it overlooks the obvious fact that men <u>do</u> act from motive other than their own good. (4) Green fails to do justice to the distinctive character of moral action by tending to identify it with intelligent action. Calderwood does little more than to state these objections, and therefore leaves us largely to imagine the grounds on which he would defend them.

[1]Another View of Green's Last Work, Mind (10) 1885, p. 80.

13. Hodgson, Richard: "Green as A Critic": Contemporary Review (38) 1880.

This is one of a series of polemic articles between Green and Spencer, the author in this case defending Spencer against Green's criticism of him as expressed in The Contemporary Review, December 1877 and March 1878. He claims that Green's criticism is vitiated both by ignorance of the contents of Spencer's work (Principles of Psychology) and also by gross misinterpretation of it. Hodgson attempts with more vigor than clearness to defend Spencer.

The point about which the argument centers is the reality of the external world. Green says that Spencer "ascribes to the object, which is in truth nothing without the subject, an independent reality, and then supposes it gradually to produce certain qualities in the subject, of which the existence is in truth necessary to the possibility of those qualities in the object which are supposed to produce them". This Hodgson says is a misrepresentation of Spencer's Transfigured Realism, and appears to class him with Berkeley, to whose position Spencer was strenuously opposed. Hodgson says in defence of Spencer, "I venture to say that by no writer has the existence of an external reality apart from perception been insisted on with greater rigour than by Mr. Spencer".[1] This is exactly what Green says Spencer has

[1] Green as a Critic, Contemporary Review (38) 1880, p. 901.

done, and objects to his having done. But so scornful is Hodgson of Green's position, that he says he is "trying to clamber from the earth to the moon upon nothing" and them having arrived there has "dragged the earth out of existence with a rope."[1]

This is typical of Hodgson's criticisms, which do not seem to me to be worth considering in detail. One other point however is of some importance. He says Spencer "repeatedly points out how different is the ground of our belief in the external world from an account of the genesis of that belief; but this difference Professor Green has been unable to see, and his whole discussion from this aspect is therefore futile".[2] In this there is a point of some validity, for Green undoubtedly confuses metaphysics with epistemology, and gives an undue emphasis to origins. However, Hodgson's defense of Spencer is not a great improvement over Green's view, for he argues for realism on the basis of Spencer's statement that realism "is established as a datum long before reasoning begins, and immeasurably transcends reasoning in certainty". On such a basis, any deliverance of the spontaneous consciousness would necessarily be true.

Hodgson points out in conclusion that "a very large portion of Professor Green's second article consists in the assertion, against Mr. Spencer, of doctrines which Mr. Spencer has himself elaborated at length" and on this basis he assumes that Green must have criticized without having read.

[1]Green as a Critic, Contemporary Review (38) 1880, p. 902.
[2]Ibid., p. 907.

14. Spencer, Herbert: "Professor Green's Explanations", Contemporary Review (39) 1881.

When Hodgson's article was published, Green was considerably disturbed by it, and though he rarely resorted to polemic in his own defense he did so on this occasion. The substance of his challenge to Spencer is expressed in the words, "I call in question Mr. Spencer's whole theory of the origin of intelligent consciousness as arising ultimately from the operation of the object, unknown in itself, upon a subject to which it stands in this relation of independence and externality". Green denies the a priori necessity of holding to realism, and with regard to Berkeleianism in Spencer, Green says that if he really thought Spencer held Berkeley's position the whole point of his charge would be gone. But he practically admits the charge of having criticized Spencer without having read his works thoroughly, for he says, "To trace this inconsistency soon became a wearisome task".

The final word in the controversy appears when Spencer himself decides to take a hand and straighten matters out. He, like Hodgson, maintains that Green has grossly misrepresented him.

He proceeds however on a somewhat different strain by bringing in the problem of evolution, which he regards as destructive of idealism. He says that since there must have been matter

on the planet prior to conscious life, the proposition that matter is a form of consciousness is overthrown, and with it Professor Green's idea that the object can exist only by correlation with the subject.

Spencer quotes what he considers another fundamental misconception in Green, "We should be sorry to believe that Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewes regard the relation between consciousness and the world as corresponding to that between two bodies, of which one is inside the other". This, Spencer says, is precisely what he does believe, and he thinks Green could not have read him very intelligently without finding out that he believed it. He says Parts II-IV of his "Principles of Psychology" are occupied with tracing out mental evolution "as a result of converse between organism and environment", and Part V "presupposes from moment to moment a surrounding world and an included organism", so that it is strange Green should think he had abandoned this position in his conclusions.

I shall not attempt to be the arbiter in the quarrel, for both Green and Spencer seem to be using the term "origin of consciousness" in an ambiguous sense. It is used sometimes to refer to the causal origin of our conscious states from some external stimulus, and sometimes to the temporal origin of human consciousness in the evolutionary development of primitive man.

Green (in these articles) seeks chiefly to refute the former, while Spencer tries to answer him on the basis of the latter. Both have confused a biological with an epistemological problem, and then in turn have confused epistemology with metaphysics.

15. Johnson, R.B.C.: The Metaphysics of Knowledge, An Examination of Green's Theory of Reality. (Princeton Contritutions to Philosophy, Vol.I No.3,1900)

Johnson, in this treatise which was written as his doctor's dissertation at Princeton, makes a very thorough study of Green's epistemology and its relation to his metaphysics. Unlike most of Green's critics, he shows a thorough familiarity with the epistemological and metaphysical material in Green's entire works, as well as that in the Prolegomena.

Johnson gives an excellent discussion of Spencer's philosophy in its relation to that of Green. He shows that Spencer's chief error lies in the fact that he assumes an order of nature, and then by "hereditary transmission" thinks he has accounted for it. Thus he falls into a fatal confusion between subject and object (an epistemological consideration), and mind and matter (a metaphysical consideration). Green, according to Johnson's interpretation, avoids this difficulty by pointing out that mind and matter are not equivalent to subject and object, for subject and object are correlative factors of everything as known.[1]

[1]Works, vol. ii, pp. 181-182.

Spencer ascribes to the object an independent reality and then supposes it to produce the subject, but idealism, since the time of Kant, has regarded them as correlated aspects of the knowing process, so that matter as known involves the subject-object relation but matter itself does not.[1]

Johnson likewise discusses and defends Green's attitude toward the ordinary common sense assumption of a world external to consciousness, which at bottom does not differ from Spencer's "transfigured realism".[2] While no philosopher questions the reality of the external world (as some have charged Green with doing), there is a vast difference of opinion as to how we shall interpret it. Confusion commonly arises from thinking the relation of thought to its object the same as the relation of the externality of one material thing to another in the world of space. It is assumed that space relations exist independent of consciousness, when consciousness is itself the very condition of there being any such relation as space. To the objection (raised by Spencer) that Green's idealism is opposed to the scientific fact of the world's existence before the appearance of thinking beings, Johnson replies that since reason did not begin with our sentient human life, the objection is not valid.[3]

He assumes also the objection, raised by Balfour, that Green's theory is solipsistic. He says that there is no solipsism

[1] Works, vol. i, pp. 387, 388.
[2] Ibid., p. 376.
[3] Prolegomena, p 38.

in Green because he does not make experience consist of relations to an isolated subject. The very incompleteness of our finite experience (as in error and illusion) drives us to an ideal of a wider experience in which contradictions are harmonized. Since even our group experience is fragmentary and piecemeal, the only unity is in God. Since it is meaningless to predicate the existence of the world except as the object of thought, we can find in our limited finite consciousness an argument for the existence of a complete, eternal consciousness; and when we say "In Him we live and move and have our being", we are not uttering pious mysticism but a presupposition of life itself.

Johnson attempts to answer also the objection raised by Seth that Green has given a hypostasized abstraction of Kant's synthetic unity of apperception.[1] Johnson maintains that Green has improved upon Kant by transforming his abstract formal unity into something metaphysically real, i.e. the absolute self. He shows with considerable cogency, that this is not only possible but logically necessary, if there is no "ding an sich".[2] As Royce maintains, Kant's distinction between mere subjective personality and the objektiv Einheit des Bewusstseins pointed logically to "the further universalizing of this human self-hood into the world-self of objective idealism - the highest and deepest result of all modern philosophy".[3]

In his last chapter, Johnson develops at considerable

[1] Supra, p.
[2] Works, vol ii, pp. 23,24.
[3] The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 487.

length this idea that if we reject the "ding an sich" we must believe that the ultimate reality is personal and spiritual. Otherwise, he says, the assertion of the unity of the world of our experience only transfers that world to a larger chaos. Without the "ding an sich", we no longer have the distinction between the self as a formal unity and as an ontological reality, and if any unity persists, it must be metaphysical and personal. But the conditions of the real world all imply some synthetic action of consciousness, establishing relations and giving unity. The world is an inter-related whole because related throughout to a single subject. The "ding an sich" leads to scepticism. but if we give this up, the next step is to assert the existence of a Universal Thinker as the only absolute reality.[1]

Johnson's treatment on the whole is thorough and conclusive. The chief objection to be brought against it is that he tends to minimize the extent to which Green confused epistemology with metaphysics. While he admits that the incompleteness of Green's account of thought relations is his chief weakness, he does not regard this as a serious error. He quotes passages to show that Green did not put all relations on the same level (as has been charged) but distinguished between the relations of objects to each other, and their relation to consciousness.[2] While such distinctions can undoubtedly be found, Johnson attributes to Green a greater consistency than is characteristic of the latter's writings.

[1] Works, vol. ii, p. 32.
[2] Prolegomena, pp 30, 54-56.

16. Brett, G.S., Article on Green in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Scribners, New York, 1914)

This article by Brett is very fair and very thorough in its presentation of the points of strength and weakness in Green's position. He is one of the very few who have evaluated Green's work without undue hostility or adulation.

Brett introduces an excellent comparison of Green and Mill. He regards Mill as typical of English, Green of German thought, and says that from this German influence arose Green's hostility to the English empiricism which Mill adopted. They differed also, Brett says, in the fact that Green's central position was religious while Mill's was not. Green was more academic and studious, while Mill appealed more to those interested in social progress. But the antagonism between Mill and Green has often been exaggerated, he says, because Mill incorporated a large element of Kantian morality in his system, and Green on the other hand depended largely on Utilitarianism to supply the content for his theory of absolute ends.

Of the relation of Green's metaphysics to the rest of his philosophy, Brett says that Green like Kant was seeking a metaphysical basis for God freedom and immortality, and accordingly his metaphysics grew out of the demands of religion and

ethics. The general relation of his metaphysics to his ethics is found in the fact that if there is no self capable of originating action, there is no responsibility and no morality. Historically, the influence of Locke and Hume gave rise to Deism and infidelity, for man refuses to regard himself as the creature of circumstances, and either rises above or sinks below this view. There is accordingly a real relation between ethics and epistemology, for if sensations that are pleasing, tempting, etc. come wholly from without and are not the work of the mind, man is a victim of circumstances; but if pleasures and pains can be taken into the self, there is then a chance for self-determination and self-realization.

Brett classifies Green's theory of the self under three heads: 1) The self must be unitary, since reason and desire, if so related as to be distinguished, must be contained in a higher unity which is their real identity. 2) The self must be continuous in time yet not static; therefore evolution is not a sequence of disconnected stated resulting from changes in environment, but an evolution of spirit depending on the activity of a self-determining agent. 3) Green tries to prove that this spiritual evolution, or personal self-realization, necessarily implies a similar universal evolution; so that the development of the moral ideal means a process in which humanity as a whole realizes its

universal "self". Brett objects to this last point on the score that while Green gave a spiritual view of the individual and society, he had no adequate basis for claiming that there is beyond the unity of the individual self "a universe of rational beings which also becomes one in a higher unity". Accordingly, he thinks Green falls into a mysticism and pantheism hostile to ethical theory, for if man is the vehicle of the Divine Consciousness his self-realization is not personal, while if his personal nature is emphasized the will to be evil is a contradiction of the Divine Will.

Brett is fair enough, however, to recognize the value of this theory. He says Green reinterpreted and combined the Platonic and Hegelian views, showing that man is not an isolated being but that personalities are like nuclei in a network of relations. Both in man and society, the whole comes before the parts. So the will of God is above all, yet realized only in individual wills, and this makes the essence of religion consist of cooperation with God.

Regarding Green's religious philosophy per se, Brett stresses the idea that man has in himself a witness to God, for the life of thought gives a perpetual revelation of infinite possibilities. Faith then means an immediate consciousness of potential unity with God, i.e. an inner experience, not an

acceptance of proofs or arguments.

Brett regards Green's political philosophy as the most concrete part of his thought, because here he comes closest to the daily life of people. His mysticism here, Brett says, is not so abstruse as in his religious philosophy, and he holds to personality more consistently here than in his metaphysics. We have again the suggestion of a "universal self" embodied in society, for (according to Brett) Green reverenced institutions because they represent the social consciousness and so have universal significance. Brett somewhat misconstrues Green's meaning, I think, in identifying the Universal Consciousness with the social will, but his evaluation on the whole is excellent.

17. Rogers, A. K.: English and American Philosophy Since 1800 (Macmillan, London, 1922).

This work, like the preceding, consists of an exposition of Green's philosophy combined with a good deal of penetrating analysis. The author calls Green's work "the most powerful single influence in securing to Absolute Idealism the position, which it continued to hold until into the twentieth century, of an almost official philosophy in England and America".[1] Yet on the whole Rogers himself is unfavorable to Green's position and directs a good deal of adverse criticism against it.

[1] English and American Philosophy Since 1800, p. 220

His main objection, which we have already frequently met, is that Green confuses a logical with a metaphysical unity. He says Green fails to distinguish between reality as intelligence, or a rational self, and reality as intelligible, or rational, and then attempts to proceed from the latter to the former by an ambiguous shifting of terms.[1] Accordingly, while Green attempts to use the unity of the empirical self as a mediating term between the chaos of mere feelings and the timeless unity of pure knowledge, the apparent validity of his argument depends on his refusal to see any distinction between the experienced unity of human life and the logical unity of a system of thought.

While Rogers devotes most of his attention to metaphysical difficulties similar to those previously discussed, he also enters some protests against Green's ethics. He says that Green's conception of moral goodness as an all-embracing end either leads to inertia or affords a challenge to activity. But while the latter accords with Green's intention, the moral ideal , Rogers says, loses its power as an actual stimulus through its unattainableness and its vagueness. Its tends to take attention away from the realization of concrete values, and becomes "sentimentalized".[2]

Rogers objects further that even if the moral ideal be conceded to offer motivation, it does not constitute an actual source of guidance. No empirical principle is given except the accepted teachings and practice of the past, and thus conduct

[1] English and American Philosophy Since 1800, p. 227.
[2] Ibid., p. 244.

instead of looking forward to an ideal is actually made dependent on the principles of conventional morality. If we appeal to individual insight in the interpretation of these principles, we have a method no more objective than in an appeal to the Scriptures where the right of private judgment is exercised in their interpretation.[1] Rogers tend to minimize the significance of Green's view that the experiences of actual life and the application of reason to each concrete situation will largely supply the guidance which is needed.

[1] English and American Philosophy Since 1800, pp, 246, 247.

D. Works Mainly Ethical.

1. Sidgwick, Henry: Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau. (Macmillan, London, 1902).

This work consists of a posthumous collection of lectures and gives a penetrating analysis of the views of the philosophers mentioned in the title. Sidgwick's position here is not materially different from that expressed in his metaphysical articles which we have previously discussed,[1] but he endeavors here to point out the flaws in Green's system from a more distinctly ethical standpoint.

Sidgwick's first objection deals with Green's metaphysics. He maintains that Green's idea of a spiritual principle which binds together nature in an "all-inclusive, unalterable system of relations" and reproduces itself in man, is not properly proven because Green passes from analogy with human consciousness to affirmation of identical quality in the divine. Passing over the objection that the unity of human consciousness is destroyed by being divided between a Divine Eternal Mind out of time and an animal organism in time, he grants that such an eternal consciousness may exist. But even so, he says, it is ethically barren, for it is a purely intellectual conception and can not furnish an "ideal of holiness" or of an "infinitely and perfectly good will".[2]

[1] Supra, p. 59f
[2] Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau, pp. 8-14.

Sidgwick's next objection is directed against Green's idea of freedom, which he says is really only thinly disguised determinism, for Green, like other libertarians, tries to "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds". He seizes upon Green's admission that the choice of the motive which constitutes one's idea of personal good is affected by his character, which in turn depends upon his past experience and is therefore, according to Sidgwick, determined solely by natural causation. While Green explains that determinism is avoided by the fact that both present and past choices depend upon the free action of a self-conscious subject who thus builds his own character, Sidgwick gives no credence to this explanation.[1] He also charges Green with ignoring willful choice of evil in making "the idea of personal good" the motive of action.[2]

The next point of attack is the unsatisfactoriness of Green's conception of the moral ideal. From the fact that human desires originate (at least in part) from animal wants, Sidgwick thinks that the latter should not be disregarded in the ideal; but on the contrary Green states that the true good is complete self-realization, or the abiding staisfaction of an abiding self. This, Sidgwick says, is either equivalent to hedonism (with an emphasis on permanent pleasures) or else it is inconsistent and ambiguous. For complete self-satisfaction is never attainable

[1] Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau, pp. 17-20.
[2] Ibid. p. 24.

even by the most virtuous, and partial self-satisfaction may be found in vicious as well as in virtuous action.[1]

Closely allied with this point is Sidgwick's objection to Green's treatment of personal immortality, or, as he puts it, the use of "theological notions" as the basis of a philosophy of practice. According to Green's theory the ideal of perfection or complete self-realization of capabilities, with an abiding satisfaction in such attainment, is possible only on condition of personal existence after death. Sidgwick objects to this postulate, and maintains furthermore that Green's theory gives no adequate basis for such a belief. He says Green's statements point only to the view, (1) that the personal self-conscious being which comes from God is forever continued in God; or else (2) that it is continued in a society which carries forward the movement toward perfection.[2]

This brings us to another objection, i.e., that Green confuses the good of self with the good of society. Sidgwick maintains that the "essential sociality of man" furnishes no reason why one man should sacrifice his own good for the good of others, and he challenges Green 's statement that "egoism and self-sacrifice will be when duly enlightened two roads to the same goal".[3]

In this connection we must note that Sidgwick charges Green with having confused two incompatible conceptions of human good: (1) moral activity directed toward complete self-realization

[1] Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau, pp. 37-42.
[2] Ibid, pp 49-56.
[3] Ibid, pp: 56-59.

or perfection, including artistic and scientific development; and (2) moral activity as limited to virtue proper. This confusion, he says, makes it unclear whether the true good is competitive or non-competitive, whether egoistic or social.

In the chapters on Green's treatment of hedonism, Sidgwick attempts to answer numerous charges brought by Green against his own theories. Some, he says, are due to a serious misunderstanding of his distinction between the desirable and the desired. To Green's charge that "the greatest possible sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning", he answers that the lack of a definite standard of measurement is no objection to hedonism, for it is always possible to judge a pleasure as more or less than another under given circumstances. To the objection that utilitarianism is not conducive to virtue, Sidgwick replies that Green has not proved perfectionism to be any more so.

Sidgwick's conclusion is that Green's ethical theory affords no practical basis on which a system of duties can be worked out. He grants that the Prolegomena contains much instructive description and discussion of the general attitude to be taken toward practical problems, but affords no cogently-reasoned solution of any of these problems.

Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau, pp. 65-71.
Ibid., pp. 110-113.

2. Rashdall, Hastings: The Theory of Good and Evil. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1907).

Rashdall at various intervals gives quite an extensive discussion of Green's ethics, most of which consists of adverse criticism. This is the more surprising in view of the fact that Rashdall's own view, in its general outlines, does not differ very widely from that of Green. But while Rashdall claims that he does not himself hold to psychological hedonism or hedonistic utilitarianism, he takes considerable pains to show that Green has not properly refuted either.

The most serious charges which he brings against Green are as follows: (1) Green's contention that "the greatest possible sum of pleasures" is meaningless, is a mistaken view: (2) Green's self-realization theory is not altruistic, but egoistic: (3) Green is wrong in maintaining that pleasure can not be attained by the pursuit of pleasure: (4) Green's theory of the "timeless self" provides no proper connection with the self in time with which ethics is concerned.

Rashdall's own view makes the summum bonum "the greatest quantity of good on the whole for all mankind",[1] and this good is defined not as virtue alone, nor as pleasure alone, but as a combination of both. Thus while not a hedonist per se, he defends the hedonistic calculus, and maintains that both virtue and pleasure

[1] The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. ii, p. 1.

are capable of quantitative comparison. His chief object of attack upon Green is directed against Green's statement that the summum bonum can not be a greatest possible sum of pleasures, since the latter is intrinsically unmeaning.

Rashdall answers this objection by showing that, as Green himself admits, pleasures are capable of being measured in the sense that one pleasure is preferred to another because of its greater intensity or greater duration. Even though these quantities of pleasure may not be reduced to numerical terms, they are nevertheless "summed"[1] (and Rashdall believes that they can be measured numerically). In regard to Green's argument that pleasure is an inadequate end because it is an ever-receding goal, Rashdall interprets Green to mean simply that the summum bonum can not be something which can not be enjoyed all at once. He says that this objection could be urged with equal force against virtue, for neither can the virtues be practiced all at once.[2]

Rashdall's second charge is a still more serious one, for he claims that self-realization is in reality both egoistic and hedonistic. He calls it an "ambiguous mysterious term"[3] which acts as a cloak for a refined hedonism. His particular point of attack is Green's use of the term "common good". He regards Green's view of the compatibility between good for self and good for others as being either fallacious or unmeaning. For there are plenty of cases,

[1] The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. ii. p. 5.
[2] Ibid., p. 15.
[3] Ibid., p. 69.

even among the higher goods, in which one man's enjoyment of the good involves another man's loss. But if on the other hand we attempt to reconcile self-realization and self-sacrifice by making the good will the only good, (as Green tends to do) then the same objection may be raised which Green raised against Kant, i.e., that the good will is robbed of its content.

A third objection, to which Rashdall does not devote much attention, is directed against the view of Green and most anti-hedonists, that the pursuit of pleasure does not lead to pleasure. Rashdall admits that this is true in some instances, but says that since it is not universally or even commonly true, it can not be urged as a valid objection against hedonism. Most people who plan on having a good time succeed in getting it, and the pleasures for which we work hardest are those we enjoy most.

A fourth (and more valid) objection, is based on metaphysical grounds. Rashdall says that there is a logical hiatus between Green's ethical system and the metaphysical system with which he sought to connect it.[1] If the temporal self which is active in morality is identical with the "spiritual principle not in time" which is implied by all our knowledge, and if this in turn is identified with a Universal Consciousness, the self loses the power of free causalty which ethics demands. If it is the Universal Self which acts in man, either his actions must all be good or we must

[1] The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. ii, p. 204.

impute evil to the Infinite.[1] Green's view is termed by Rashdall "a vague but stimulating mysticism".

3. Taylor, A.E.: The Problem of Conduct (Macmillan, London, 1901).

The Problem of Conduct whose subtitle is "A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics", was originally written in competition for the prize in Moral Philosophy established by Green at Oxford. This is significant in view of the fact that Taylor devotes an entire chapter to demolishing the metaphysical structure on which Green rests his ethics. Taylor professes to have great admiration for Green's account of moral institutions as found in the latter part of the Prolegomena, but thinks he is rendering a real service to Green's memory in dissociating this section from its untenable metaphysical assumptions.[2]

Taylor's main contention is that ethics is not a normative but an empirical science. He maintains that Green has reversed the correct order in making metaphysics the beginning of his ethics, for the relation between them (if there be any) is rather that ethics furnishes important empirical data regarding one aspect of experience which metaphysics must interpret. Accordingly he rejects Book I of the Prolegomena and attempts at some length to show (1) that there is no such thing as the Eternal Self, in Green's use of the term; and (2) that if there were such an Eternal Self it would have no

[1] The Theory of Good and Evil, vol ii, p. 205.
[2] The Problem of Conduct, pp 12, 59.

ethical value.[1]

In defense of the empirical character of ethics he maintains, first of all, that there is no essential difference except in degree between the so-called normative sciences and the physical sciences, for the former must rest upon a scientific inquiry into facts and the latter contain also a normative element. "If ethics tells us how we ought to act, and aesthetics what we ought to admire, and logic how we ought to reason, histology, for instance, tells us what we ought to see under the microscope."[2] On the other hand, no science can say what ought to be without a previous investigation into what is.[3]

Turning more specifically to Green's ethics, he quotes Green's statement "It is obvious that to a being who is simply a result of natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning".[4] Taylor maintains that this is not only not obvious, but is untrue, since a growth of man's aspirations from animal origins does not interfere with their reality or significance. "The primary question for ethics is after all not how we came by our ideals, but what they are".[5]

Taylor attacks also Green's argument from the possibility of moral progress in which he maintains that we can judge no state to be "better" than another except by reference to an ideal "best". He says that here again Green reverses the real order of thought, for in our everyday conduct when we are not reflecting on problems

[1] The Problem of Conduct, p. 65.
[2] Ibid., p. 54.
[3] Ibid. p. 56.
[4] Prolegomena, p. 9.
[5] The Problem of Conduct, p. 61.

of philosophy "we are not ordinarily haunted by the idea of an ultimate best" but we simply choose the course which seems preferable among several alternatives.[1] So it is in reality the empirical "better" rather than the metaphysical "best" which dominates our moral activity and furnishes the subject-matter of ethics.

Taylor's principal charge, however, is directed against Green's idea of the Eternal Self as the metaphysical prerequisite of his ethics. In order to prove the contention that there is no such Eternal Self, he seems somewhat to distort Green's meaning. He represents Green as assuming that if the self has an evolutionary origin, it is purely a physical product to which only material concepts are applicable, and to escape this conclusion the idea of the Eternal Self must be introduced. Taylor, on the other hand, believes that empirical psychology is valid, without any such Eternal Self, if the self is regarded as a psychical rather than a physical development. In this, Taylor states the truth but not the whole truth, for he seems to overlook Green's admission that man's psychic organism may have developed, phenomenally, from animal origins.[2]

Taylor objects also to Green's assertion of the eternal or timeless character of the self on the score that the actual self which we know is not only not timeless, but is not even permanent within the range of our experience. "Self-identity", he says, "is in fact altogether a matter of degree",[3] for the psychic content is so different in babyhood and maturity that we are scarcely justified

[1] The Problem of Conduct, p. 63.
[2] Prolegomena, pp. 94-96.
[3] The Problem of Conduct, p. 74.

in assuming a permanent selfhood. Since the self is not timeless, but only relatively permanent in time, the Eternal Self, if such exists, stands outside the circle of our conscious activity, and is only a hypostasised abstraction of the subject-object relationship involved in the knowing process.[1]

Taylor does not rest with having reduced the Eternal Self to an epistemological relationship, as many of Green's critics have done, but he goes farther and even impugns the validity of this relationship. He says, "We seem justified in denying that the subject-object relation is a primary and indispensable form of human experience".[2] He justifies this belief by what seems a flimsy argument, i.e. that in the pre-natal and early infancy period there is probably a form of experience without objects.

Having thus disposed of the eternal self to his own satisfaction, Taylor says further, "If the eternal self exists, it is yet positively useless and out of place in a theory of ethics."[3] It is disconnected from the empirical wants and aspirations with which ethics has to deal, for if it is changeless it can have nothing to do with a changing order of human affairs, and if it is timeless it must stand outside the time-processes by which we get our satisfactions and reach our ideals.

Taylor's parting shot at the idea of the Eternal Self is found in his scornful comment on the advice, "Realise thine

[1] The Problem of Conduct, p. 75.
[2] Ibid., pp. 76-78.
[3] Ibid., p. 81.

Eternal Self". He says that to most men "Be yourself" means something because they know empirically what the self is, but "this self that is but the abstraction of the subject-object relation is shadowy and formless as the moonlight reflection of a ghost; it is realised as much in one mode of action as in another, as real in crime as in heroism, in indolence as in strenuous industry."[1]

Thus we find Taylor objecting to Green's metaphysical basis of ethics for these reasons: (1) ethics is not a normative but an empirical science: (2) it has an evolutionary not a metaphysical basis; (3) moral progress requires no ultimate standard; (4) the Eternal Self is psychologically unnecessary; (5) if timeless, it can not be an aspect of our temporal experience; (6) it is simply a hypostasized abstraction of the subject-object relation, which in turn is not wholly valid; (7) even if the Eternal Self exists, a timeless self is ethically useless; (8) as a moral stimulus it is an idea without content.

4. Dewey, John: "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive"., Philosophical Review (1) 1892.

In this article Dewey carries out somewhat the criticism made by Caird regarding the negative character of the self and the ideal. His attack however is more particularly directed against the unsatisfactoriness of Green's conception of the ideal, and he maintains the somewhat surprising position that Green so contradicts

[1] The Problem of Conduct, p.82.

himself as to make morality absolutely impossible. "No thorough-going theory of total depravity", he says, "ever made righteousness more impossible to the natural man than Green makes it to a human being by the very constitution of his being."[1]

Dewey prefaces his remarks on Green with a discussion of ethical theory in its relation to individual conduct. "Ethical theory", he says,"must be a general statement of the reality involved in every moral situation. It must be action stated in terms so generic that every individual action will fall within the outlines it sets forth".[2] On this basis, he maintains that Green's theory is not metaphysical in the true sense of being a guide to actual conduct, but in the false sense of being remote from contact with actual experience.[3]

The process by which Dewey arrives at the abstractness and contradictoriness of Green's theory is by comparison with Kant. Kant, he says, introduced a dualism by separating the self as reason from the self as want or desire. Green, he says, has a similar dualism in separating the end which would satisfy the self as a unity or whole from that which satisfies it in particular cases of actual conduct. This is based on Green's view that the ideal is never fully realized in any particular act, and according to Dewey the opposition is even more distinct than in the dualism of Kant, for there is no intrinsic impossibility of a harmony between reason and

[1] Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, Phil. Rev. (1) 1892, p. 598.
[2] Ibid, p. 596.
[3] Ibid., p. 597.

will, while in Green's conception the theory itself makes it antecedently impossible that the ideal should ever be attained.

Green's theory of the moral motive, as interpreted by Dewey, means that the self, in becoming conscious of a want, objectifies that want by setting it over against itself.[1] Such a theory, he says, could be developed in either of two ways: (1) particular wants and desires may be regarded as the content by which the self "relieves itself of its abstractness, its undeveloped character, and assumes concrete existence"; or (2) the self may distinguish itself from its particular wants and desires. The former, according to Dewey, is metaphysical, but Green did not follow it: the latter falls into the hopeless antithesis above indicated.

Dewey bulwarks his position with Green's admission, "Of a life of complete development, of activity with the end attained, we can only speak or think in negatives."[2] Such a negative conception of the ideal, Dewey says, relapses into a thorough-going ascetism, for instead of pointing the way to the ideal it "condemns to insufficiency every concrete step towards reaching the ideal".[3] It is an idea which cannot be <u>used</u> (and therefore according to the pragmatic standard untrue). It contains furthermore the logical fallacy of an undetermined infinite negative.[4]

Dewey then discusses the three ways in which Green has tried to give concrete content to the moral ideal and shows that

[1] Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, <u>Phil. Rev.</u> (1) 1892, p. 599.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 180.
[3] Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, <u>Phil. Rev</u>. (1) 1892, p. 600.
[4] Ibid., p. 605.

each attempt is unsatisfactory because of the inadequacy of the foundation on which it rests. These three ways are (1) the categorical imperative; (2) moral progress; and (3) the existence of permanent institutions.

The categorical imperative, Dewey says, is inadequate because instead of telling us what to do, it simply tells us that we ought to do something; and then Green's theory tells us that whatever we do we can not obtain our objective. Rigidly applied Dewey says that this would lead either to complete recklessness of conduct or to pessimism.[1]

With the idea of moral progress, the case does not stand very much better, for the mere idea that there is a better is a mockery unless we know what the better is. Though moral progress can not be denied, its explanation can not be found in any theory which places its end outside the process itself.[2]

With regard to the existence of permanent institutions, Dewey charges Green with having introduced content into his theory which does not logically belong there. For if the ideal has embodied itself in institutions and the moral code with sufficient fulness to make them in any measure a guide to the ideal, then the ideal is not the abstract unity which Green elsewhere makes it. If the ideal is in reality negative to every special end, condemning our actual efforts as contradictory to its true nature, then the

[1] Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, Phil. Rev. (1) 1892, p. 603.
[2] Ibid., p. 603.

moral command would be "Be not loyal to existing institutions, if you would be loyal to me, the only true moral ideal".

5. Dewey, John: "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal", Philosophical Review (2) 1893.

This article is a sequel to the one by Dewey previously discussed, and while it is not devoted so exclusively to Green, it contains a severe criticism of the theory of the self which Dewey regards Green as holding.

Dewey begins, correctly enough, by stating that if self-realization is to have any meaning, we must have some notion of what the self is that is to be realized. Then he states two possible conceptions of the self and attempts to show that Green has chosen the untenable one. The two conceptions are (1) "the self as a presupposed fixed schema or outline, while realization consists in the filling up of this schema"; and (2) "the self as a concrete specific activity, with therefore the identity of self and realization." Dewey rejects the former and defends the latter.

Of Green's view, Dewey says that the assumption of an "eternally complete consciousness" constituting the moral self to be realized by man is an illustration of the fixed or presupposed self. He regards this as a rigid framework to be filled in by self-realization, rather than as a practical or working self whose actuality consists in its specific content.

Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, Phil. Rev. (1) 1892, p. 605.
Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal, Phil. Rev. (2) 1893, p. 653.

Dewey does not enter upon an explicit metaphysical discussion of the eternal consciousness, though his own attitude is clearly indicated in a passage which is worth quoting as typical of his general position, "Why a completely realized self should think it worth while to duplicate itself in an unrealized or relatively empty self, how it could possibly do this even if it were thought worth while, and why after the complete self had produced the incomplete self, it should do so under conditions rendering impossible any adequate approach of the incomplete self to its own completeness - this difficulty should make us wary of the conception."[1]

However his particular point of attack is directed toward the idea that "upon the basis of a presupposed complete self, the possibilities of the present, working or individual self are the actual content of this presupposed self".[2] In refutation of this view he maintains that the realization of any capacity, e.g.the artistic capacity of a child, must exist as an end in some one's consciousness, and can not exist simply in general. "Capacity is not only relative to specific action, but is itself action".[3] Therefore to realize a capacity does not mean to fill up some presupposed ideal self, but to act with the completeness of one's existing powers.

[1] Self- Realization as the Moral Ideal, Phil. Rev. (2) 1893, p. 654.
[2] Ibid. p. 654.
[3] Ibid. p. 656.

Another objection which Dewey raises against the "fixed self" idea is that it is essentially selfish. "Whatever is done, is done for this fixed self.....I do not see that it is a bit better to act to get goodness for the self, than it is to get pleasure for the self....The selfishness of saints who are bound to maintain their own saintliness at all hazards, is Pharisaism".[1]

With specific reference to Green, Dewey says that Green tries to get around the difficulty by splitting the presupposed self into two parts - a realized self which is the agent and an ideal self which is the goal of action.[2] But the problem which Green does not solve is how to get them back together again. Dewey says that what Green has done is to hypostatize into separate entities what in reality are simply two stages of insight, upon our own part, into the same self. Dewey concludes with the statement that the most pressing need of ethics is the demand that the self be conceived as a practical, working self akin to the "working hypothesis" of science rather than as a fixed ideal.

[1] Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal, Phil. Rev.(2) 1893, p. 661.
[2] Ibid., p. 662.

6. Hobhouse, L.T.: The Rational Good. (Macmillan, New York, 1921)

In the last chapter of The Rational Good, Hobhouse discusses the implications of his theory as compared with those of Mill and Green. While comparatively little space is devoted specifically to Green, the chapter contains some interesting suggestions, not only on self-realization in general, but upon the metaphysical basis of ethics.

Hobhouse's own theory of the rational good makes harmony its central feature. Harmony is defined as "a form of mutual support" and as "that relation of parts in a whole in virtue of which they maintain and (if they admit of development) further one another".[1] Thus the theory of harmony has something in common both with Mill's Utilitarianism and with Green's Ethical Idealism.[2] Its point of contact with the former lies in the fact that all true harmony involves pleasurable feeling. But Hobhouse points out that such harmony depends upon desire for the pleasant (i.e. the satisfying) rather than merely for pleasure, and thus cuts the roots of hedonism. Mill in admitting qualitative distinctions in pleasures ceases to be a consistent hedonist and approaches the theory of a harmonious fulfillment of human powers.[3]

But the theory of harmony is much more closely akin to Green's theory than to Mill's. For real harmony ~~is~~ depends not

[1] The Rational Good, p. 69.
[2] Ibid., p. 137 f.
[3] Ibid., p. 139.

simply upon pleasurable feeling but upon "a rational appreciation of an intrinsically good life",[1] and self-realization is practically equivalent to "harmony in development". It depends upon the fact that life is an organic whole, in which the development of one must contribute to and be conditioned by the development of all.

While agreeing with Green in the general outlines of his theory, Hobhouse mentions two points in which he disagrees. The first is with regard to pleasure, which Green regards as a secondary consequence rather than an integral element of the good, Hobhouse insists that the harmony of feeling with experience which constitutes pleasure or happiness is an essential, though not the sole, element in harmonious development.

The second point of divergence is concerned with the conflict between self-realization and self-sacrifice. Hobhouse, while not entirely disagreeing with Green, thinks he gives too optimistic a solution of the difficulty. The realization of the common good through self-sacrifice can not be regarded simply as a sum of self-realizations. The good of the whole, in many cases, involves a real loss of the good of the individual. However such sacrifice is not only necessary but justifiable, on the basis of the organic relationship of the individual to the whole. If the good of society requires the sacrifice of the individual, such a course of action is not only the best thing for society but "it is also the

[1] The Rational Good, p. 141.

best, i.e., the least bad, thing under the circumstances for the individual. It is his duty, and the worst thing he can do is to shirk his duty".[1] But such a sacrifice must be regarded not as a good in itself but simply as a means to an end, and any state of society which requires such sacrifice of the individual good involves disharmonies. "What is good in itself is the sense of oneness with others and the desire to serve .....which make men ready for self-sacrifice".[2]

At the end of the chapter Hobhouse discusses somewhat the relation of ethical theory to cosmic philosophy. He says that there would be ample reason for the moralizing of human life according to the theory of harmony even if it has no metaphysical basis; but without a belief that the ties which bind the world-order into a harmonious whole are real and operative, our conception of moral development must be greatly changed. "The harmony that we shall seek will be that of the Buddhist, founded on the impermanence of things, rather than that of the Greek, founded on the intrinsic value, the promise and the hopefulness of life".[3] Thus while ethics does not furnish a positive proof of the existence of God and immortality it furnishes a strong presupposition in that direction. The theory of harmony, when taken in conjunction with the general theory of evolution, gives evidence of a teleological development which implies a Mind at the center of things to give harmony and unity to the world-process.

The Rational Good, p. 143.
Ibid., p. 143.
Ibid., p. 160-161.

7. Ayres, Clarence E. : The Nature of the Relation between Ethics and Economics. (Philosophical Studies, Univ. of Chicago, No. 8)

Ayres criticizes Green's ethics from a pragmatic standpoint to show that he has not been sufficiently definite in giving practical guidance for moral conduct. He says Green recognizes the dual task of ethics, i.e., to explain how men do act (in making moral judgments) and how they should act.[1] But while Green sees the failure of utilitarianism to fulfill both functions, he does not do so any better himself.

Green's whole ethical theory, Ayres says, is a piece of cyclical reason, and may be expressed in the proposition, "Virtue is the devotion of the moral man to the realization in his own life of this perfection (of the eternal consciousness), which in turn consists in the complete dedication of human endeavor to this self-realization." In other words, "To be good is to seek to be good."[2]

The source of this reasoning in a circle, Ayres says, is found in Green's undue emphasis upon motives to the exclusion of consequences. Green recognizes that motives will not help a man to know what he should do,[3] but Ayres regards him as inconsistent, for he seems to imply that ignorance excuses error.[4]

Ayres makes a good deal of Green's admission at the end of his theory that he has not given a rule by which effort is to be guided.[5] Green says, however, that while no theory will settle

[1] Prolegomena, p. 9.
[2] The Nature of the Relation between Ethics and Economics, p. 7.
[3] Prolegomena, p. 331 f.
[4] Ibid., p. 334.
[5] Ibid., p. 391-395.

a question requiring an analysis of facts and circumstances, self-realization will direct what effects to look for in the analysis and what values to put upon them.[1] However Ayres maintains that Green has not done even so much as he claims, nor has he given anything beyond "traditional acquiescence in convenient dogma".

8. Mackenzie, J.S.: Manual of Ethics. (University Tutorial Press, London, 1904)

Mackenzie does not give a very lengthy discussion of Green's ethics, but makes repeated references to Green's works, especially to the Prolegomena. In twenty or more instances he supplements the statement of his own theory with references to Green's views on the subject. He is mentioned by Rashdall in The Theory of Good and Evil as a disciple of Green who has carried his theories too far.

With regard to the relation of pleasure to objects, Mackenzie states Green's view and discusses Sidgwick's objections to it. According to Green, pleasure can not be conceived as a feeling, apart from the objects which produce it; while according to Sidgwick pleasure may be regarded as an end of rational action whatever its contributing causes. Mackenzie sides with Green.

In his constructive statement of Green's system of ethics, Mackenzie emphasizes, more strongly than most writers, the rational element in self-realization. He says that the rational principle which is implicit in nature and animal life is in man more explicit.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 395.

"The significance of the moral life consists in the constant endeavor to make this principle more and more explicit - to bring out more and more completely our rational, self-conscious, spiritual nature".[1] Thus in seeking to distinguish the higher from the lower among our "universes" of desire, Green tells us to choose that which is most completely rational. The true self is the rational self, and while we can never hope fully to grasp the content of its universe we can at least approximate it by observing the principle of self-consistency.[2]

Another point in which Mackenzie refers to Green at considerable length is with regard to his comparison of modern with Greek conceptions of virtue. Mackenzie calls this section of the Prolegomena "the most original and suggestive chapter in the whole of that great work".[3] Green while recognizing the essential unity of the Greek and Christian moral consciousness, shows that in the personal virtues, e.g. courage and temperance, we have in modern times both extended the range of their application and have deepened our conception of the principle on which they rest.[4] This has come about through an extension of the area of human interests and a greater realization of the inwardness of the virtuous life.

[1] Manual of Ethics, p. 135.
[2] Ibid., pp 136-138
[3] Ibid., p. 272.
[4] Prolegomena, pp. 284-288.

9. Mackenzie, J.S. : Introduction to Social Philosophy. (Macmillan, London, 1890).

Mackenzie's Introduction to Social Philosophy, like his Manual of Ethics abounds in incidental references to Green (principally in foot-notes) without giving an explicit discussion of his philosophy. One or two points, in which he quotes Green at some length, are worthy of notice.

With regard to the question as to whether the will can be the end, an affirmative answer apparently involves a circulus in definiendo, for to will means to seek an end.[1] Green holds that this difficulty is not fatal to the theory, for while the same condition of will must be regarded alternately as a means and an end, there is a distinction between the full self-conscious realization of capabilities and the various acts of will by which such a realization is attained.[2] Mackenzie's point here is that Green avoids moving in a circle only by introducing another element, for the good-will is to be regarded as the highest good, not because it is the most desirable thing in itself, but because it is the fullest expression of self-realization.

Another point of some importance is Mackenzie's emphasis of Green's view regarding the limitations of civil law. According to Green, "the law can do only that in the doing of which it is not necessary that personal qualities should be displayed."[3] This

[1] Introduction to Social Philosophy, p, 197 f.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 205.
[3] Works, vol ii, p. 342 f.

is in harmony with the view that self-development is stimulated more by encouragement through education than by compulsion through law.

10. Barbour, G. F.: "Green and Sidgwick on the Community of the Good", Philosophical Review, (17) 1908.

Barbour gives an excellent comparison of the views of Green and Sidgwick regarding the common or non-competitive character of the good. On the whole he is favorable to Green's position, which he defends against Sidgwick's attacks, but the article is a fair and well-balanced presentation of both sides of the question.

Barbour begins with an historical review of the point at issue. He show that the community of the good may refer either to its social or to its non-competitive character. We find the former expressed in early Greek ethics, the latter expressed (though not fully developed) in Plato, and both conceptions fused in Stoic and early Christian ethics. Spinoza argues from the unity of reason to the unity, and hence the non-competitive character, of the good. Kant by a similar process passes from the autonomy of the will to the view that all good wills cooperate and harmonize in a "kingdom of ends".

In presenting Green's view Barbour shows its similarity to that of Spinoza and Kant. He quotes numerous passages from the Prolegomena which show that Green regarded the true good as being

both social and non-competitive. Since the true good consists in self-devotion to an ideal of mutual service, and therefore in the will to be good, there is no real conflict between self-realization and self-sacrifice.

Sidgwick on the contrary holds that Green has not properly reconciled the distinction between good for self and good for others. Barbour in reply admits that the moral life must be lived in a sphere of material goods which are competitive, but shows that since the true good consists in a good will which is unlimited in its exercise, the good remains non-competitive in spite of its material environment. Thus, while self-sacrifice may involve the giving up of material goods or of certain forms of enjoyment, it does not involve a sacrifice of ultimate good.

Barbour maintains, furthermore, that the question as to whether ethics is an empirical or a normative science rests upon the opposing positions represented by Green and Sidgwick. If it is to be simply empirical, it may rest on a hedonistic basis, which to be consistent must be also egoistic. But if ethics is to be a normative science, it must regard persons as ends rather than means, and must aim to have each member of the social order share in and work for the common good. The ideal of self-realization in union with self-sacrifice then becomes consistent and acquires validity as a supreme regulative principle.

11. Dewey, John and Tufts, J.H.: Ethics (Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1910)

We find in Dewey and Tufts' Ethics only a very meagre reference to Green, although where he is quoted it is apparently with respect and agreement. Green is credited with having pointed out the fundamental fallacy of psychological hedonism, i. e. the view that a desire can be aroused or created by the anticipation of its own satisfaction. Green is again quoted with approval in his recognition of the practical value of Utilitarianism. Excerpts are taken from his statements in the Prolegomena to show that while he was a consistent opponent of the hedonistic basis of Utilitarianism, he was nevertheless able to recognize the practical service of the theory in promoting political and social reform.

12. Everett, W. G.: Moral Values (Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1918).

Everett, like Dewey and Tufts, quotes Green occasionally but does not give a detailed discussion of his philosophy. He disagrees with Green's metaphysical method and says that ethics precedes and leads up to metaphysics[1]. He maintains that neither metaphysics nor theology has ever discovered a new type of human value, and it is their task to deal with the preservation and completion of values rather than to deal with the specific problems of morality. He disagrees also with Green's view that that good in the motive of an act is exactly balanced by the good in the consequence,[2]

[1] Moral Values, p. 12.
[2] Ibid., p. 286.

and says that such a view disregards too much the limitations imposed upon conduct by the lack of insight, skill, or power.

Everett quotes Green with more approval with regard to determinism. While Green himself was far from being as deterministic as Everett, certain passages in which Green protests against unmotived willing are introduced to bulwark Everett's position. One of these refers to the continuity of conduct whereby the choices of today are inseparably linked with the choices of yesterday.[1] Another is found in the fact that repentance and shame for evil conduct are possible only to a person whose action represents his character rather than some arbitrary freak of unmotived willing.[2] Everett introduces this point to show that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, but he does not give sufficient emphasis to the <u>self</u>-determinism of Green's theory.

[1]Prolegomena, p. 115.
[2]Ibid., p. 113.

E. Works Mainly Political.

The works dealing with Green's political theory are not numarous, but they have a distinctive characteristic. While his metaphysics, his general ethical theory, and (to a less extent)his religion have repeatedly been attacked by his critics with only an occasional champion to defend his position, those who have thought it worth while to write upon his political theory are unanimous in their approval. This is doubtless due to the fact that Green's political principles, while dependent upon his general ethical theory, are so dominated by his own practical interest in the common welfare that they are largely free from the flaws that may be detected in his theory as a whole.

1. MacCunn, John: Six Radical Thinkers (E. Arnold, London, 1907)

The article on "The Political Idealism of Thomas Hill Green" is the concluding chapter of a series of articles by John MacCunn on Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Cobden, Carlyle, Mazzini, and Green. The articles on the whole are keen and penetrating. They are written in a very attractive style, and while devoted expecially to the political aspects of each man's work they show

a thorough acquaintance with the philosophy underlying each type of political theory.

MacCunn's attitude toward Green is thoroughly sympathetic and appreciative. His quotations and references include not only the Principles of Political Obligation which is his chief object of study, but also the Prolegomena, Introduction to Hume, and most of Green's miscellaneous articles and addresses. While he does not give a detailed discussion of Green's metaphysics, he is apparently familiar with its main outlines. MacCunn's article is of special value from the standpoint of the present study for the reason that it gives considerable recognition to the religious foundation underlying Green's ethical principles. For this reason we shall reproduce it with more detail than would otherwise be necessary.

MacCunn, like Nettleship, regards Green's interest in political activities as being derived from two main origins, i.e., his own strong sense of public duty, and the application of his philosophical idealism. We have seen that his personal characteristics caused him to rank high the life of "the good neighbor and the honest citizen". MacCunn says that the central object of his philosophy, like that of Hegel, was to furnish a basis in reason by which to interpret the facts of human experience; and this object applied to civic interests meant the attempt from an idealistic standpoint to show the reasonableness of democratic citizenship.[1]

[1] Six Radical Thinkers, pp. 219-220.

MacCunn does not hesitate to assert that Green carried the spirit of religious devotion into his politics. This appears in his work, not in religious phraseology, but in his cardinal doctrine that the political life of man is a spiritual revelation. The "eternal consciousness" which is the basis of man's activity from a metaphysical standpoint, is likewise the true source of social institutions. Green believed profoundly that the moral and political life of man can not be made intelligible "except through the presence in so-called secular affairs of that universal spiritual force to which the religious consciousness bears witness".[1]

While neither Green nor MacCunn uses the term "objectivity of value", MacCunn in reproducing Green's thought gives a fine statement of its essential elements. He first shows how Green met the objections arising from the problem of evil. Obstructions which seem to thwart human progress are to be regarded not only as significant forces to be reckoned with (not overlooked as by the Puritans), but also, and more significant still, as material which in the divine plan may be transmuted to the service of higher ends.[2] Even the sins of men may be "overruled for good", for behind the selfish passions which darken the course of history we may see (as in the work of Napoleon) that the final results are good. In man's upward climb toward higher conceptions of

[1] Six Radical Thinkers, p. 225.
[2] Ibid., p. 226.

public good we see the immanence of the eternal consciousness.[1]

The positive side of Green's belief in the objectivity of values appears in his doctrine of the progressive spiritual revelation which comes to man through his ideals. The nerve of all progress is the presence and everlasting vitality of ideals,[2] for the contrast between what is and what ought to be is the force which shakes men from their lethargy and moves men to reform. Furthermore, the ideal is not only loftier but it is more real than the actual, for, says Green, "To anyone who understands a process of development the result being developed is the reality."[3] The seeming paradox, that the ideal is found in experience, yet is more real than any of our particular experiences, becomes more clear if we regard "the far-off divine event" as a communication to the human spirit of the divine. Ideals are not mere guesses and gropings of the human imagination; they are revelations of that larger spiritual life which is working toward results far greater and more truly real than anything mankind has yet attained.

MacCunn points out that this conception of political life as a revelation of the Divine Idea tended to make Green both a conservative and a radical.[4] It gave him on the one hand a high respect for existing institutions which though imperfect were an earnest of better things to come; and on the other hand his passion for the ideal led him to throw himself into the battle for

[1] Six Radical Thinkers, p. 228.
[2] Ibid., p. 231.
[3] Works, vol. iii, p. 224.
[4] Six Radical Thinkers, p. 236-237.

its realization with the enthusiasm of a prophet. Green himself may be termed a sober-minded visionary.

In discussing Green's specific political interests, MacCunn points out that in many respects he stood for the same principles as Bright and Cobden and the other radicals of his day, --sympathy with the middle classes and laboring men, acceptance of free trade, respect for non-conformity, dislike of ecclesiasticism, belief in parliamentary reform, national education, land-law reform, interest in the Irish land acts and the disestablishment of the Irish church, and in American politics ardent sympathy with the Northern cause.[1]

Yet Green differed from the other radicals of his time in the stress which he constantly laid upon social and political institutions, These, as we have seen, he valued as the result of the action of the Universal Spirit; and in keeping with his ethical theory he also esteemed them for their value as a means to the development of individual character. MacCunn points out that Green agreed with the Utilitarian radicals in stressing the practical value of political institutions, but that he did so, not on a hedonistic basis, but for their instrumental function in up-building the lives of men.[2]

MacCunn also compares Green with Bentham and Mill with regard to their conception of society. Like them, Green is an

[1] Six Radical Thinkers, p. 236-237.
[2] Ibid., pp 241-243.

individualist, but he avoids their atomic individualism which regards society as merely an aggregate of units. His individualism, like that of Aristotle and Hegel from which it is largely derived, takes the form of a protest against the fallacy of abstraction involved in regarding society as something existing in itself. He stresses the fact that the welfare of the nation consists solely in the welfare of its individual citizens, yet this is not inconsistent with his other doctrine that man is by nature fundamentally social. A national will is not a mere aggregate of individual wills; yet it is only through the individual wills of socially minded persons that it finds its substance and its force.[1]

In discussing Green's belief that political institutions should be democratic, MacCunn points out that Green's personal sympathies were strongly democratic, yet he built his system not on sympathies (nor on sentimentalism as did Rousseau), but like Hegel he founded it on reason.[2] He accepted Kant's dictum that persons should be treated, not as means, but as ends in themselves. But instead of falling into Kant's error of exalting the moral law above human feelings and desires, Green regarded these feelings and desires as the distinguishing mark of humanity, and the incipient promise by which human nature despite its frailties may rise to higher attainments. The less civilized races and the less developed members of society are to be regarded, not in the light

[1] Six Radical Thinkers, p. 245.
[2] Ibid., p. 248.

of what they are, but of what they have it in them potentially to become.[1] It is this conception of the dignity of humanity, joined with his conviction that the ideal is the truly real, which forms the foundation of his democratic sympathies.[2]

A significant point of agreement with Kant is found in his doctrine that duty is more fundamental than rights. He believed that because God has given man the capacity for duty he must claim his rights in order to be able to do his duty. Once more, we find that Green's theory hinges upon the reality of the ideal and man's kinship with God; for he argues for rights not as an end in themselves but as an aid to the fulfillment of man's high moral destiny. The same line of thought is found in his conception of freedom, for he believed that true freedom consists not in the mere possession of rights, but in the satisfying fulfillment of civic duties. Thus the only genuine freeman is the fully developed man and citizen who endeavors to exercise his God-given powers.[3]

On the mooted question of state interference, Green again makes the development of the citizen's character the real criterion. His favorite phrase "the removal of obstructions" must be interpreted as involving more than a negative connotation. He was in favor of any legislation which would favor the development of personality. Yet none protested more vigorously against

[1] Prolegomena, p. 236.
[2] Six Radical Thinkers, pp. 249- 251.
[3] Ibid., pp. 256-259.

the inadequacy of mere legislation to take the place of religion and morality. His plea for laissez-faire was based upon the conviction that no external compulsion can force a man into right relations with God nor supply the inner springs of action without which no conduct is truly moral. For he believed that only through an inward growth can man attain to the life of the good neighbor and the honest citizen.[1]

MacCunn's interpretation of Green's political theory requires little further comment. It appears not only to be an appreciative statement of Green's position, but to be an accurate and well-balanced presentation of political idealism. MacCunn justifies his inclusion of Green among the six radical thinkers discussed on the ground that Green's conception of civic duty as a spiritual function was a radical position; and it is apparent that MacCunn is himself more closely in harmony with Green's position than with that of Bentham, Mill, Cobden, Carlyle, or Mazzini. He seems to regard Green as possessing most of the merits without the faults of the other five.

2. Ritchie, D.G.: Principles of State Interference (Swan, Sonnenschein & Company, London, 1891.

The book by Ritchie entitled "Principles of State Interference" consists of four essays dealing with the political

[1] Six Radical Thinkers, pp. 260-266.

philosophy of Spencer, Mill and Green. In the first two he attacks Spencer's individualistic and biological conception of society, and the laissez faire attitude toward the State which results from it. The third essay in which he criticises J. S. Mill's conception of individual liberty is in reality the most constructive section of the book, for in it Ritchie states his own idea of the true function of the state and applies it to particular problems. The last chapter, which deals specifically with Green, contains a restatement of Ritchie's own views, in which he is in close agreement with Green.

The true object of the state, Ritchie says, is "the realization of the best life by the individual" -- a best life which is possible only in an organized society or state.[1] As to what constitutes this best life, the ideal determines the actual but is also determined by it. Ideals advance as man advances, and the good man of any age is the standard of goodness for that age.[2] In the education of the race, correction and modification of erroneous ideals are necessary, but the guiding principle of the common good remains unchanged.

This, in brief, is Ritchie's own theory which he opposes (with considerable sarcasm) to Spencer's naturalism and Mill's utilitarianism. This it will be noted, is very similar to Green's theory, but with an important difference. Ritchie,

[1] Principles of State Interference, p. 102.
[2] Ibid., p. 103.

makes no attempt, as Green does, to rest the validity of the ideal upon an objective or religious basis. Though not anti-religious or anti-theistic, he seems to regard the progressive development of the ideal as a merely human achievement, and makes no mention of an objective foundation.

This theory of the good he applies to the question of State interference with regard to certain specific problems: the regulation of opinion (e.g. as in religious persecution); compulsory education; free trade; and factory legislation. He shows that the policy to be followed in each case depends upon what contributes to the highest physical, intellectual, and moral welfare of the community. Restraint in itself, he says, is neither good nor bad, but may be good or bad according to the end for which it is used. This view-point we perceive to be in harmony with Green's position that it is the human values to be attained which determine the propriety of State legislation.

Turning to Ritchie's discussion of Green's philosophy per se, we find that he regards Green as practically the only English philosopher who has advocated a political theory consistent with his philosophy. The individualistic prejudices of Spencer hindered him form giving an adequate treatment of the nature of the state, and while in Mill we can trace some connection between his psychical atomism and his political individualism,

the connection is far-fetched. Most of the practical reformers have given little attention to philosophy, and vice versa, but in Green we find a meeting-point of the speculative and practical interests.

Ritchie like MacCunn asserts that the point of contact between Green's metaphysics and ethics is found in his theory of the self. Otherwise his self-realization theory would be simply egoistic hedonism; for the pleasure seeker might safely claim that he was realizing himself as much as the philanthropist, were it not for the fact that the self is more than a series of feelings. Furthermore in interpreting self-realization as the realization of the common good, he finds a logical basis for the altruism which the utilitarian may introduce, but without logical foundation. Ritchie points out that in many practical issues Green is fully in accord with Mill, but that he (Green) is more consistent in his altruism and in his criterion for preferring the higher pleasures to the lower.

3. Muirhead, J.H.: The Service of the State (John Murray, London, 1908)

This work consists of a series of four lectures devoted to Green's political philosophy. While its main interest is in Green's political theory, the author also presents an excellent

survey of the general aspects of Green's thought in their relation to his politics. While Muirhead's analysis is very comprehensive, we shall limit our discussion of it chiefly to the elements which have not been given full consideration in connection with MacCunn and Ritchie.

In his first chapter entitled "The Problem of the Seventies", Muirhead makes the interesting observation that of the three outstanding men of Oxford at that period, Jowett, Nettleship and Green, the latter undoubtedly exerted the deepest influence. The source of this influence Muirhead attributes to the union in Green of the ideal citizen and the idealist philosopher. The problem of the times as stated by Green himself was to reconcile the conflicting claims of the modern spirit "to be free, to understand, and to enjoy"[1]---a reconciliation which could only be brought about by putting a more rational basis for life in the place of the old sensationalistic philosophy. This affords the raison d'être for his effort and for his vital influence.

Muirhead makes an interesting comparison of Green's position with that of pragmatism. While Green has often been attacked by humanistic writers(see Leland, Dewey, etc.[2]) as being "the prince of intellectualists, a metaphysical Frankenstein who spent himself in setting up as the ultimate truth of things a

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 94.
[2] Supra, p.100 f, 109, 135.

logical monster unrelated to human purposes". Muirhead maintains that his starting-point at least was humanistic, for he wanted to establish through philosophy a working basis for human effort.[1] The charge often brought against him by pragmatists, that he undermines the value of human effort by making it merely a reproduction of results already achieved by the eternal consciousness, involves a misconstruction of his theory; for the Absolute is not a mere timeless summation of perfection, but is the underlying reality of the temporal life of man.[2]

Muirhead in discussing Green's theory of the good makes a significant observation regarding the relation of pragmatism to evolution. The pragmatist who turns to evolution in order to determine from a sociological standpoint what "works", is in danger of falling into the error of confusing origin with value and of applying the pragmatic test on a narrow or utilitarian basis.[3] Muirhead points out that Green was the first to use the theory of evolution to demonstrate the reality and validity of an objective ideal which is being progressively revealed to man. He thus turned the flank of naturalism by showing that the history of civilization itself gives evidence that it is the end being developed which is the true reality.[4] The value of any step must be judged, therefore, in the light of ends rather than origins.

[1] The Service of the State, p.8.
[2] Ibid., p. 18.
[3] Ibid., p. 32.
[4] Ibid., p. 41.

In considering Green's conception of the true good as personal and social, Muirhead maintains that it is the union of these two elements in one which forms the real ground-work of Green's political theory. On any other basis it is impossible to reconcile the claims of the individual with those of society. Hedonism attempts to do so, but can succeed only by a tour de force.[1] But if the good of self is so closely bound up by nature with the good of others that self-realization involves the service of others as an essential element, there is no longer any real conflict. Muirhead also indicates the relation which exists between this standpoint and the principles of religion; for he says, " Personality lives in the material ends with which society supplies it, society lives through the form that free personality impresses on its purposes.. ...It is the ethical and political counterpart of the religious principle that he that seeketh his life shall lose it, he that loseth it shall find it".[2]

This conception of the organic unity of the individual society forms the basis of Green's theory of the State. The State is not to be regarded as some external force which limits the natural rights of individuals, but is on the other hand an expression of the corporate will of society. The older political philosophies, from the time of Hobbes to that of Spencer,

[1] The Service of the State, p. 36.
[2] Ibid., p. 37.

though showing no close connection with the general philosophical systems of their founders, had been based in general on a theory of individualism which regarded the State as a secondary and artificial product.[1] But Green, starting with the idea of the community of man's essential interests, considered civil law not as a means of restriction upon the free pursuit of individual ends but as a means of securing the highest welfare both of the individual and society. His theory is summed up in the formula, "Will, not force, is the basis of the State".

The subordinate elements of Green's political theory all follow from his conception of the nature of the self and society, and the objectivity of the ideal, Institutions then become the habits of society and the concrete embodiment of the ideal. Circumstances are to be regarded not as external and purposeless factors but as representations of the influence of the general over the particular will.[2] Great men contribute to the life of their times by being the exponents of man's deeper purposes and the correctors of ~~the~~ shallow (though often prevalent) impulses.[3] The general will itself, though not always noble, rises to heights of idealism in a crisis and reveals the spirit of the Greater Will which shapes man's destinies.[4]

From the organic nature of society, it follows also

[1] The Service of the State, p. 51.
[2] Ibid., p. 64.
[3] Ibid., p. 66.
[4] Ibid., p. 67.

that the rights of the individual are always relative to society. Green says, "It is on the relation to a society, to other men recognizing a common good, that the individual's rights depend, as much as the gravity of a body depends on its relation to other bodies".[1] Every man therefore has a right to be treated as a member of society, and though not to be free from society, to have the freedom of it.[2] The issue in political reform is not a question of the rights of man against society, but of a better form of society against a worse.

Green's treatment of the right of property is typical of his general attitude. Property is more than the appropriation of some object for selfish purposes; it is a means whereby the possessor may serve society through adding to his own efficiency. On any other basis it is robbery.[3] The justification of private property as opposed to communism is found in the theory that the welfare of society is served best through individual ownership. "The rationale of property", Green says, "is that every one should be secured by society in the power of getting and keeping the means of realizing a will which in possibility is a will directed to social good".[4]

In the closing chapter which deals with the relation of Green's theory to national politics, Muirhead points out that

[1] Works, vol. ii, p. 416.
[2] The Service of the State, p. 71.
[3] Ibid., p 79.
[4] Works, vol. ii, p. 526.

Green was in thorough agreement with Mill in his defense of political liberty and the demand for the enfranchisement of the masses. Both believed that the vote was necessary in order to turn the natural loyalty of the people in the direction of intelligent citizenship. However, Muirhead takes issue with Hobhouse's statement that in Mill the motive for democracy lies deeper than in Green. Muirhead maintains (rightly I think) that in Mill the democratic spirit is largely out of harmony with his philosophy, while in Green it is a corporate element of it. It is not to secure a transient happiness but to secure a greater realization of man's divinely-appointed destiny that political reform must be enacted.

4. Bosanquet, Bernard: The Philosophical Theory of the State (Macmillan, London, 1899).

This work is included here, not because it gives a specific discussion of Green, but because it contains so many references to him and is so often quoted in connection with his political theory. It is evident that the Principles of Political Obligation constitutes a very important background to Bosanquet's political thinking.

It is scarcely necessary to enumerate all the instances in which Bosanquet makes reference to Green's works. Among

them we may note his doctrine of the "hindering of hindrances", which is identical with Green's plea for the "removal of obstacles" to personal development. He draws upon Green also in stating his conception of liberty, which is not simply the juristic idea of freedom from constraint, but involves also the freedom to act according to the principles of self-determination.[1] The philosophical idea of freedom is stated by Bosanquet, in harmony with Green, to consist of "being one's self in fullest sense". Bosanquet likewise agrees with Green in his conception of rights, which are defined as "that which is really necessary to the maintenance of material conditions essential to the existence and perfection of human personality".[2] Bosanquet in his general philosophical position follows Hegel more closely than Green, but in his political theory his viewpoint is very similar.

5. Leland, Abby Porter: The Educational Theory and Practice of T.H.Green. Columbia Contributions to Education, No. 46. (Columbia University Press, 1911).

This book, which was apparently written as a doctor's dissertation at Columbia, contains a good summary of Green's life and social theory, but in other respects it is very disappointing. A large part of its sixty pages consists of lengthy verbatim quotations from Green and his critics, many of which are repeated at various intervals. The book contains a helpful bibliography,

[1] The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 137 f.
[2] Ibid., p. 203, quoted from Prin. of Pol. Obligation,

although this does not by any means exhaust the list of works dealing with Green. Green's metaphysics is introduced only incidentally, the paucity of its treatment being evidenced by the fact that in only one or two instances does the author refer to the "eternal consciousness", and to the theory of relations not at all.

However, the work is not without its merits, and in spite of the limitations noted, it contains a good many valuable ideas. While these are scattered at random throughout the book, we shall attempt to bring together and note the most significant of these.

The author's reason for undertaking a study of Green's educational theory is not that he gives a specifically worked out educational system, but that he lays down principles on which an educational system can be built. As Miss Leland puts it, "Green's aim was not educational in its reference.....but educational in its essence"[1]; and she makes a good deal of Professor Dewey's statement, "Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things". It is on this basis that she maintains (and I think rightly) that Green's philosophy affords a good basis for educational theory. For Green, instead of es-

[1] The Educational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, p. 4.

tablishing a set of rules for conduct, gives us rather the principles of self-development by which the individual may learn to make decisions in concrete situations. He gives us also the raison d'être for education, for the whole business of education is the development of personality in accordance with the principles of self-realization.

In the chapter on Green's ethical philosophy, the author discusses at some length Green's theory of the self and the ideal. While her account of the finite self does justice to Green's conception, she leaves out of account almost entirely the eternal consciousness. Through this omission, she not only fails to give an adequate presentation of a most essential element of Green's philosophy, but she also fails to provide any real basis for the realization of the values which are advocated by her educational theory. She approaches the problem from a pragmatic and positivistic standpoint, and in fact, she makes the interesting observation that while Green is a pragmatist and humanist in his ethical theory, he is too intellectualistic in his metaphysics.[1] If this attributing of pragmatism and humanism to Green means simply that he was interested in life and all its activities, there is justification for the statement.[2] But if these terms are taken in their technical sense (as popularized by Dewey) Green would scarcely choose to be complimented by these

The Educational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, p. 24.
Supra, p. 129.

titles. The "intellectualistic" element (wherein Miss Leland assumes that he has fallen into error), though it has difficulties of its own, is nevertheless the basis for a theistic view which is essential to a metaphysical interpretation of the realization of the ideal.

However, the author gives an excellent account of the finite aspects of the moral ideal, and of its relation to selfhood. She quotes at length from the Prolegomena to show that it is "an abiding satisfaction of an abiding self" which ensures responsibility for conduct. In Green's words, "If I could trammel up the consequence of that which at any time I am and do; if there could be any break of continuity between what I shall be and what I am; then indeed I might be reckless of what I do, so long as it is pleasant".[1] She also quotes effectively to show the similarity between Green's conception of the true good and that found in the Greek classification of the virtues.

In the chapter on Green's social and political institutions the author brings out very well Green's conception of the organic nature of society, in which there is an inseparable relation of individuals to each other and to society as a whole. On this basis the question of the priority of the individual becomes not only insoluble but meaningless. Only by a synoptic view can their true relations be determined.[2]

[1] Prolegomena, p. 126.
[2] The Educational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, p. 33.

The author gives also an excellent statement of Green's theory of the origin of moral ideas and institutions, and of their mutual relations. "The condition of a moral life", according to Green, "is the possesssion of will and reason", and "all moral ideas have their origin in reason, i.e., in the idea of a possible self-perfection to be attained by the moral agent".[1] Moral progress tends to bring about the harmony of will and reason, and becomes crystalized in institutions. Institutions then may be regarded as the actualization of the moral ideal, or as the habits of society. Their value, according to Green, lies in their concrete realization of the capacities of will and reason which are indispensable to moral life.[2]

Of the function of the various human institutions, Miss Leland says that the essence of Green's political philosophy may be expressed in terminology borrowed from Aristotle, "For as the state (i.e.,institutions) was formed to make life possible, so it exists to make life good".[3] That is, the sole purpose of the family, civil society, the church, etc. is to contribute to the common good. It is on this basis alone that questions of enfranchisement, property rights, etc. must be settled. Since all virtues are in a sense social, there is no real conflict between the good of the individual and the good of society.[4]

[1] Works, vol. ii, p. 337.
[2] The Educational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, pp. 34-36.
[3] Politics, Book I, Chapter 2.
[4] Works, vol. ii, pp. 550, 428, 450, et al.

In the chapter which deals specifically with Green's educational theory and practice, the author dwells upon Green's desire to bring education within reach of the middle and lower classes, to improve the position of teachers, and to raise the standards both of instruction and of organization. All this is based, of course, on the theory that every person has a right to the free development of his personality to the limit of his capabilities. "Green's entire endeavor in theory and practice appears to have been to vindicate the essential reasonableness of the claim of the modern spirit 'to be free, to understand, and to enjoy'".[1] Attention is called to Green's desire that the common school system, in extending its scope to the masses, should level up without leveling down.[2] All this of course is very true, and its recognition is very important to educational theory. But Miss Leland does not say very much which is original or profound.

[1] The Educational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, p. 53.
[2] Works, vol. iii, pp. 459-460.

F. Works Mainly Religious.

The most striking characteristic of the works which deal with Green's religious views is their scarcity. We have seen that his philosophy of religion, though unsystematized, is nevertheless a very essential element of his thought. The religious essays of the third volume of his published works serve to supplement and illuminate materially his more technical writings. But while Green has any number of critics to discuss his metaphysics and his ethics pro and con, most of them apparently do not think his religion (except such elements as are implied in his general metaphysical system) to be worthy of any consideration.

1. Chubb, Percival: "The Significance of Thomas Hill Green's Philosophical and Religious Teaching". Journal of Speculative Philosophy (22) 1888.

The article consists of a semi-popular account of Green's principal philosophical ideas and their relation to religion. Chubb opens his discussion by commenting upon the general tendency of the day to find solace for its loss of religion by recourse to agnosticism and to culture. Both, according to Green (and the author) are futile, for the only safety lies in a rational and consistent view of human life in which religion is included. "It is the true Nemesis of human life that any spiritual impulse not

accompanied by clear and comprehensive thought is enslaved by its own realization", says Green. While the claim of the modern spirit is "to be free, to understand, and to enjoy", the popular philosophy of materialism and agnosticism leads only to confusion and despair.

Chubb then gives an excellent summary of the historical setting in which Green's work appeared, emphasizing especially the Humean philosophy which had dominated English thought before his time. He traces, as Green does, the connection between Hume's sensationalism and Spencer's evolutionary philosophy, and shows that in Spencer's view the associations have become racial but are of the same general nature. "It is at bottom the same old contention that the edifice of thought is built up of bricks of sensation, cemented by the tendency to association. The only difference is that the flux of the mind's thoughts and sensations is styled a series of states of consciousness: but it is still a straggling disorderly procession with no spectator to view it, or know it as a procession".[1] In contrast with the tendency of English philosophy to follow Hume, numerous poets and writers were defending idealism and the religious faith. But it was the task of Green to establish the soundness of religion, not through literature, but through philosophy.

The distinction between philosophy and religion, as

[1]The Significance of T. H. Green's Philosophical and Religious Teaching, Jour. Spec. Phil. (22) 1888, p. 8.

stated by Chubb, is that philosophy aims to give a calm statement of ultimate truths, while religion is the response of the mind, heart, and imagination to these truths, i.e., religion is not simply "morality touched with emotion", as Matthew Arnold says, but it is "philosophy touched with emotion".[1] Religion to Green meant "the intellectual vision of the divine unity of the world and the mystical sense of the communion between the individual and the universal spirit.[2]

Green's conception of sin is stated to be "partiality, defect, negation" - a conception which follows from the rest of his view of the world, for as intellectual error consists in regarding partial relations as totality, so "sin consists in the individual's making his own self his object, not in the possible expansion in which it becomes that true will of humanity, which is also God's, but under the limitations of momentary appetite or interest".[3]

With regard to the Christian revelation, Chubb in discussing Green's attitude toward miracle and the historicity of Jesus, emphasizes Green's view that the true meaning of the incarnation and the resurrection lie in their symbolism of the spirit of God incarnate in all mankind and the "death into life" which is the essence of the moral life. "The importance of

[1] T. H. Green's Philosophical and Religious Teaching, Jour. Spec. Phil. (22) 1888, p. 14.
[2] Ibid., p. 15.
[3] Ibid. P, 16.

Christ to us lies not in his supposed advent as a Messiah, or his supernatural place in a scheme of redemption; but, as it lay for his apostle Paul, in the power of his spirit and example".[1] While this interpretation of Paul is open to question, the statement accords with the "modified unitarianism" with which Green labels his theological views.

Of the relation of Christianity to the other religions, Chubb brings out the fact that Green states a decided preference for Christianity, not on grounds of prejudice or authority, but on the basis of its practical value in inspiring life to nobler effort. The idea of "death into life", which is the source of the divine element in man, has in other religions lain barren. Green's applications of the pragmatic test of truth to religion is seen further in his statement, "As the primary Christian idea is that of a moral death into life, as wrought for us and in us by God, so its realization, which is the evidence of its truth, lies in Christian love.....All other evidence is fleeting and accidental, but this abides".[2] The pragmatic test does not here conflict with coherence but supplements it.

Chubb closes with an appreciative statement of the unswerving loyalty with which Green not only insisted that religion must reveal itself in moral living, but put into practice his own ideals. The article as a whole gives a fair presentation of Green's

T. H. Green's Philosophical and Religious Teaching, Jour. Spec. Phil. (22) 1888, p. 17.
Ibid., quoted, p. 18.

views and contains little that is open to criticism.

2. Upton, C.B: "Theological Aspects of the Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green", The New World (1) 1892.

This theological discussion forms an interesting contrast to the one by Chubb previously noted, for while Chubb is expository rather than controversial, Upton is decidedly controversial without being sufficiently expository. His own position seems to be a combination of personalism and theistic realism, and Dr. Martineau, repeatedly quoted, appears to be the author of his "philosophical Scriptures".

Of Green, Upton has scarcely a single good word to say, except for the purity of his life (which nobody seems able to assail). In his philosophy, he ranks him solely and completely as a Hegelian. The Hegelian philosophy Upton regards as hostile to religion, and Green is singled out for denunciation as a typical representative of this school. While Upton says a good many things that are true in showing the inadequacy of the Hegelian elements of Green's thought, I should have more respect for his criticism if he had read Green far enough to discover that he was not entirely a Hegelian.

The first objection he raises (which we have often met before)[1] is that the eternal consciousness "performs merely the function of giving logical unity to the infinite variety of phenomena".[2]

[1] Supra, pp. 42, 47, 59, 61, 64, 86 etc.
[2] Theological Aspects of the Philosophy of T. H. Green, New World (1) 1892, p. 141.

He bases his attack on Green's rather unfortunate statement (made in refutation of supernaturalism) that the spiritual principle which gives unity to the universe must not be regarded as a Causal Will for the explanation of natural phenomena. On the same basis Upton charges Green with having made no provision for the direct communication of religious content from God to man through revelation. Upton overlooks entirely the aspect of Green's thought which makes man's whole religious and moral life a manifestation of the indwelling presence of God.

Another charge which he brings against Green is that his philosophy fails to accord with the facts of the moral consciousness, especially as involved in sin. He declares that Green has not dealt successfully with ethical and spiritual facts, and has tended to weaken the pre-existing interest in theology. He bases this objection on the ground that Green's conception is a "thorough-pantheism", in which the eternal consciousness acts for man and allows him no individual moral responsibility. He assumes (without attempting to prove) that Green's philosophy is thoroughly pantheistic.

A closely related point of attack is directed against Green's view of moral freedom, which Upton declares is in reality determinism. In connection with this he enters upon a spirited defense of the "transcendent self", which he says is necessary to any adequate conception of moral freedom. "The moral consciousness

involves the activity of a metaphysical or noumenal self which has, not is, the various ideas and habits which make up its character".[1] So he objects strenuously to Green's view that "the character is the man". What he is apparently trying to do is to refute sensationalism, but he has not discovered that Green has already done it for him.

Another criticism of Green, which involves a serious misunderstanding of him, is directed against his view of immortality. Basing his argument on the page devoted to the "fragment on Immortality", Upton claims that Green makes man simply a phase of the eternal thought, which after ceasing to be the vehicle of this eternal thought is fused with it and loses all personal identity. He apparently does not know that in the Prolegomena Green expressly argues for personal immortality on the ground that the continued development of personality in a social medium requires it.

His concluding statement is that in a "metaphysical dream" the idealist may persuade himself that nature has no reality save in the thought that thinks it, and the soul no reality but eternal thought, but contact with practical life and its moral problems will prove the contrary. And he thinks he has discovered something which Green did not suspect!

[1] Theological Aspects of the Philosophy of T. H. Green, New World (1) 1892, p. 153.

3. Lilly, W.S.: "Works of Thomas Hill Green". Dublin Review (22)1889

This article consists of a review of Nettleship's edition of Green's works, and since it is largely biographical and expository it will not require lengthy comment. However, it has one very interesting feature not found in most articles on Green; namely, that it is written from an avowedly Catholic standpoint. The writer expresses his motive in the words, "My aim will be to expound, not to judge. And indeed, for the well-instructed Catholic student, this should be sufficient".[1] At the close of his exposition he repeats this observation with the remark that ill-instructed Catholic students, though not numerous, are entitled to some consideration. So he proceeds to criticize Green briefly for their benefit.

The main criticism which he brings against Green's philosophy is that he adopts an abstract form of consciousness. "Hence it not seldom becomes a system in the air, suitable perhaps to the dwellers in Cloud Cuckoo Town, but hardly adapted 'for human nature's daily food'".[2] Lilly adds that if he had consulted St. Thomas, or some of his expositors, he would have seen that the self is a concrete act of experience. The criticism is not developed sufficiently to be very effective (at least to a non-Catholic student).

[1] Works of Thomas Hill Green, Dublin Review (22) 1889, p. 100.
[2] Ibid. p. 117.

Another criticism (which has greater validity) is directed against Green's separation of the historical Jesus from the Christ of faith. Green assumes that we can hold to the latter without the former. But (to quote Lilly's somewhat unfortunate figure), "If we would drink wine, there would needs be a vessel from which to imbibe it".[1] He says further, "The facts contain the revelation: the Idea without the Person is empty.....Reject historical Christianity, and in the course of a very few years, how much definite Christianity will be left?" And I think he is right. Christianity, like philosophy, to be secure must be grounded in a Person rather than an abstract principle.

4. Porter, Noah: "The Late Professor Green of Oxford". New Englander and Yale Review (50) 1889.

This article combines the functions of giving a biographical sketch of Green's life and personality and a review of the Nettleship edition of his works. His educational and political theory are discussed at some length, the latter being characterized as "a theory in which seemed to be blended the poetry of Chivalry, the prose of Radicalism, and the consecration of Religion". Green's theology, however, receives more explicit treatment than any other aspect of his thought.

[1] Works of Thomas Hill Green, Dublin Review, (22) 1889, p. 117.

Another criticism (which has already been mentioned) is directed against Green's assumption of an "original" state of nature. Green argues that we can hardly imagine the future. But (the question) is meaningless unless in figure). "If we could trace it, that would be a reason for how with to create it." Green's reply is "the state of nature was not the idea which Green [illegible] ....Because life-[illegible] Obviously, in any sense of a word, to [illegible] much as this [illegible] be [illegible] I [illegible] obviously. [illegible] pol[illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Porter speaks in the highest terms of the value of Green's theological attitude in his calling attention to the uses and abuses of dogmatic theology, in combatting an unspiritual acclesiasticism, and in bringing out the fact that the creeds are largely the products of the schools and hence not to be confused with the faith of the church. But Porter does not agree at all with Green's attitude toward the historicity of Jesus. He thinks that Green very much underestimated the impression which Jesus made upon the people of his own generation and especially upon Paul. He takes issue with Green's assertion that Paul's conversion occurred "in spite of ignorance of the facts of our Lord's life prior to his death as detailed in the synoptical gospels".[1] Porter maintains that such an exegesis of Paul's relation to Jesus does violence both to the principles of rational psychology and of historical criticism. He assumes (though not quite fairly) that Green treated the story of the earthly life of Jesus as largely mythological. While this is somewhat farther than Green actually went, Porter on the whole gives an excellent statement of the discrepancies in Green's conception of the person of Christ.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 161.

IV. Critical Analysis of Green's Treatment of Metaphysics, Ethics, and Religion.

In the preceding pages a good many problems relating to Green's metaphysical, ethical and religious views have been touched upon. It is now our task to attempt a more minute analysis of the outstanding features of his system, and at the risk of some repetition to bring together the main points by which to evaluate the merits of his work.

1. Metaphysical problems.

Since it is the primary purpose of this study to discover the relations between Green's ethical theory and his religious thought, metaphysical questions will of necessity be limited to outstanding features. But owing to the fact that his ethical and religious views rest upon his metaphysics, the latter must receive consideration. In discussing Green's metaphysics we shall take up in turn his epistemology, his theory of relations, his conception of the self -- finite and infinite, his idea of freedom, and his belief in the objectivity of value.

a. Epistemology .

We shall start with his epistemology because Green himself makes it his starting-point. He makes no clear dividing line between epistemology and metaphysics. In fact, a serious weakness of his system is found in the fact that he often fails

to distinguish between the two. Both logically and chronologically he begins with the consideration of the question "How is knowledge possible?" and on his answer to this question he proceeds to build his metaphysical system. We shall first state briefly the main outlines of his epistemology and then shall offer some criticisms upon it.

Green's epistemological position in general is that of Kant. He insists upon the activity of the self in knowledge, and in connection with his theory of relations (in which the world is regarded as a single all-inclusive system) he makes the self an indispensable factor in bringing together these relations and giving them meaning. This "synthetic unity ofapperception" is further extended to account not only for the grasping of these relations by the finite mind but for their very existence, and accordingly he proceeds to an epistemological proof of the existence of God.

Green's earlier works are devoted very largely to an attempt to reveal the inadequacies of empiricism. In his Introduction to Hume, he discusses the epistemology of Locke , Berkely and Hume, with the conclusion that in each case there has been an attempt to build up a knowledge of the external world on a basis which can give it no true unity or reality. Locke's fatal weakness he thinks arises from his method of trying to base all conclusions regarding the origin and nature of knowledge on

passive observation of what goes on in one's own mind, without due regard for the objective world which is perceived.[1] Berkeley's chief error (as interpreted by Green) lies in regarding the material world as a mere succession of feelings (i.e. sensations) with the conclusion that material substance is a fiction.[2] Hume, following Locke's premises to their conclusion, could find nothing in his mind when he "looked into it" except a mass of sense impressions which had no connecting bond except as they were somehow worked over into ideas by the uncertain alchemy of association.[3] In protest against such sceptical and inadequate conclusions, Green insists upon an objective mode of approach which shall do justice both to the world as actually experienced and to the nature of the subject who experiences it.

In his lectures on Spencer and Lewes, Green carries further his attack on empiricism by showing that Spencer's philosophy, under the guise of "transfigured realism", fails to give any adequate solution of the problem of knowledge. Spencer makes the object exist apart by itself, prior to and independent of the subject, and then assumes that the object somehow causes mental activity in the consciousness of the subject. This Green shows to be untenable on the ground that the subject-object relation is an indispensable aspect of all knowledge and that neither subject nor object has any reality apart from the other.[4] While Green does not

[1] Works, vol. i, pp. 7, 11, et al.
[2] Ibid., p. 157.
[3] Ibid., p. 162 f.
[4] Ibid., p. 387.

use the terms epistemological monism and dualism, his affirmation that every act of knowledge involves both a subject and an object indicates that his general position is that of epistemological dualism.

In the Prolegomena, the question of the possibility of knowledge takes the form, "Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature?"[1] In reply he shows that the very fact of our ability to know nature implies a principle in man which is not natural, since the attempt to answer the question empirically or materialistically lands us in hopeless dilemmas. Matter and motion, he says, are merely expressions of relations found in our conscious experience, and however much we may seek to explain experience by them, the very fact of there being an explanation remains unexplained.[2] From the inadequacy of material formulae to explain the possibility of knowledge or the source of thought relations, he concludes that an idealistic interpretation must be sought.

The most important aspect of his epistemology, aside from its relation to his metaphysics, is his conception of the test of truth. Sense perception (under the name of feeling) is shown in the Introduction to Hume to be an inadequate criterion, since it fails to meet the demands of a unitary system. Authority and tradition are rejected as criteria, as is evident in his

[1] Prolegomena, p. 11.
[2] Ibid. p. 14.

protests against the influence of religious dogma. The pragmatic test had not yet come into sufficient prominence to call forth any consideration. But in accordance with his view that reality is a "single unalterable, all-inclusive system of relations", he adopts unalterableness as a criterion. He insists that a thing is really what it is unalterably.[1] Appearances may change, but the real nature of the object remains the same amid changing manifestations. Thus the scientific quest for truth is merely the search for the uniformity or unalterableness which constitutes the real nature of the object of inquiry. On this basis he holds that Locke's antithesis between the real and the work of the mind is unfounded, for in a sense every act of the mind is real; but that it is nevertheless possible to distinguish between objective reality and illusion on account of the unalterableness of the relations which constitute ~~which constitute~~ the former.

Green has commonly been considered to be an exponent of the coherence criterion, and it is accordingly pertinent to inquire whether there is after all any real difference between coherence and unalterableness. It is evident that both rest upon the theory of truth as an organic whole. Whether a thing is true because it is an integral and consistent element of the system, or whether it is true because it can be depended upon to remain an unchanged element of the system, in either case it is the place it occupies in the system which makes it true. Green in

[1] Prolegomena, p. 29.

his practical application of the criterion makes no distinction between coherence and unalterableness and seems to assume that the one implies the other.

However, in theory at least, there is a difference. Green's description of reality is that of a "single, unalterable, all-inclusive system of relations". The distinction between unalterableness and coherence as a test of truth rests in turn upon the distinction between the adjectives "unalterable" and "all-inclusive". The former signifies the absence of change or variability; the latter the absence of omissions. Or (stated in positive terms) the difference is that between the sameness and the completeness of the system. It is evident that these concepts are not identical.

Having stated the essential elements of Green's epistemology, we may now attempt to make some criticisms upon it. Its outstanding merits lie in its refutation of empiricism and its insistence upon the activity of the self in knowledge. Green was thoroughly sound in insisting with Kant upon the "synthetic unity of apperception".

However, the charge is often raised that Green took from Kant a legitimate epistemology and made it over into an unwarranted metaphysics, and for this charge there is some justification. It may be said in Green's defense that he apparently did not intend to allow epistemology to usurp the place of meta-

physics. In his discussion of Spencer and Lewes, he states that metaphysics becomes a "presumptuous paradox" unless it is based upon an analysis of the objective world, and not upon the processes of our intelligence which presuppose that world.[1] The same idea is expressed in his refutation of Locke and Berkeley. But when he comes to build up his own metaphysics, we find that he does rest his system largely on epistemological grounds, Not only in the Prolegomena, but also in his Introduction to Hume, in his lectures on Kant, and his lectures on Logic, he starts with an examination of the conditions of knowledge, and it is by proving the inadequacy of empiricism that he establishes his own theory of the world as a system of knowable relations. His doctrines of the conscious self which experiences these relations and of the eternal consciousness which makes all knowledge possible, appear to be an outgrowth of his epistemological inquiries.

This raises the question as to whether the eternal consciousness is really "a hypostasized abstraction", "a mere unifying principle", "an epistemological monstrosity", as charged by many of his critics.[2] While a full discussion of this problem must be reserved for the following section, it may be said that in general Johnson's solution of the difficulty appears correct.[3] That is, Green saw that if the Ding an sich were eliminated from the Kantian conception of the synthetic unity of apperception, the self to have any value must be regarded as

[1] Works, vol. i, p. 377.
[2] Supra, pp. 42, 47, 59, 61, 64, 86 et al.
[3] Supra, p. 80.

metaphysically real, and on the same basis the Universal Self must be more than an epistemological unity. But Green does not make this point very clear, and he undoubtedly weakens his metaphysics by leaning too heavily on epistemology for its support. He seeks to avoid this fault by beginning ostensibly with the object known rather than with the knower. But as a matter of fact, in regards the objective world from the outset as a system of thought relations, and thus brings in an idealistic interpretation which rests upon epistemological grounds. Then when he seeks to find an explanation of this system of thought relations in a unifying principle, it is easy for him to slip (as Seth suggests) from "consciousness in general" to "universal consciousness".[1]

Another question may be raised regarding the consistency with which he adheres to epistemological dualism. We have seen that he insists upon the reality of the objective world and admits the distinction between the subject and object aspects of thought relations. Yet in his theory of relations he seems in some respects to be very close to epistemological monism. In making the objective world itself a system of thought relations, he appears to put the relations existing between its various objects on the same level with those existing between the objects and the self that perceives them. For this reason he has often been considered

[1] Supra, p. 42.

mentalistic and solipsistic;[1] and it may be said also that if all reality consists in relations this view is not far removed from the epistemological monism of neorealism. But, as in previous instances, we must attribute to Green's inconsistency the apparent validity of the charges. It is evident from his main position that he did not intend to reject the objective reference of thought, even though in some instances he appears to be doing so.

Again, his treatment of the distinction between truth and error is not wholly satisfactory. In his discussion of the relation between subjective and objective reality, he is, if not inconsistent, at least unclear. We surely can not take him at his word in saying that we have no right to ask "What is the real?"[2] for if so we should be equally unable to ask "What is the system?" But granting that he did not intend to deny the possibility of distinguishing reality from illusion, the criterion of "unalterableness" is an unfortunate term, for it appears to deny the possibility of change in anything real. What he probably means by it is that the real is subject to a uniform law of change. But even so, unless we are to bring consciousness within the chain of natural causation, to insist literally upon unalterableness as a criterion would make consciousness itself unreal. While he uses the term as practically synonymous with "coherence within the system", it is in reality the all-inclusiveness rather than the unalterableness of the system which gives it its epistemological value.

[1] Supra, p.54.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 26.

b. The theory of relations.

The connecting link between Grean's epistemology and his metaphysics is found in his theory of relations. This, as we have seen, involves the dual doctrine that "all reality lies in relations" and that "only for a thinking consciousness do relations exist". In this theory he attempts to bring together the outer world and the self to form a unified system (1) by regarding every object as metaphysically conditioned in its nature by its internal relations to every other object, and (2) by making the conscious self indispensable to the recognition of these relations.

In discussing the theory we shall attempt first to state what may be said in favor of it, then to discuss the objections that may be raised against it, and finally to try to see how its discrepancies may be harmonized.

The chief merit of the theory seems to me to be its emphasis upon the unitary nature of the system. It attempts to solve the problem of the One and the Many by showing that while each object possesses individuality by virtue of the uniqueness of its own peculiar relations, it likewise possesses universality because of its inter-relations with every other element in the system. From an epistemological standpoint, the theory affords an excellent basis for the application of the coherence criterion,

since truth may be tested by the possibility of fitting a given judgment into the whole system of related judgments. Likewise from a logical standpoint, the stating of relationships is indispensable to the definition of terms. From a psychological standpoint, it may be said in its favor that no datum of consciousness is ever given as an entirely unrelated event.

Another merit of the internal relations theory, as found in Green, is his emphasis upon the function of consciousness in the apprehension of these relations. By this theory every object becomes an object of thought, and the system gets its unity through the unifying function of intelligence. Since all relation implies meaning, and meaning exists only for conscious subjects, the very existence of the external world affords an argument for the metaphysical reality of the self.

Turning now to the objections which may be raised against the theory, we find at the outset that its two cardinal doctrines are inconsistent. If all reality lies in relations, then the self, if it is real, must also consist of relations. The self, by the law of identity and contradiction, must obviously be either real or unreal. If it is unreal, Green's whole theory falls to the ground, for the very purpose of his metaphysics as stated in the Prolegomena is to show the reality of the self or "spiritual principle" in man. Green assuredly never intended to deny the reality of selfhood, which is asserted on

almost every page. But on the other alternative, that the self is real, if we take Green at his word we must believe that the reality of the self, as of the external world, consists in relations. This doctrine sounds very much akin to neo-realism, and is open to the same objections, i.e. that it affords no basis for causality or substance, nor even for a unifying principle by which to distinguish truth from error. From his emphasis upon the unifying function of consciousness, it is evident that Green, had he lived in this day, would have indignantly rejected the charge of kinship to neo-realism. But if we take his statement as it stands and make all reality rest in relations, this is the conclusion we reach.

Another serious objection, previously hinted at, is the fact that the theory of relations does away with the category of substance. If all reality lies in relations, then we have an infinite number of relations but nothing to relate. It is (as James Ward says in another connection) like the grinning Chesire cat in Alice in Wonderland which disappeared but left its grin. It would, if taken literally, plunge us into the very scepticism which Green was endeavoring to combat in Locke and Hume. It is, of course, not necessary to lapse into realism or materialism to assert the reality of substance: but Green's theory, if taken at its face value, would, as we have seen, do away with the reality of substance even in the self. If it does this for the finite

consciousness, it has the same effect upon the nature of the infinite consciousness. Laurie is right, I think, in saying that on this basis both the finite self and God would be simply "a complex whorl of knots tied without a string".[1]

Two other objections commonly raised against the theory of relations do not seem to me to be so well-founded. One is, that to regard the self simply as a unifying principle destroys the nature of thought.[2] That is, it robs the self of its creative function, and makes it exist only for the purpose of synthesizing impressions that come to it from without. This argument, it seems to me, rests upon the fallacy that a self which has a unifying function acts only in this capacity. While the validity of this argument will receive further treatment in connection with Green's theory of the self, there is no occasion for denying that a conscious self which apprehends and unifies relations may also have a creative function.

Another fallacious argument, akin to this and refuted on the same basis, is the contention of Sidgwick and others that if we regard God as a unifying principle we give him no ethical character.[3] But his very willingness to establish a universe which has unity instead of chaos is an ethical consideration, and the fact that God (or man) has metaphysical attributes does not in any wise deprive him of ethical characteristics.

We have seen that the theory of relations has something

[1] Supra, p. 56.
[2] Supra, p. 55, 58.
[3] Supra, p. 61, 63, 98.

to be said in its favor as well as some objections to be raised against it. It may be worth while to try to discover where the difficulty lies.

The root of the trouble, it seems to me, lies in the fact that Green tried to begin with the object of thought rather than the subject, yet rested his argument upon epistemological considerations. An idealistic argument of some soundness can be built upon epistemological grounds but it must begin with a study of the immediate data of consciousness and the nature of the knowing process. In his fear of subjectivism, Green did not adopt this method. A far more tenable idealism can be built upon metaphysical grounds by an analysis of the object known. Such an analysis Green attempted to make, but he fell into the error of leaning too heavily upon epistemology. True reality must lie not only in intellectual cognition but in active will, and the self must be regarded as active not only in apprehending relations but in providing the cause of change in relations.

Another source of error is found in the fact that Green seems to have confused the descriptive with the constitutive character of relations. It is true that every object of thought stands in certain relations, and that in a sense Aristotle is right in saying that the indeterminate is non-existent.[1] But this does not by any means prove that it is the relations of an object

[1] Cf. supra, p. 51.

which constitute its metaphysical nature. The real issue is the problem of what constitutes these relations and what causes changes in the relations. However valuable a statement of relations may be in defining a term, naming a thing does not make it what it is.

We have found the chief merits of the theory to be its emphasis upon the unitary character of the system and upon the function of the self in apprehending relations. Its chief defects we have seen to be the inconsistency of its two major doctrines and its banishment of the category of substance, leading even to the destruction of the reality of the self if rigidly applied. Its chief sources of error we have located in Green's confusion of epistemology with metaphysics, and his misunderstanding of the true nature of relations.

In conclusion, it may be said that if Green had revised his doctrine to read, "All reality lies in conscious selves who apprehend relations caused by personal activity", he would have avoided the difficulties which we have mentioned. Such a conception makes a place for the category of substance, while at the same time it preserves the values of a unitary inter-related system and emphasizes the function of the "spiritual principle" which Green himself regarded as essential to metaphysics, ethics, and religion.

c. The self -- finite and infinite.

In discussing the nature of the self, we shall consider first Green's conception of the finite self, then his theory of the infinite self, and finally the relation he seeks to establish between them.

In considering the theory of relations we have found that Green's theory on the one hand makes the self indispensable, yet taken literally it makes it impossible. In evaluating the work of any philosopher we must consider his theory, not at its worst, but at its best. Accordingly in fairness to Green we must center attention not on its discrepancies but on its real contributions.

So, taking Green's theory of the finite self as an indispensable adjunct to the theory of relations, we find that he makes it an epistemological necessity. Relations would be utterly meaningless, were it not for the self which grasps the relations and by its unifying activity brings order out of chaos and makes the relations meaningful. The mere fact that we can know an objective order points to the conclusion that there must be a principle of organization, not itself one of the objects, through which all objects derive their meaning.

But not only is the self an epistemological necessity, it is also a metaphysical necessity. The self is unitary and

timeless, and it is only through a unitary, timeless principle that we are able to solve the problems of unity and plurality, and of change and identity. Through the function of the self in synthesizing the manifold, it is possible to reconcile the One and the Many, or (as Hegel puts it) to find the "concrete universal". Through the non-temporal character of the self it is possible to find a principle of permanency in the midst of change; for while the stream of consciousness is ever changing, its separate states are knit together by an abiding self.

Furthermore, the self is an ethical necessity. In fact, it is for this very reason that Green prefixes to his ethics an entire book of metaphysics. While it is quite possible to accept the main principles of Green's ethics without accepting his metaphysics in its entirety (e.g. the theory of relations), it is impossible to regard ethics as a normative science without recognizing the function of the self. Unless the fact of moral obligation rests, as Green says, upon a "spiritual principle" which is not itself a natural phenomena, we must be content to regard ethics as a natural science, to be studied empirically like physics or biology. Moreover, if one is to accept a self-realization rather than a hedonistic theory of ethics, the abiding self must be recognized as indispensable; for if the self were a mere series of passing sensations, the sensual hedonist might claim to be realizing himself quite as well as the seeker after

moral perfection. It is only on the basis of an abiding self whose character is shaped by moral choices that self-realization has any meaning.

The fact that the self is a religious necessity grows out of the foregoing. Were it not for the abiding self which communes with the infinite and partakes of its nature, religious experience would be impossible. If religion is to be anything more than a barren form, it must have an ethical and spiritual content which would be impossible except for the conscious self. Otherwise the cardinal religious requirements of God, freedom and immortality would be meaningless.

Turning now to Green's conception of the infinite self, we shall discuss first the reasons on which he bases the belief that God exists, and then his theory as to what God is.

That God exists, is a fact which Green regards as established beyond all doubt. "That God is", he says, "it (human reason) enables us to say with the same certainty as that the world is or that we ourselves are. What he is, it does not indeed enable us to say in the same way in which we make propositions about matters of fact".[1] Passing over the inconsistency of the implication (apparently unintended) that the existence of God is not a "matter of fact", we find him untouched by doubts as to the divine existence. The grounds on which he regards this proposition as established are similar to those on which he bases the

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 268.

reality of finite selves. In fact, he has often been criticised for basing his argument for the reality and nature of God on analogy with finite persons. As the existence of an objective order of relations implies a spiritual principle in man by which they may be known, so too the very existence of the "unalterable all-inclusive system of relations" implies the existence of a universal spiritual principle which establishes and unifies these relations.

If we analyze Green's argument for the existence of the infinite self, we find that this, like the finite self, is shown to be necessary on epistemological, metaphysical, ethical and religious grounds. In the first place, God is necessary in order to explain the possibility of finite knowledge, for it is the eternal consciousness reproducing itself in us which establishes a unity between the relations of the external order and our finite minds. "The inference from nature to a being neither in time nor contingent but self-dependent and eternal ---- is valid because the conception of nature, of a world to be known, already implies such a being".[1] Granting that the world exists, and that we exist, God is necessary to explain our knowledge of it.

While Green rests his argument for the divine existence largely on epistemological grounds (and weakens it by so doing) it has also an important metaphysical aspect. For the very existence of an objective order of relations implies God as the source

[1] Works, vol. i, p. 129.

of these relations. The unity of the system would be impossible were it not for a unitary being who posits and maintains these relations. This unitary being must be infinite and eternal, since no human consciousness is all-complete and all-embracing.

This view that God is the source of relations is apparently Green's meaning, although in his effort to avoid the semblance of the cosmological argument he obscures his point by saying that God is not to be regarded as the cause of the objective order. This denial of causality in God has exposed him to serious attack,[1] and if taken as it sounds, it is inconsistent with the rest of the system. What he probably means to deny is the view that God caused the world to begin to exist at a given period of time. He says, "We contradict ourselves if we say that there was first a chaos and then came to be an order; for the 'first' and 'then' imply already an order of time, which is only possible through an action not in time".[2]

While Green in his mode of procedure places his metaphysics before his ethics, there is a sense in which he would agree with Lotze that that "ethics is the beginning of metaphysics". For not only is God necessary to explain the possibility of knowledge and the source of relations; he is necessary also to explain the possibility of moral life. The fact of moral obligation which prompts men to strive toward an ideal is unexplainable unless there is a supreme being who cooperates with men in their efforts

[1] Supra, p. 47, 61, 63, 98.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 77.

to realize the ideal. As coherence between the finite mind and the outer world indicates a spiritual principle which harmonizes the system, so also coherence between the moral life and the reality of the ideal requires a spiritual principle which gives a teleological basis to the moral order.

Green in his metaphysical and ethical works does not make much direct use of the argument from religious experience. He seems to feel that mystical considerations, in particular, should be kept in the background. But in his religious essays the need of belief in a God "who is nigh thee" is stressed as strongly as the "eternal consciousness" or "universal principle" in his distinctly philosophical works. Religious considerations are probably largely responsible for the direction taken by his philosophical convictions, and these will be given fuller consideration in a later section.[1]

When we ask the question, "What is God?" Green frankly asserts that the question can never be fully answered. Yet the fact that our knowledge of God is limited does not imply the Spencerian doctrine that he is unknowable. Green may perhaps be charged with having occupied a disproportionate amount of space in showing that God is rather than what he is, but he gives us nevertheless some idea of his conception of the divine nature.

Some of God's attributes he regards as knowable within a reasonable degree of assurance. Through analogy with finite

[1] Infra, p. 254.

selves we may regard God as personal (though Green is not wholly consistent in this view). To perform the function implied in the existence of the world order, God must be unitary. To serve as the permanent correlate of change, he must be timeless and eternal. To be a spiritual and non-natural principle, he must of course be non-spatial. If he is not to be himself determined and limited by the relations which he constitutes, he must be self-determined. Green sums the matter up by saying, "We are entitled to say, positively, that it (the spiritual principle) is a self-distinguishing consciousness; and negatively, that the relations by which, through its action, phenomena are determined are not relations by which it is itself determined".[1]

Yet in this very statement which seems to assert so positively what God is, and what he is not, we have a discrepancy which is typical of Green's entire discussion. The spiritual principle, he says, is a self-distinguishing consciousness. Again and again he uses these terms as synonyms, with reference both to the finite and the infinite consciousness. But we may ask, "Is consciousness a principle?" If it is, it ceases to be self-distinguishing, for no <u>principle</u> has the power of distinguishing itself, or anything else, from the rest of the world of objects. If on the other hand, God is a self-determined and completely conscious person, it is incorrect to call him a principle. By so doing, eternity of thought is substituted for continuity of

[1] Prolegomena, p. 59.

consciousness, and logical wholeness takes the place of conscious activity.

The same discrepancy arises in Green's treatment of the moral ideal. He is unclear as to whether God is himself the ideal which man seeks to realize, or whether God though having a separate existence is the source of the ideal which he sets before man. The distinction is more than a verbal one, for if God is himself the ideal, man in striving to attain it progressively realizes God and in a sense "creates" him. Green expressly rejects the implication that this theory in any sense makes God unreal,[1] yet his interpretation of God as the "possible self" seems to ascribe to him a potential character which becomes real only as man makes it so. On the other hand, if God is a complete and infinite person distinct in his existence from man and capable of purposes and plans of his own, he may set before men an ideal which he bids them realize and may cooperate in their efforts to grow into God-like-ness without in any sense losing his own identity.

These problems relating to the nature of God overlap the question of the relation between the finite and infinite self, to which we shall now give more specific attention. The discrepancies above noted are characteristic of Green's tendency to waver between theism and pantheism. There has been much discussion as to whether Green should be classed as a theist or a

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 224.

pantheist, but this question can not be answered, I believe, except by saying that he was both. Instead of trying to pigeonhole his philosophy, we must content ourselves with marshalling the evidence on each side. The pantheistic elements will be presented first.

There is, first, the tendency already noted to confuse a "unifying principle" with a "unitary self". If God is merely a principle, we have the barren one-ness, devoid of ethical value, of which Sidgwick complains.[1] The effect which this has upon the nature of finite selves depends upon how closely we regard the analogy between man and God to hold true. If the finite self is a "self-distinguishing subject", man remains personal even though God does not, and we have a form of pluralism. But if human consciousness also is merely a unifying principle, i.e., one element in the universal system, then we have monistic pantheism. Both conceptions are found in Green.

Another strongly pantheistic tendency is found in his conception of the divided or double nature of the finite consciousness. If God is reproducing himself in man and making the animal organism the vehicle of the eternal consciousness, then the finite self tends to merge its identity in that of the infinite. If there is one universal self which thinks in all finite thinkers, the finite self is robbed of its uniqueness and separateness. In so far as it is God, and not man, who thinks, man is deprived of

[1] Supra, p. 61.

freedom. On such a basis the Universal Knower must know and experience everything just as it is known and experienced by every finite self; yet this is impossible without imposing upon God the limitations and contradictions of finite existence. It may reasonably be granted that God is immanent in the lives of man, and we may even go so far as to say that God gives content to human consciousness which would not otherwise be experienced. But when we assert, as Green in a measure tends to do, that God is metaphysically merging his existence with that of finite selves by reproducing himself in man, we have a pantheistic position which is untenable.

As previously suggested,[1] another pantheistic problem arises over the question as to whether God is real or potential. Green apparently intended to regard God as a complete reality; yet he represents God as the ideal which is revealed, though never completely, in the lives of men. As man seeks to attain this ideal he tends to identify himself with the life of God. Green is unclear as to whether this identification of man with God involves numerical identity of existence, or an approximation of identity of type. If the former, we must conclude either that man loses his identity in God, or else that God is only potential except as he acquires reality in the lives of men.

Green seeks to avoid the charge of unreality in God by

[1]Supra, p. 172.

pointing out that the ideal is itself the highest reality. Thus if God is the ideal self, he is the most real being. But while the reality of the ideal may be admitted, the grounds on which Green defends this position are somewhat questionable. He defines the real as "that which has qualities and relations of its own". God is therefore the highest reality because he is the most completely related being. This is in harmony with the rest of his theory of relations, but as we have seen, there are some objections to accepting the premises, and hence the conclusions, of the relational theory.

When we turn to the theistic aspects of Green's philosophy, we find many features which counteract the pantheistic tendencies we have noted. In the first place, Green apparently did not intend himself to be regarded as a pantheist. In discussing the philosophy of Hegel, he explicitly denies the view that reality consists in an absolute system of thought.[1] He criticises the view that "it is not we that think but the universal reason which thinks in us" on the score that this makes an unwarranted leap from the process or power of thinking to an "absolute spiritual life" which is God. This, as we have seen, is the very charge which has often been raised, with some justice, against Green himself;[2] but he was apparently not blind to the weakness of the Hegelian position and tried to offset it by the theistic elements of his system.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 143.
[2] Supra, pp. 42, 47, 59, 61, 64, 86 et al.

In opposition to his pantheistic tendencies, he repeatedly affirms the self, both finite and infinite, to be a "self-objectifying" and self-distinguishing" consciousness. By this he means a personal being that has the power of being conscious of itself as an object and of distinguishing itself from nature and from other selves. He says that our truest idea of the infinite must come from analogy of the finite self as we know it, and that personality must be ascribed to both. He says on the point, "But for reflection on our personality, on our consciousness of ourselves as objects to ourselves, we could never dream of there being such a self-realizing principle at all.... It is only because we are consciously objects to ourselves, that we can conceive a world as an object to a single mind, and thus as a connected whole. .....Whatever we mean by personality,.....it is certain that we shall only fall into contradictions by substituting for persons, as the subject in which the divine self-realization takes place, any entity to which self-consciousness can not be ascribed".[1]

The above passage clearly indicates that Green intended to affirm the personal nature of the self while likewise representing God as realizing himself in finite minds. It is possible to retain the personality of both God and man if "divine self-realization" means simply that God is cooperating with men in their own efforts to attain the ideal which he has set before them. As

[1] Prolegomena, p. 208 f.

pantheism is inconsistent with freedom, Green's emphasis upon the free activity of men in their ethical endeavor implies that he did not intend to regard man's identity as lost in that of the infinite.

If we seek to examine the causes of this apparent discrepancy in Green's position, they may be found largely in his failure to use terms with fixed meanings. For instance, in the term "eternal consciousness" he sometimes uses eternal to mean "rational" and sometimes "divine". Thus, confusion arises between the eternity of a thought system and of a timeless personal being. Again, "universal consciousness" means sometimes an all-inclusive system of thought relations; sometimes an omniscient person who unifies these relations. From this, it is easy to confuse logical identity with metaphysical identity, and the universal aspects of selfhood become one universal self.

Another cause of his frequent though perhaps unintended lapses into pantheism may be found in his religious conviction of the divine immanence. To him the deistic tendency which placed God "afar off" was so repulsive, that in his efforts to show the nearness and indwelling presence of God, he tended to overlook his transcendence. A union of immanence and transcendence in a personal God is not an impossible conception, nor one which is foreign to Green's thinking, but he gave a disproportionate emphasis to the immanence aspect of the divine nature. The question

as to whether he was in reality a pantheist, or whether he should be classed as a theist with an undue stress upon the divine immanence, must remain unanswered. Philosophy is not "the art of affixing labels".

d. Freedom.

Green's conception of freedom is fundamental to his ethical theory. In fact, he states that the whole purpose of the metaphysical inquiry with which he begins the Prolegomena is to arrive at some conclusion regarding the possibility of freedom.[1] If man is a mere machine, moral choices are impossible, but Green attempts to show that man is not a mere machine. His account of freedom is on the whole satisfactory.

His conception of freedom centers around four leading ideas: (1) Man himself is a non-natural being who owes his origin to the eternal consciousness rather than to natural causation. (2) Man, like the eternal consciousness, is a "free cause". (3) Man, in his ethical activity, is determined in his choices by motives. (4) Man is most free when he acts in harmony with the ideals of service and self-realization.

The first proposition has already been discussed. It is the "spiritual principle" in man which sets him apart from

[1]Prolegomena, p. 85.

natural phenomena. Since human consciousness is not a product of natural forces, but is the manifestation of the eternal consciousness which reproduces itself in finite selves, man's ethical activity can not be limited by the chain of natural causation. To consider man merely as a natural phenomenon, would involve a disregard of the "self-objectifying consciousness" in which he is akin to God.

The proposition that man is a free cause grows out of the preceding. Green discusses this at considerable length at the end of Book I of the Prolegomena. The chief point which he raises is the question as to whether man can still be free when his animal organism is determined like other phenomena by natural processes. The answer which he gives is that man, as a knowing subject, is a reproduction of the eternal consciousness and therefore partakes of the freedom of the infinite self.

To the question as to whether this reproduction of the eternal consciousness in the animal organism does not make man in part a mere product of nature and only in part free, he gives a negative answer. For he says the spiritual element in man is his true self, and the animal functions which condition his organism cease through their relation to consciousness to be merely natural processes. "In strict truth, the man who knows, so far from being an animal altogether, is not an animal at all or even in part."[1]

[1] Prolegomena, p. 90.

He bases this belief again on the "self-distinguishing" nature of consciousness, for a living body does not consciously distinguish itself from its relations, while man possesses this power as his special characteristic.

Green's conception of ethical activity as determined by motive is closely related to the freedom involved in the self-distinguishing nature of consciousness. The crucial question as to whether ethics is a natural or a normative science depends upon whether the motives which determine conduct are products of natural forces. At first sight it may appear that they are, since the wants which determine motives are in large measure animal wants. But if the animal organism, through becoming the vehicle of the eternal consciousness, loses its animal nature and becomes a function of the conscious self, so also choices made by the conscious self cease to be animal wants and become motives of free personal activity. Among numerous "solicitations", perhaps natural in their origin, one is chosen as a motive which represents an ideal of personal good.

This question of the relation of freedom to motive is discussed by Green at length, for the charge is often raised that if the motive is the outcome of circumstances and character, freedom is abrogated. The answer which he gives is, that circumstances determine the motive only through the action of the character or self

upon them, since circumstances take on new meaning in the light of the consciousness that experiences them. "The circumstances which in combination with character affect moral action, just because they are so combined, are no longer what they would be merely as circumstances."[1] Furthermore, to the charge that character itself lacks freedom because it is inevitably determined by past choices, it may be admitted that character is largely the product of past "presentations"; but this does not rob it of its freedom because past like present choices are timeless acts, in which the self identifies itself with some desire and thereby transforms an animal want into a personal motive.

To the question as to whether motivated action is in reality determined rather than free because one always acts from the strongest motive, Green admits that "to a will free in the sense of unmotived we can attach no meaning whatever".[2] But to call the motive which determines action the "strongest" is misleading, because one does not always act in accordance with his strongest desires. He acts rather in accordance with an idea of personal good. This ideal of personal good may be regarded as the outcome of circumstances and character without any incompatibility with freedom, if it be understood that the choice is made not by natural forces but by a self-distinguishing consciousness.

[1]Prolegomena, p. 109.
[2]Ibid., p. 108.

Applying Green's conception of freedom in a wider sense to the activity of man in his social and political relationships, we find him voicing the sentiment that true freedom consists in the ability "on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of themselves".[1] For this reason he was opposed to slavery and to every form of intellectual and political bondage, and labored diligently for the removal of obstructions to the free development of the oppressed classes. In his essay on The Force of Circumstances, we find him expressing the view that the human spirit escapes from bondage by recognizing the call of the eternal spirit "whose service is perfect freedom". The force of circumstances can not be evaded but it may become a power for good instead of evil, for "the good man, by manifesting the power of the creative spirit to bring good out of evil, asserts the freedom which the other abdicates".[2] Thus the faith of the martyr by rising above untoward outward circumstances exerts the truest freedom; while bondage consists in following the path of least resistance instead of obeying the call of God to sacrifice and service.

Green's conception of freedom requires little criticism. It is one of the most substantial and fruitful elements of his philosophy, and while flaws may be found here and there, his main position is securely grounded.

His conception of human freedom as resulting from the

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 371.
[2] Ibid., p. 6.

reproduction of the eternal consciousness in man may be criticized on the score that this contains pantheistic implications hostile to freedom. If we recognize only the pantheistic side of Green's th thought, this charge must hold. However, the point which Green is apparently seeking to emphasize is the fact that man, like God, possesses a conscious life which is more than a natural function. This view is entirely in keeping with personalistic theism.

Again, he may be criticized for denying that Man is in part a natural product. His account of the mind-body problem is not adequate. He was perhaps over-meticulous in explaining away man's animal nature, for by granting the possibility of interaction, it may be admitted that man's animal organism is a physical machine without detracting from his spiritual nature. Green's purpose, however, was not to deny this fact but to emphasize the point that the real man is not the physical organism but the conscious self which uses the organism as its instrument.

A further charge (which Sidgwick raises) is that Green by admitting the power of circumstance and character in controlling motive, becomes in reality a determinist.[1] It is true that Green somewhat overestimated the scope of freedom, and underrates the power of external forces which thwart its operation. However the charge as raised seems correctly refuted by Green himself in the

[1]Supra, pp. 89, 116.

view that the free activity of the self by its conscious choices has the power to resist circumstance and to transform character.

e. The objectivity of value.

The central feature of Green's ethics is found in his theory of the moral ideal, and this in turn rests upon a deeper metaphysical problem; namely, the objectivity of value. While Green does not use this term, he fully affirms the belief that values are not merely subjective experiences but have a real existence in the purposes and plans of the eternal consciousness. The main problems of ethical and religious importance which relate to the objectivity of value are (1) the relation of value to origin; (2) the reality and significance of the ideal; and (3) the problem of evil. These will be discussed in turn.

(1) Value and origin.

The problem of the relation of value to origin bears directly upon the question of evolution. Many have thought it impossible to regard consciousness and social institutions as having an objective or divine origin in view of the fact that their development can be traced back historically to primitive forms. Accordingly, such "positivists" have regarded ideals likewise as having merely a subjective, human existence and have

rejected "all moral and spiritual ontology".[1]

Green's treatment of the relation between origin and value is not entirely clear, and from his vigorous rejection of the view that evolution can explain all conscious phenomena, he has been charged with overlooking the distinction between phenomenal and metaphysical origins. However, this does not appear to have been his intention. He points out the fact that a genetic study of man's life, whether physical or conscious, in no wise abrogates the importance of the eternal consciousness as its metaphysical source. Such an inquiry, he says, "may no doubt result in discoveries of the greatest importance for the relief of man's estate", but can in no respect explain the ultimate nature of human experience.

Green's treatment of the subject of origins appears principally in his discussion of the bearing of the evolutionary process upon the nature of consciousness. In his essays on Spencer and Lewes,[2] and again in the Prolegomena,[3] he affirms the view that there is no incompatibility between the belief in the non-natural character of consciousness and the view that man's physical organism may have had a strictly natural history. Such incompatibility would arise, he says, only if it could be proven that such physical processes actually constitute the self-distinguishing consciousness; but on the contrary human action is explicable only

[1] Perry, R.B.: Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 344.
[2] Works, vol. i, p. 474
[3] Prolegomena, p. 94.

by the action of the eternal consciousness which uses these physical processes as its organs.[1] These involve elements of space and time which do not explain consciousness, but are only explained by it. Accordingly from a study of physiological psychology, whether experimental or genetic, we may add to our knowledge of the nervous organism but not to our conception of what consciousness really is. For "when we analyse any mode of consciousness we do not come upon neural tremors".[2]

Green even goes so far as to admit that human intelligence itself may have developed, phenomenally, from animal origins. But he asserts that such a discovery would not affect the fact that our consciousness has value and significance to us only because it is not now an animal function but a reproduction of the eternal consciousness in us. He says, however, that to attempt to explain human consciousness by animal origins is to explain ignotum per ignotius since "we have much surer ground for saying what we are than for saying what animals are not".[3] He thinks it highly improbable that animals possess any such intelligence as would justify our assuming even the phenomenal development of human consciousness from the animal mind.

On the relation of value to origin in the development of social institutions, Green takes a similar position. He makes no attempt to deny that our social and political institutions have

[1] Prolegomena, p. 93.
[2] Works, vol. i, p. 476.
[3] Prolegomena, p. 95.

grown from humble origins. A study of tribal customs reveals historical information which is of much interest and value; yet such early customs afford no explanation of the teleological development toward higher forms. In the gradual growth of social institutions we find a manifestation of a progressively-realized ideal which is more than human in its metaphysical source. Man's social and political life then becomes, not merely a natural product of inevitable forces, but a spiritual revelation. The guiding ideal, which throughout its various manifestations is always at bottom an ideal of the common good, leads man from crude beginnings to an ever-increasing realization of the God-given values of life.

(2) The reality of the ideal. The most significant feature of Green's conception of the objectivity of value is found in this theory of the reality of the moral ideal. We shall now discuss the grounds on which he bases this view.

There is, first, the argument for the existence of an ideal moral order, from analogy with our knowledge of the existence of the physical order. Just as the possibility of knowledge of an external order and our desire for further knowledge of it gives evidence of an objective order to be known, so too our desire to be better and to attain the moral ideal is an evidence of an absolute "best" which has real existence in the eternal consciousness.[1]

[1]Prolegomena, p. 216.

This argument is practically synonymous with that which Sorley emphasizes as "coherence".[1]

Another evidence of the objective existence of the moral ideal is found in the teleological character of moral progress. While the content of the ideal in various stages of man's development has undergone manifold changes, its form has remained uniformly an ideal of the common good; and this ideal, as a supreme regulative principle, has shaped the progress of mankind toward a definite goal. Unless the goal of moral progress has real existence in the mind of God, there is no guarantee that progress will continue, and there is no explanation of the fact that man thus far has apparently been moving toward a "far-off divine event". He says, "If the history of mankind were simply a history of events, of which each determined the next following, there would be no progress or development in it"; for there would be nothing in it "to satisfy that demand for unity of the manifold in relation to an end, which alone leads us to read the idea of development into human affairs".[2]

An argument from finite limitations appears in his view that it is result being developed which is the true reality. This likewise grows out of the demand for completeness. Since the full realization of man's capabilities is not found in any finite life (and so far as we know can not be fully attained

[1] Sorley, W.R.: Moral Values and the Idea of God, pp 96 f.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 216.

under finite conditions) the only way to secure completeness in the moral ideal is to posit an eternal spirit, free from finite limitations, in which self-realization is complete. Man's true self then becomes, not the empirical self as it exists at any given period of time, but the ideal or "possible" self which is the reproduction in him of the eternal consciousness.

On this basis Green regards God, not merely as the name for an empty ideal (as may be charged) but as the most real being. Man is relatively real, in proportion as he identifies his life with the eternal consciousness, but God alone is completely real because in him alone is the ideal completely realized. "There must be eternally such a subject which is all that the self-conscious subject, as developed in time, has the possibility of becoming; in which the idea of the human spirit, or all that it has in itself to become, is completely realized."[1] The reality of the ideal thus becomes a transformed version of the ontological argument for the divine existence.

Of the nature of the ideal, Green asserts, as cardinal doctrines, that it must be <u>personal</u> and <u>social</u>. "Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of <u>personal</u> worth. All other values are relative to value for, of or in a person. To speak of any progress or improvement or development of a nation or society or mankind, except as relative to some greater worth of

[1]Prolegomena, p. 215.

persons, is to use words without meaning".[1] Accordingly in considering the development of man toward the goal established by the eternal consciousness, we must rule out any conception which would make this end consist in the extinction of personality or in the treatment of persons merely as a means.[2] This emphasis upon the personal nature of the ultimate good may be regarded as Green's greatest contribution to ethical theory.

The view that the ideal is personal is inseparably connected with the idea that it is social, for as Green says, "Without society, no persons: this is as true as that without persons, without self-objectifying agents, there could be no society".[3] Society is the condition of the development of a personality, and while the various membere of society develop in various ways, it is only as society seeks to fulfill the ideal of development of human capabilities in the direction of the common good, that it may be said "to fulfill its function, to realize its idea as it is in God".[4]

Green's conception of the reality of the ideal in general is sound, and it is a fundamental conception both of ethics and of religion. As we shall see, it affords the chief meeting-place of ethical theory and religious thought.

It may be said, however, that Green assumes too much in considering the reality of an objective ideal to be logically

[1] Prolegomena, p. 210.
[2] Ibid., p 217.
[3] Ibid., p: 218.
[4] Ibid., p. 220.

demonstrated. Attention has been called to the fact that in regarding God as the most real being because the ideal is the true reality, he practically restates the ontological argument.[1] While this conception has great value both for religious and ethical thought, it does not absolutely hold as a "rigor and vigor" proof.

Again, Green's conception of the manner in which man attains the ideal is not wholly satisfactory. For here, as elsewhere, the idea of the eternal consciousness which "reproduces" itself in man and constitutes his real self tends somewhat to discredit the reality and distinctness of finite selfhood. This aspect however has already been discussed[2] and need not detain us longer.

The most valuable elements in Green's conception of the objectivity of values are found in his doctrine of the reality of the ideal as based on coherence and teleology, and also in his doctrine of the nature of the ideal as personal and social. These are basis factors which are of permanent value.

(3) <u>The problem of evil.</u> The problem of evil is included at this point, not because Green gives it a prominent place in his philosophy, but because any theory of the objectivity of value must be viewed with suspicion unless it provides

[1] Supra, p. 169
[2] Supra, p. 171 f.

a consistent place for this age-long problem. The clearest expressions of Green's views on this subject are found in works which, chronologically, stand almost at opposite extremes of his creative work; i.e., in his undergraduate essay on The Force of Circumstances and in the lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation delivered not long before his death. The view-point of the two does not differ fundamentally.

In The Force of Circumstances the main point which he makes is that the obstacles which seem to thwart human progress are placed in our way, not to be yielded to, but to be triumphed over. Again he draws an analogy between physical nature and the moral life. Just as there is no chasm between man and nature, but "one is the living receptacle, the other the apt channel of the influx of divinity"[1]; so we may regard the circumstances which seem to enslave us, as being in reality forces to try our mettle and bring us closer to God by overcoming them. "Bodily suffering has always been considered by religious men as chastisement from a father's hand, which curbs the overweening conceits of their childish assurance; and even the infection of past sin, which they can not wholly purge away, becomes part of their spiritual training."[2]

Green regards the different ways in which opposing circumstances are met as being the truest index of the character

Works, vol. iii, p. 5.
Ibid., p. 6.

of men and of nations. The great mass of people simply drift with the tide, and in following the path of least resistance they become slaves both to external forces and to their own evil impulses. Others there are who desire goodness, and who follow the path of goodness rather than evil when they can do so without too great effort, but they never rise above the bondage of circumstance. Of these it may be said that "the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak". But the redeeming feature of every age is that it possesses a few rare spirits whose high creative energy is such that with the faith of the martyr they rise above opposing circumstances that would seem insuperable. "When they are weak, then are they strong". When a nation makes progress in the direction of higher ideals and finer spiritual living, it is not because of the rank and file who are the creatures of circumstance, but because of its prophets and reformers who are the creators of circumstance. "The spiritual energy of the liberated few introduces an element of good into the force to which the many are subject."[1] Such spiritual energy we may regard as a manifestation of the divine, and in triumph over opposing circumstances we may see the hand of God revealed.

The principal point with reference to the problem of evil which Green makes in his lectures on the Principles of Political Obligations is that God "overrules for good" even the

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 9.

selfish acts of evil men. The career of Napoleon is mentioned as an outstanding example, for the passion for glory which dominated Napoleon was selfish in its motive, yet in its outcome it served the welfare of western Europe. The possibility of such "overruling" Green finds in the fact that no motive is wholly selfish, and it is the good element in it which causes it to work good results. Furthermore the "idiosyncrasy" of a particular man may be evil, but the results of his work are determined in large measure by forces over which he does not exercise control. An ideal of social good may cooperate with the motives of selfish men, and it is only through such cooperation that they become instrumental for good.

Green does not here develop very fully the view that the "ideal of social good" which triumphs over evil is founded on the activity of God, for the Principles is written from an ethical rather than a metaphysical stand-point. However he strongly suggests this idea in the words, "Perhaps, on thinking the matter out, we should find ourselves compelled to regard the idea of social good as a communication to the human consciousness, a consciousness developing itself in time, from an eternally complete consciousness." He states further that while

Works, vol. ii, p. 442.

its active presence in the minds of men is due to the institutions under which they have been born and bred, the very existence of these institutions is due in turn to the action of what appears to be a universal idea.

Green's solution of the problem of evil is satisfactory as far as it goes. As we have seen, he brings out clearly the fact that the existence of opposing forces is not inconsistent with the realization of an objective moral ideal; and in his view of the possibility that evil may be overruled for good he implies that the good is objective while the evil is not.

However, Green may be criticized for what he leaves out. He makes no clear distinction between moral evil and physical evil. He recognizes, of course, that both sin and suffering exist, but we find in his work no definite attempt to separate and solve the problems connected with each. His treatment of sin is more adequate than that of suffering, and will be discussed further in connection with his religious views.[1]

Again he may be criticized for failing to state clearly whether he regards God as the metaphysical cause of the opposing circumstances themselves, as well as of the good which triumphs over them. He seems to imply this in The Force of Circumstances

[1]Infra, p. 285.

where he says that creative spirits regard their environment not simply as "of the earth, earthy" but as a divinely-appointed discipline. In opposing circumstances we may read "the living law of a supreme creative spirit".[1] He brings out the same idea also in his lectures on the English Commonwealth, when he says that we dishonor God and the rationality of his operation in the universe if, in doing honor to a hero, we depreciate the purposes that crossed his path, and find in them only unreason.[2] However, in the Principles of Political Obligation we find the idea that the forces which thwart progress are antagonistic to the divine will, and must be fought against by God as well as man. He means, probably, that physical obstructions and those which result from natural causes owe their metaphysical origin to God, while moral evil resides in the free activity of sinful men. This distinction however is not clearly made.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 7.
[2] Ibid., p. 278.

2. Ethical Problems.

In attempting to analyze Green's ethics we shall consider in turn the nature of ethics, the relation of ethics to epistemology, its relation to metaphysics, the relation of self-realization to formalism, and its relation to hedonism. While the main principles of Green's political theory will also be considered in connection with these topics, no specific discussion will be given to it for the reason that it raises no serious problems. Its main outlines have already been stated in the reviews of MacCunn, Ritchie and Muirhead, and it is in the main satisfactory.

a. The nature of ethics.

We can not proceed far in an evaluation of Green's ethics until we know on what basis we are working. While men have moralized for centuries, we have not yet reached a general agreement as to what constitutes the proper subject-matter or the proper view-point of the science of morality. Many of Green's critics have objected to his ethical theory, not on the ground of any inherent inconsistency in the theory itself, but because it has failed to coincide with their own conception of the real nature of ethics. Accordingly it will be profitable to examine briefly the main questions which relate to the nature of Green's ethics, with an analysis of

Green's attitude toward these questions.

The question which first presents itself relates to the problem as to whether ethics is a descriptive or a normative science. Does ethics ask how men do act, or how they should act? It is obvious that results will differ widely according to which of these view-points is selected. If ethics is merely a descriptive science, it is placed on the same basis as the physical sciences, and conduct as it is becomes an object of investigation and observation without reference to any ideal standard of what it ought to be. Taylor, we have seen,[1] holds that there is no essential difference between ethics and the physical sciences, for both involve descriptive and also normative elements.

Green's position (and in this respect it coincides with the one commonly held) is that ethics is both descriptive and normative. He maintains however that there is a real difference between ethics and the physical sciences. Ethics considers meanings and values and the possibility of free activity, while the physical sciences limit their investigations to the existential and naturalistic aspect of things. In the introduction to the Prolegomena he shows with considerable cogency the inconsistency of trying to build a normative science on a naturalistic basis. He says "It has generally been expected

[1] Supra, p. 96.

of a moralist, that he should explain not onlyhow men do act, but how they should act, and as a matter of fact we find that those who regard the process of man's natural development most strictly as a merely natural one are as forward as any to propound rules of living, to which man ought to conform."[1] It is in this connection that Green makes the statement so frequently quoted,"It is obvious that to a being who is simply a result of natural forces an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning." Green has been charged with overlooking here the distinction between origin and present value, and while he undoubtedly falls into this error, his main point relates to the impossibility of building a normative science on a basis which regards man's present nature as purely naturalistic. He shows that such an attempt if adhered to consistently (as it generally is not) leads invariably to psychological hedonism.[2] We can not tell a person what he ought to do if he is in the grip of inexorable natural laws; we can only state what the quest of pleasurable sensations called forth by physical stimuli obliges him to do. In this I believe that Green's position is valid. Ethics must first examine conduct as it is, but it must go farther and attempt to set a standard of what ought to be; and if this ideal standard is to be in any sense within the reach of man's attainment ethics must be more than a naturalistic science.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 10.
[2] Ibid., p. 11.

A second (and closely related) problem is involved in the question. "Does ethics precede metaphysics, or does metaphysics precede ethics? While we shall have occasion in a later section to devote more space to the relation between ethics and metaphysics, it may be noted at this point that Green's whole mode of precedure in the Prolegomena rests upon the answer which he gives this question. He believes that metaphysics precedes ethics, i.e that there can be no ethical theory in a real sense unless it can find a foundation in man's metaphysical nature and in the structure of the universe. Accordingly the defense of the "spiritual principle" in man and in the cosmos is made a primary issue. It is the priority of metaphysics in Green's thought which gives the Prolegonena its name, and in fact the first hundred pages which are devoted to metaphysics are the only part of the books which can properly be termed "prolegomena".

However, the majority of ethical writers (even those whose ethical theory does not differ materially from that of Green) hold to the view that ethics may proceed without reference to metaphysics, and that through the study of ethics data may be gathered which will be of value in formulating our metaphysical world-view. On this basis, ethics precedes metaphysics. This position I believe to be valid.

Nor is it necessary to assume that in studying ethics empirically, or without regard to metaphysics, we are necessarily committed to the view that ethics is a purely descriptive science. Green seems to assume that to be normative, ethics must be metaphysical, but he overlooks the fact that norms of conduct may be established and principles laid down for their attainment without raising metaphysical issues. It is possible to accept the essential elements of Green's ethical theory and at the same time to reject the greater part of his metaphysics.

Then how shall we evaluate Green's conception of the priority of metaphysics? Was he entirely mistaken in his view-point? The solution of the problem must be found, I think, in a distinction between ontological priority on the one hand, and logical, chronological and pedagogical priority on the other. Green is right in maintaining that unless man has the power of free activity and the power of building moral ideals, and unless there is something spiritual in the structure of the universe to ensure him the exercise of this power, there can be no moral conduct in the true sense of the word. But on the other hand, man makes moral choices before he reflects upon the possibility of making them. We may argue from our actual moral life to the metaphysical foundation on which it rests, and we may study the conditions of moral

conduct, both actual and ideal, without reference to underlying metaphysical issues. Yet the issues are basic even though excluded from our study, and for this reason Green's metaphysical method does not deserve the opprobrium that it has commonly received.

A third problem regarding the nature of ethics is involved in the question as to whether the aim of ethics is theoretical or practical. Green has frequently been charged with having failed to provide any practical guidance to moral conduct. Sidgwick raised this objection on a hedonistic basis and the charge is brought from a pragmatic standpoint by Dewey and Ayres.[1] It must be admitted that Green's theory does not provide any convenient yard-stick or set of rules which can be applied infallibly to every particular case. Whether or not his ethics stands condemned because of such a limitation must rest upon our conception of what the true function of ethics is.

Green himself discusses the problem toward the close of the Prolegomena, where he considers the comparative functions of moral philosophy and external authority in the shaping of conscience.[2] His contention is that it is the business of the moral philosopher so to enlighten conscience that it can make proper discriminations among opposing claims; but that if he attempts to lay down hard and fast rules for

[1] Supra, pp. 91, 100, 109.
[2] Prolegomena, pp. 391-396.

the guidance of conscience, he is not only unsuccessful in this attempt but he fails to perform his higher function. A philosopher may render an important practical service to morality in clarifying thought, but he can not supply the "moral dynamic" which is the basis of right conduct. "No doubt, as Plato saw, till the character is set in the direction of the ideal, a theory of the ideal can be of no value for the improvement of conduct in any sense."[1]

It is on the ground of admissions such as these that Green has been charged with supplying no practical guidance to conduct.[2] However it may be questioned whether his position is as negative as it appears. To borrow Bosanquet's phrase, his conceptions of the task of ethical theory is the "hindering of hindrances" to clear thinking, and accordingly to right acting. This view, which appears with great distinction in his political and educational theory as the removal of obstructions to free development, is implied throughout his whole discussion of ethical theory. Even his metaphysical starting-point depends upon his belief that false theories must be eliminated in order to provide firm grounds for the true. If the general validity of this view-point be accepted, it is unnecessary to charge Green with having promulgated a theory having no practical value.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 395.
[2] Supra, pp. 86, 91, et al.

Furthermore (to quote a pragmatist) Dewey says "Rules are practical, they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things." But Dewey himself would not say that ethics is a matter of rules rather than principles. Granting that it is true that the principles of self-realization are intellectual (or theoretical) they still remain "useful methods of judging things." It provides furthermore, a standard of judging things which can be applied to specific circumstances, and while it does not enable us to determine with mathematical accuracy what ought to be done on every occasion, its standard is at least as concrete and definite as that of any rival theory. The fact that Green did not follow the Prolegomena with a book on practical ethics is no detraction from the value of the former; and the extent to which Green himself participated in the solution of current ethical problems affords sufficient evidence that he was no impractical theorizer.

Supra, p.134.

b. The relation of ethics to epistemology.

Ethics bears a closer relation to epistemology than is generally recognized. While the relation between ethics and metaphysics has repeatedly been made an object of disputation by philosophers, it is only occasionally that one attempts to show the connection between the theory of morality and the theory of knowledge; and for this reason it is much to Green's credit that he faced the problem squarely. To be sure, he sometimes confused the epistemology of the English empiricists with their metaphysical views, but since they did so themselves he is not wholly reprehensible. The best statement of his conception of the relation of ethics to epistemology is found in the Introduction to Hume and in and in his essay entitled Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life. There he gives an excellent discussion of the ethical implications of English empiricism.

Green points out with considerable cogency that the only consistent outcome of a sensationalistic epistemology is a hedonistic ethics which is also deterministic and egoistic. If the content of consciousness consists

solely of a series of sensations, pleasurable feeling is the only possible criterion of moral goodness. If there is no rational self to function in acquiring knowledge, neither is there a rational self to act in making moral choices. "As in the popular (i.e. empirical) theory of knowledge, no distinction is made between the sensation itself and the intellectual judgment of which sensation is the occasion or accompaniment, so in the corresponding theory of morals, feeling is treated as the exhaustive account of all modes of consciousness with which it is associated."[1] This theory, first definitely formulated by Locke but presupposed before his time, has been the basis of the popular philosophy which has dominated English thought and life. Green traces the results of this theory through its various stages and shows that only through doing violence to the theory itself can it be made a tenable basis for moral conduct. In Hobbes, the feeling on which morality is assumed to rest is mere animal appetite, but he is forced to a surreptitious introduction of self-consciousness before he can even account for the universal warfare which is the basis of his ethical theory.[2] Butler likewise is forced into an inconsistency (though from a very different motive), for in his desire to save morality and religion he is obliged to do violence to the principles of empiricism by separating conscience and self-love.[3]

[1]Works, vol. iii, p. 97.
[2]Ibid., pp. 97-98.
[3]Ibid. pp. 99-105.

While Green does not specifically discuss Berkeley's ethical theory, he might have added that Berkeley also, in his effort to preserve a sound basis for morality and religion, is obliged to depart from a consistently hedonistic position by making the general well-being of mankind the true end of ethical endeavor, by recognizing qualitative differences in pleasures, and by insisting upon the rational guidance of ethical conduct.[1]

However, it is in connection with Hume that Green gives the most complete account of the hedonistic and egoistic implications of sensationalism. Hume, he says, consistently sifted the theory of Locke to the bottom and found it wanting, yet English philosophers since his time have continued to "dig in the old vein which he had exhausted, and of which his final dilemna had shown the bottom."[2] The desire to show the futility of this procedure and to reestablish both epistemology and ethics on a Kantian rather than a Humean basis appears to have constituted a large element in Green's philosophical motive.

Hume's epistemology, in its relation to ethics, may best be presented by excerpts from Green's statement of it. "Good and evil, according to Hume, always mean pleasure and pain, either as actually felt or as anticipated. Pleasure and pain, again, are ultimately impressions on the bodily organs, or, in Hume's technical language, 'impressions

[1] Alciphron, pp. 63, 64, 150; Miscellaneous Works, pp. 179, 453f.
[2] Works, vol. i, p. 2.

of sensation.' Of these, 'copies are taken by the mind,' called ideas; and as thus copied, the primary impressions of sensations give rise to 'impressions of reflection,' and to the 'direct passions' of desire and aversion, hope and fear."[1] Indirect passions likewise arise from modifications of the ideas originating in sensations and copied on the mind. Green continues, "These passions, according to Hume, either as simple or as complicated with each other .... are the causes of all the actions of men. Reason neither has anything to do with their constitution, nor can it conflict with them. It gives nothing, it merely has to do with the relation of given 'ideas' to each other, either in the way of agreement and disagreement or of cause and effect, so in regard to action it merely has to calculate the means to a pleasure that is desired or hoped for, and discovers the cause of a pain that is disliked or feared."[2] It is obvious that on such a basis, ethical conduct is reduced to psychological hedonism. If reason can not origininate activity and man must do what the "passions" arising from sensations bid him do, the desire for pleasure is the only possible motive for activity.

[1] Works, vol iii, p. 106.
[2] Ibid., p. 107.

But Green does not rest his analysis of the problem there. He asks further, "How do we come to speak of a way in which we ought to act, of rights and obligations?"[1] He finds in Hume the answer that pain and pleasure "are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence." That is, the faculty through which they are felt is itself the moral sense, and the feeling of satisfaction experienced in contemplating a pleasurable act is identical with the sense of moral approbation. "In brief, its pleasantness makes an act or character virtuous; not however directly, but through the medium of a further pleasure arising in contemplation of the first."[2]

Thus on a sensationalistic basis, we are forced to do the thing which pleasurable feeling dictates, and virtue itself becomes a form of pleasure. The fact that we apparently do acts unpleasant in themselves, from a sense of obligation, is explained away by the view that we actually do them from a desire for ultimate pleasure.

How the substitution of ultimate pleasure for temporary feeling is possible without the activity of reason is a question not answered by Hume and not given sufficient attention by Green. Yet it constitutes an

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 107.
[2] Ibid. p. 108.

an important objection to Hume's theory, for sensations, as sensations, can not be experienced in the future. Only through the activity of a unifying self can the necessary connections be made which transform fleeting states of consciousness into a unitary whole.

However, at this point Green raises a very pertinent question, "How is vice possible?" Borrowing Berkeley's phrase, Green says that on Hume's basis, the viciousness of an act, like its virtue lies not in the *esse* but the *percipi*. That is, its moral quality depends not on the act itself but on the feelings which it arouses. But since one is bound to choose that which will afford pleasurable feelings, he is therefore bound to be virtuous. If this be true, all possibility of moral choice is destroyed. The empiricist who attempts to build an ethical theory on pleasurable sensations is caught in the grip of his own logic, and reaches a conclusion which experience itself refutes.

Green makes an interesting application of the deterministic outcome of sensationalism in reference to the main theme of his essay on "Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life." The claim of the modern spirit, he says, is to be free, to understand, and to enjoy.[1]

[1]Works, vol. iii, p. 94.

But if it attempts to understand (i.e to be consistent) on the sensationalistic basis, its claim to enjoy runs counter to its claim to be free.[1] The burden of moral obligation may be shifted off, but only to be replaced by the shackles of natural necessity. The influence of Hume's philosophy as it has permeated English thought is held by Green to be "the source of much undemonstrative agony at the times when speculation comes home to life."[2]

We have seen how Green traces the epistemology of Locke and Hume to conclusions that are hedonistic and deterministic. A word should be said regarding its egoistic inplications. Hume's only explanation of altruism lies in the theory that the instincts of sympathy or benevolence leads one to take pleasure in the pleasure of another. But on the basis of pleasurable feelings alone, there is no valid explanation of the possibility of choosing pain for one's self in order to give pleasure to another. As Green says, "The distinction between the selfish and the unselfish only finds its way at all into Hume's system at the cost of marring its unity."[3]

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 111.
[2] Ibid., p. 111.
[3] Ibid., p. 110.

for Hume admits that sympathy must be taken as "an original principle of our nature" which is not to be reduced to the desire for pleasure or aversion to pain. (A further consideration of the egoistic implications of hedonism will be given in a later section).

Whatever may be the limitations of Green's own epistemology,[1] he did an admirable piece of work in showing up the ethical inadequacy of sensationalism. By building on Kant's foundation rather than Hume's and recognizing the activity of the self in knowledge, he was able to avoid the pitfalls to which empiricism is subject. The self, then, is able to give rational guidance to conduct. Moral activity is thus prompted by a desire to conform to a moral ideal rather than by desire for pleasurable sensations. The self, thus liberated, is free to choose and free to act; and in its moral activity it may consistently be directed by altruistic motives. On such a basis it is possible not only to understand, and to be free, but to enjoy (in the highest sense) without the hopeless contradictions of empiricism.

[1] Supra, p. 150 f.

c. The relation of ethics to metaphysics.

We have already given considerable attention to the problem of the relation of ethics to metaphysics in discussing Green's metaphysics and also in considering the nature of ethics. Accordingly it will be possible to eliminate from this section some elements (such as the relative priority of ethics and metaphysics) which would otherwise require consideration.

As we have seen, the fundamental issue regarding the relation of ethics to metaphysics centers about the nature of the self. If the self is a mere mechanism, "simply a result of natural forces" as Green puts it, then it follows that "an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning." On the other hand if the finite self loses its idenity in the infinite, and a universal self "thinks in all so-called thinkers,"[1] then it is equally impossible for the finite self to exercise the power of moral choice. Naturalism and pantheism, though differing vastly from each other, are alike in robbing man of moral responsibility. Empiricism also, when it exalts itself into a metaphysic, affords an untenable conception of the self, for unless there is an element which is unitary and abiding amid the transient stream of consciousness there can be no continuity of ethical endeavor and pleasurable feeling must be the only guide to conduct.

[1] Supra, p. 200.
Supra, p. 42.

We have noted that Green explicitly sets himself to the task of refuting the anti-ethical implications of naturalism and empiricism.[1] The grounds on which he does this are in the main conclusive, and as they have already been discussed they need not be repeated at this point. But we have noted also, in considering his metaphysics, that he constantly wavers between theism and pantheism.[2] This inconsistency in his thought has serious ethical consequences which call for further discussion.

The most vulnerable point in Green's whole philosophy is found in his theory of the relation of the finite self to the infinite, and few of his critics have failed to point out the ethical inadequacy of the "timeless self". Seth, Sidgwick, Laurie, Sturt, Taylor, Dewey and numerous others of lesser importance have dwelt upon this weakness in his system,[3] and while their attacks have often overlooked the constructive elements of his theory, there is a measure of truth in the charges. Green could have made his theory much stronger by giving a more positive, and less ambiguous treatment of the self. The general problem of the ethical inadequacy of his conception takes several forms which will be discussed separately.

[1] Supra, pp 180, 199
[2] Supra, p. 171 f.
[3] Supra, pp. 42, 61, 63, 98, 105.

The form which the charge most frequently assumes is that Green in exalting an epistemological unity of thought into a metaphysical unity of reality has given us a hypostasized abotraction which has no ethical value. In reply, it must be admitted that Green is guilty of the fallacy of abstraction. He does rest his conception of the self, both finite and infinite, too largely upon an epistemological unity of thought. If the self were merely a unifying principle and nothing more, neither man nor God would have much ethical signifance.

But Green's conception is not reduced to the paucity of ethical content which most of his critics imply. The main tenor of Green's thought indicates that he regarded the self both finite and infinite, as metaphysically real, having a causal (and not merely a unifying) function. As Johnson has shown,[1] this conception became logically necessary when the "ding an sich" was eliminated from the Kantian epistemology. Green's critics, however, generally overlook this feature and make a good deal of his apparent denial of causality in God.[2] Sidgwick,[3] for example, apparently misconstrues Green's affirmation of the self-limited character of God to mean that God has no character except

[1] Supra, p. 81
[2] Prolegomena, pp. 86-88.
[3] Supra, p.61.

unification. He overlooks the fact that Green is protesting against a mechanical rather than a metaphysical conception of divine causality. Sturt[1] likewise claims that in making God a universal relating principle Green has left out teleology and so has failed to make God moral. Here again attention is centered only on one side of Green's conception of the moral ideal.

A closely related objection is found in the argument (advanced principally by Sturt and Dewey)[2] that in making the self a unifying principle he has made it static. Both God and man, it is charged, are reduced to static entities having no function except to maintain or to apprehend an unalterable system of relations. Nature also is by implication a static system which is not capable of being the sphere of moral endeavor. On such a basis it is obvious that no ethical activity could take place. But Green nowhere implies that either God or man is to be regarded as static, and though he calls nature an "unalterable" system he apparently means that its change is uniform rather than that it is changeless.[3] The basis on which the self is charged by his critics with being static is found in the use of the adjective "timeless." This to be sure is a confusing term and raises difficulties, especially when applied to the finite self, but he apparently

[1] Supra, p. 63.
[2] Supra, pp 64, 103.
[3] Supra, p. 158.

means that the self is not conditioned by time, rather than not capable of change.

This brings us to the heart of the problem, which is the relation assumed to exist between the temporal and the timeless self. If the finite consciousness is a reproduction of the eternal consciousness, in metaphysical essence as well as in type, then we have the impossible dualism with which Green's critics have repeatedly charged him. As we have seen in the section dealing with Green's metaphysics,[1] the pantheistic elements in Green afford considerable justification for this view. In so far as the charge of a dualistic self is valid, his ethical theory rests on an unsound basis; for the self is no longer the unitary agent which ethical activity demands, and finite freedom is replaced by the action of the eternal consciousness.

It must be frankly admitted that Green never satisfactorily solves the problem of the union of the temporal and timeless elements of the finite self. He tries to do it by the analogy of the shield having two sides,[2] but this fails to hold in view of the fact that shields are material objects having a meeting-place of the two sides at the edge, while this can not be said of consciousness. However from a practical standpoint, he assumes in his ethical theory, a personalistic unitary self whose moral ideal finds

[1] Supra, p.171 f.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 79.

its true reality in the eternal consciousness but which is not amalagamated with it. On such a basis, there is no obstacle to an ethical activity in which the self seeks to reproduce God by attaining to a higher standard of Godlikeness.

When we examine the view-point of Green's critics with regard to this apparent dualism, we find as usual that they center attention on the inadequate elements of the conception. Dewey[1], in particular, protests against Green's disregard of the "practical working self" in favor of a presupposed schema, or rigid framework (such as Dewey assumes the ideal or timeless self to be) Taylor and Sturt[2] likewise charge him with leaving out the empirical self which is the true basis of ethical activity. However it is unfair to Green's real intention to assume that he disregards the present empirical self in his theory of the "possible" or ideal self toward which man is striving. On the contrary, the whole theory of self-realization rests upon the view that the actual, or empirical, or"practical working"self is striving progressively to attain an ever-increasing ideal. Of the so-called static nature of this ideal, it must be noted that there is a difference between an infinite ideal which has objective existence, and man's apprehension of it. It is the task of the finite self to realize as far as possible the ideal existing in the eternal consciousness, but this does not necessitate the filling in of a rigid framework.

[1] Supra, p 105.
[2] Supra, p. 97, 64.

The proximate ideal which each man sets before him is fluid rather than static, and does not exclude but on the contrary motivates ethical activity.

Summarizing Green's conception of the nature of the self in its relation to ethics, we find that it is open to the charges of being (1) an hypostasized epistemological unity, (2) a static entity, (3) an impossible dualism of temporal and timeless elements, (4) a presupposed framework without empirical content. On any of these bases it would be ethically useless, but none of these charges does full justice to all sides of Green's conception.

Turning to the closely related subject of the moral ideal, we find that here too, as in his conception of the self, Green's statement of its content is negative rather than positive. In fact he says, "Of a life of complete development, of activity with the end obtained, we can only speak or think in negatives."[1] As Caird indicates,[2] it was probably his aversion to dogmatism which made him reluctant to speak in more positive terms of the nature of the self, or of the ideal. But he could have strengthened his system very materially, and could have answered in advance a good many arguments which have been raised against it, if he had put more content into these two basic conceptions which form the foundation of his ethical theory.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 180. Cf. also pp. 189, 204, 244.

[2] Supra, p. 37.

The objectivity of the moral ideal is an essential element in self-realization, for unless the ideal toward which men are striving has some objective reality there is no ground of assurance that it can ever be attained. Even Dewey, who is most antagonistic to Green's conception of the moral ideal, makes the statement, "The realization of this (ideal) self can be made the end only if it is present in some one's consciousness."[1] It is precisely on this basis that Green postulates the eternal consciousness inorder that the end of moral endeavor may have actuality, though Dewey of course applies the term "some one" only to finite selves. We may place beside his statement the words of Green, "A state of life or consciousness not yet attained by a subject capable of it, in relation to that subject we say actually is not: but if there were no consciousness for which it existed, there would be no sense in saying that in possibility it is, for it would simply be nothing at all."[2]

The chief charge raised against Green's conception of the ideal is that it is unattainable. Dewey,[3] in particular, asserts that a goal which is ex hypothesi unattainable is not only useless but leads to pessimism and despair. This charge, however valid from an abstract standpoint, overlooks the empirical aspects of the ideal and the possibility of attaining the proximate goal which each man sets before him. The ideal is unattainable in the sense that as we progress dissatisfaction with the present leads us on to

Phil. Rev. (2) 1893, p. 655.
Prolegomena, p. 215.
Supra, p. 101.

something higher. But this "flying goal" instead of affording discouragement is on the other hand the highest incentive toward an ever-increasing harmony between the ideal and the actual. Experience instead of raising an impossible barrier to the attainment of the ideal gives us our surest clue to its nature, and points the way to our duty in particular cases.

Green makes the teleological character of the moral ideal an essential element in moral progress. In fact, he regards moral advancement as possible only when man progressively extends the area of the common good by conceiving the goal of human activity in more personal and more social terms. The teleological character of the ideal, as revealed through the ages, in turn affords grounds for belief in an objective ur ultimate "best" toward which the manifold efforts for the "better" are tending. Taylor,[1] as we have seen, denies this on the score that we empirically choose the better without reference to an ultimate best. The validity of the charge depends upon whether we have a psychological or an ontological approach. While it is doubtless true that most men do not stop to consider an ultimate standard in choosing one thing in preference to another, it is also true, that unless there were some ultimate standard, our choices would never get beyond the relativity of the Sophists. The principle involved is

Supra, p.96.

analogous to that found in the distinction between a "reflective consciousness of self" experienced (though rarely) by the few, and an "experience of self-identity" which is common to all even when not reflected upon.

The ethical significance of institutions is also an important aspect of Green's conception of the moral ideal. He regards them as the crystalized result of past efforts to harmonize the ideal and the actual.[1] Accordingly, in our moral code and in our established institutions such as the state, the family, the church, etc. we can find practical guidance to the determination of the content of the moral ideal; for these while not perfect nevertheless indicate the direction in which progress lies. Green's critics in charging him with being anti-pragmatic and too negative in his conception of the ideal, have commonly overlooked the ethical importance which he attaches to existing institutions, or else have accused him of relying merely on conventional morality.[2] Both attitudes are unjust to Green.

Other aspects of Green's metaphysics have ethical implications, but as they have previously been discussed, they need not detain us long. His conception of freedom, for instance, is a fundamental factor both of his ethics and his metaphysics. But this conception, as important as it is, rests in turn upon his theory of the self, and stands or falls

[1] Prolegomena, p. 236.
[2] Supra, p.86, 102.

with the validity of his conception of the self. The relation of freedom to unmotived willing and the deterministic aspects of choices based on animal appetites and on past character have already been considered in connection with Green's metaphysics.[1]

The question of immortality also, has both metaphysical and ethical implications, as Kant has shown. It related to ethics in that it affords the only means of balancing up the inequalities of this life and providing a suitable reward for virtue. But this consideration does not affect Green's thought materially, since he regards virtue as being an intrinsic good which brings with it its own reward. It is interesting to note that in regard to the rewards to be meted out in the future life, Green is less hedonistic than Kant. The aspect of immortality which does affect Green's ethics is the need of a continued possiblity of self-development. Green emphatically affirms in the Prolegomena[2] the belief that self-realization must be continued in a future life which is both personal and social. Just as the limitations of the finite self afford an argument for God, so the limitations of our finite existence point to a life beyond the grave in which the soul of man may attain to its larger possibilities. Death, then, is merely a transition by which we pass from the partial and fragmentary realization of God which characterizes this present life to the possibility of a realization which is full and complete.

[1] Supra, p. 179 f.
[2] Prolegomena, pp. 216-220.

d. The relation of self-realization to formalism.

We have seen that Green in his epistemology follows closely in the footsteps of Kant, and that while in his metaphysics he departs from Kant in some respects to introduce Hegelian elements, he is nevertheless as much of a neo-Kantian as a neo-Hegelian.[1] It remains for us to examine his ethics from the standpoint of its affinities to Kant's ethical system. In order to do this we shall first examine the general function of the will in Green's ethics and then shall compare his theory more specifically with that of Kant.

We have seen that Green makes the good will a fundamental aspect of self-realization. It is in a sense both a means and an end, for it is only through the will to be good that man sets before himself an ideal goal, and on the other hand the goal which he sets is a state of virtuous living. Green himself recognizes this two-fold aspect of the good when he says (in speaking of Aristotle) "For us as for him the good for the individual is to be good, and to be good is to contribute in some way disinterestedly, or for the sake of doing it, to the perfecting of man."[2] He adds forthermore, that it is the altruistic impulse, or the recognition of the claims upon us of other man, which constitutes the essential difference between our conception of virtue and that of the Greeks. Thus the good will, properly regarded, is not only both the means and the end of self-realization but it is also the basis of altruism.

[1] Supra, pp. 16 f.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 331.

We shall first examine each aspect of the theory separately and then shall evaluate the general charges raised against Green's conception. That the good will is a legitimate means of self-realization can hardly be called in question unless we wish to reject the theory in toto. Whatever may be said of the possible selfishness of self-realization, the theory in its best form recognizes the good will as not only a possible factor but the dominant factor in the effort to attain a higher standard of perfection. If the effort for self-realization is actuated by a bad or selfish motive, it is no longer true self-realization but is merely self-indulgence. It has been charged, of course, that consistently to will the good involves a self-sacrifice which is antagonistic to self-realization.[1] But while a full consideration of this conflict must be reserved for the next section,[2] it may safely be asserted that if virtue be regarded as an essential element in self-realization, the good will is the most significant factor in the attainment of this end.

Turning to the aspect which regards the good will as the end of ethical endeavor, we find that Green is unequivocal in his assertion that this is one end, though he is not so clear as to whether it is the only end of self-realization. His clearest statement is found in the words, "The ideal of virtue which our consciences acknowledge has come to be the devotion of character and life to a perfecting of man, which is itself conceived as consisting in a life of self-

[1] Supra, p. 67, 90, 93.
[2] Infra, p. 246.

devoted activity on the part of all persons."[1] He says repeatedly that while we can not know in detail the content of the true good, it must consist of an ideal of the common good in which the individual seeks to serve the welfare of the whole.

Thus we find that the good will, both as a means and an end of self-realization, is altruistic. The union of these elements is expressed in the statement, "The good has come to be conceived with increasing clearness not as anything which one man or set of men can gain or enjoy to the exclusion of others, but as a spiritual activity in which all may take part, and in which all must partake, if it is to amount to a full realization of the faculties of the human soul."[2] Green raises but never answers the question as to whether the end of self-realization is equally altruistic and universal if made to include aesthetic and intellectual as well as character values.[3]

We are ready now to examine the charges commonly raised against Green's theory of the good will. These can be reduced to two; (1) that it lacks content, and (2) that he reasons in a circle. In fact, these can further be reduced to one, for it is asserted that by reasoning in a circle, he fails to introduce any content into his conception.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 343.
[2] Ibid., p 340.
[3] Ibid., p: 343-344.

We have found that Ayres[1], from a pragmatic standpoint, regards his whole theory as a statement of the truism, "To be good is to seek to be good." which fails to tell <u>how</u> or <u>what</u> to do in order to be good. If this accusation be true, it reduces self-realization to a formalism as devoid of content as the theory of Kant.

However, I believe that the accusation is not valid, and does not do justice either to Green's intention or to his statements. Granting that he does make the good will both a means and an end, he does not use the term with quite the same meaning in each case. As a <u>means</u> to self-realization the good will has practically the same significance that it has in Kant, i.e the categorical imperative, or the obligation to do one's duty. As an <u>end</u> of self-realization, it signifies a state of personal well-being of which virtue is the dominant characteristic. This union of will and personality is implied repeatedly, but is expressed most clearly in the words "The will is simply the man. Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is."[2] On such a basis, there is nothing incompatible in the idea that the obligation to do one's duty constitutes a means or motive to the attainment of an end which is a state of character in which the desire to do one's duty shall be habitual.

[1] Supra, p.109.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 173.

The charge that Green's theory lacks content is also invalid on account of the altruistic and social elements which we have noted. If the good will involves not only the obligation of the individual to be good, but also to do good to other men, we have clearly an objective which includes within itself a great many phases of activity. To be sure, Green does not attempt to point out the concrete elements in this objective, but maintains that through the institutions that have come down to us from the past and through the exercise of our own reason it is possible to determine its specific elements.

Since the good will plays so important a part in Green's ethical theory, it may be pertinent to consider briefly at this point his conception of the relation of the will to desire. Green, as we have seen,[1] insists strongly that there can be no unmotived willing. It has sometimes been assumed that this theory simply identifies the motive with the strongest desire, and is accordingly deterministic.[2] Green himself foresees this objection, and answers it on the basis of the activity of the self. Desire, he says, is to be distinguished from mere instinctive impulse, for the reason that desire involves consciousness of self and of an object.[3]

[1] Supra, pp22, 180.
[2] Supra, p.181.
[3] Prolegomena, p. 133.

Instinctive impulse (common to animals as well as man) may give rise to pleasures and pains, but human consciousness has the power of identifying itself on rational grounds with a certain object of desire which is chosen among conflicting "solicitations" as the motive of action. Thus while it is perfectly possible for a man to desire at the same time several incompatible objects, those which his will does not choose differ entirely from the object of his choice, because in the latter he identifies himself with his desire, i.e. it becomes an aspect of his will. To say that the motive which constitutes his will in a particular case is the strongest desire is inaccurate, because it overlooks the distinction in kind between the defeated desires and that with which the self has become identified. Green summarizes his view in the words, "It must be admitted that an act of will is never mere desire, never a desire which has been in conflict with other coordinate desires and has come out strongest ----. The true distinction lies between passions as influences affecting a man --- and the man as desiring, or putting himself forth in desire for the realization of some object present to him in idea, which is the same thing as willing."

In connection with the relation of the will to desire, we must consider also the relation of both will and desire to intellect. Green shows the influence of Hegel in

Prolegomena, p. 166.

his emphasis upon the rational elements involved in moral choices. As we have noted, an object of desire becomes an aspect of the will when the man on rational grounds identifies himself with it. Green says decisively, "There is always thinking in willing. A thoughtless will would be no will."[1] But there the question arises as to whether will is simply a combination of thought and desire. To this Green replies, "Will is not thought plus desire. Desire of the kind which enters into willing involves thought; thought of the kind which enters into willing involves desire; for the desire is the direction of a self-conscious subject to the realization of an idea, while the thought is the presence of an idea in such a subject impelling its own realization."[2] Thus, thought and desire are not separable but only distinguishable aspects of will, and the true nature of both intellect and will lies in the self-conscious subject. "Speculation and moral action are coordinate employments of the same self-conscious soul, and and of the same powers of that soul, only differently directed".[3] Green makes a practical application of this principle that reason and will are inseparable elements of every moral choice by pointing out that self-realization involves "not merely a conception of a possible good for man, but the adoption by or men of that good as his or theirs."[4] It is in harmony with

[1] Prolegomena, p. 170.
[2] Ibid., p. 171.
[3] Ibid., p. 169.
[4] Ibid., p. 205

this view that he admits the inability of any theory of the ideal to improve conduct until the character is set in the direction of the ideal.[1]

Turning more specifically to the relation of Green's ethics to Kant's we find that in various important features they are in close agreement. In regard to the categorical imperative, the metaphysical postulates of morality, the worth and dignity of humanity, and the relation of rights to duties, Green's theory though expressed in different form does not differ materially from Kant's.

The categorical imperative in Green does not take such an ascetic form as in Kant, for while he is equally anti-hedonistic, Green's recognition of the importance of the object of desire in the exercise of the will precludes the possibility of a real conflict between duty and the desire that motivates the action. But the unconditional obligation to virtuous living is expressed as emphatically by Green as by Kant. In Green, to be sure, the obligation to do one's duty is complicated somewhat by the fact that this duty is assumed to be the realization of the eternal consciousness, and we have noted how Taylor holds up to scorn the paraphased dictum, "Realize thine eternal self."[2] But while the content implied by the categorical imperative differs from that of Kant, the obligation itself is equally unconditioned.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 395
[2] Supra, p. 98

Green like Kant regards the postulates of God, freedom and immortality as essential to ethical theory. Both make God and freedom the primary metaphysical assumption of morality, but Kant lays considerably more stress upon immortality than does Green. Green admits the need of immortality for continued personal development, but the Kantian argument that immortality is necessary to ensure the justice of the universe receives scant attention. This is due probably to the fact that Green makes no definite or systematic attempt to solve the problem of evil.

A point of agreement about which there can be no question relates to the worth and dignity of humanity. Green insists repeatedly that persons must be treated not as means but as ends.[1] This forms the keynote of his political and educational theory. His intense desire to secure justice for all, and especially to alleviate the suffering and remove the ignorance of the masses by extending to them greater opportunities, arose not only from his own altruistic impulses but from the conviction that ethical theory demands due consideration for the value of personality wherever found. It was the same conviction which made him an ardent advocate of the Northern cause in the fight for the extinction of slavery and made him insist that the backward races must be judged not by their attainments but by their possibilities.[2]

[1] Prolegomena, pp. 253, 321, et al.
[2] Ibid., pp. 236-237.

In the Prolegomena, the extension of the area of the common good which is made such a prominent element rests on this conception of man's duty to humanity as a whole.[1] The idea of justice, and of man's obligation to serve his fellow-man, is regarded both as an intuition of conscience and as a result of social progress embodied (at least partially) in our institutions.[2]

Green agrees also with Kant in regarding duties as more fundamental than rights. This idea is expressed most clearly in his Principles of Political Obligation, where he maintains that man's possession of certain rights is directly dependent upon the fact that these powers are necessary to the fulfillment of his duty as a moral being.[3] He shows, furthermore, that the recognition of a certain power as a right depends upon the moral ideal, for unless a man were capable of conceiving some ideal good for himself and others, he would have no motive for claiming the powers and privileges necessary to the attainment of this end.[4] The existence of "natural" or universal rights depends accordingly upon the existence of an absolute moral ideal, which gives a basis for the moral strivings of each finite individual.[5]

Turning to the points in which Green disagrees with Kant, we find a marked difference in the importance attached

[1] Prolegomena, pp. 237-253.
[2] Ibid., p. 249.
[3] Works, vol. ii, p. 347.
[4] Ibid., p. 350.
[5] Supra, p. 120.

to the objective or material aspects of morality. Green is never a pure formalist, and while it has been charged that his theory of the good will lacks content, it can scarcely be said of Green (as of Kant) that he emphasizes the intention of an act to the neglect of its consequences. Green is right, I think, in recognizing that even in Kant "the goodness of the good will lies in the prevalence of interest in a worthy object."[1] But in Kant this principle is largely obscured by an abstract conception of the moral law, while in Green the importance of the worthy object is made much more prominent. In his emphasis upon the content of the good as embodied in an objective moral ideal he successfully avoids a one-sided Kantian formalism.

But while Green escapes one error he falls into another, for in his recognition of the importance of the outer aspects of morality he tends to over-estimate the harmony which exists between motive and consequence. We find him saying, "It is only to one limited vision that there can seem to be such a thing as good effects from an action that is bad in respect to the will which it represents--- there is no real reason to doubt that the good or evil in the motive of an action is exactly measured by the good or evil its consequences, as rightly estimated--estimated that is, in their bearing on the production of a good will or the perfecting of humanity."[2] But this view seems to imply a

[1] Prolegomena, p. 310.
[2] Ibid., p. 352.

"pre-established harmony" which is seriously open to question. If this exact balance is evident only to an omniscient mind, as Green admits, it can be of little value to the finite individual. Furthermore it is doubtful whether virtue gets its due reward even in the production of a more virtuous will, for when well- intentioned efforts come to nought the result is more apt to be bitterness than purification of spirit.

Another point of differance between Green and Kant lies in the attitude taken toward the possibility of proving the metaphysical postulates of morality. While both regard God and freedom (and to a less extent immortality) as necessary postulates of ethical theory, Kant frankly admits the impossibility of proving them on metaphysical or epistemological grounds. Green apparently thinks he has proved them in the first hundred pages of the Prolegomena. The flaws in his argument have already been discussed and need not be restated.[1] But while Green asserts that we may know that God exists as surely as we know that we ourselves or the world exists,[2] it should be noted that he is not entirely unequivocal in his statements. For instance in the Fragment on Immortality he says, "There can be no proof of the 'immortality of the soul' any more than there can be proof of the 'existence of God.' You can only prove the posterior by the prior, the part by the whole".[3] This is but another case of the inconsistencies of Green's works.

[1] Supra, p. 155 f.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p 268.
[3] Ibid., p. 160.

Another point of divergence from Kant is found in the relation of theism to moral autonomy. Green believes as firmly as Kant in the general principle of moral autonomy, and it is to establish its possibility that he gives freedom such a prominent place. But Kant though not anti-theistic seems to regard divine participation in human affairs as an infringement of moral autonomy, while Green looks upon all human efforts for the good as being in a sense divine in their origin. The truth doubtless lies between the two, for the significant factor in the question is the extent to which the eternal consciousness, reproducing itself is man, enters into and determines finite willing. God can guide and cooperate, but he can not do the willing for man without depriving man of his freedom. However, the relation of theism to moral autonomy is but a special form of the larger question of the relation of the finite to the infinite self, and as this has previously been discussed it need not detain us longer.[1]

[1] Supra, p. 165.

e. The relation of self-realization to hedonism.

The relation of Green's theory to hedonism is especially interesting in view of the fact that while he was strongly anti-hedonistic in his own attitude, he has often been charged with having promulgated a theory which is really hedonism in disguise.[1] Accordingly we shall examine his attempted refutation of hedonism, the validity of the charges of hedonism and egoism which have been raised against self-realization, and the outstanding points of agreement and difference between Green and Mill.

Green's refutation of psychological hedonism has met with more favor than his attitude toward ethical hedonism. We have seen that he conclusively established the fact that a consistent sensationalism can end only in psychological hedonism.[2] But if the self is a real element in man's nature and is active in making moral choices, as Green shows it to be, than it is possible to conceive that the self acts, not solely from the motive of pleasure, but from the desire to conform to an ideal which may involve pain rather than pleasure in its realization.

Green regards the true relation of desire to pleasure, and of desire to its object, as being radically different from that assumed by psychological hedonism. According to the latter, pleasure is considered more fundamental than desire, and it is assumed that a desire can be aroused or

[1] Supra, p. 89, 93,
[2] Supra, p. 199.

created by the anticipation of its own satisfaction. In reality, Green maintains, a certain course of action seems pleasurable only if there is already some desire for it. There can be no desire in general but only desire for some object, and this object of desire is not simply pleasure. To be sure this object of desire may seem pleasurable, but it is the object itself rather than the pleasure it engenders which makes man seek it. For example (as suggested in Dewey and Tuft's Ethics)[1] it is assumed by psychological hedonism that the idea of the pleasure of exercise arouses desire for it, whereas in reality the idea of exercise is pleasant only if some desire for it is already present. "The object of desire is not pleasure but some object is pleasurable because it is the congenial terminus of desire."[2]

Green shows, furthermore, that psychological hedonism is wrong in assuming, as it does, that there is no intrinsic difference between a good and a bad will, for if pleasure be regarded as the sole motive of action, moral distinctions are obliterated.[3] The unsophisticated conscience refuses to believe that all objects of desire are alike save in the amount of pleasure they afford, and when qualitative differences in pleasure are admitted, as they are by Mill, the ground-work of hedonism is destroyed.[4]

[1] Supra, p. 115.
[2] Dewey and Tufts: Ethics, p. 270.
[3] Prolegomena, p. 178 f.
[4] Ibid. p. 184.

The confusion arises, Green says, from failing to distinguish between pleasure and satisfaction, and also between pleasure as an object and pleasure as a by-product. Men seek satisfaction in objects which they know will involve the sacrifice of pleasure and while a certain type of pleasure follows from the attainment of self-satisfaction, this is very different from pleasure as an object. "It is the consciousness that self-satisfaction is thus sought in all enacted desire, in all desire that amounts to will, combined with the consciousness that in all self-satisfaction, if attained, there is pleasure, which leads to the false notion that pleasure is always the object of desire."[1]

Turning to Green's attitude toward ethical hedonism we find that he gives a very keen and discriminating treatment of the subject in Book III, chapter 4 of the Prolegomena under the caption of "pleasure and common good," besides devoting much attention to the subject in his consideration of Greek ethics and in his comparison of utilitarianism and perfectionism from the standpoint of their practical value. To reproduce in full his entire analysis of hedonism would extend this article far beyond its legitimate limits, and only its essential outlines can be stated here.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 180.

As usual we find that is is the idea of the self which forms Green's starting-point. The self is not a mere bundle of desires, but owing to the rational faculty man is capable of forming an idea of some object of desire which he believes will contribute to his permanent satisfaction. This idea of a general standard or conception of the good by which particular desires are to be measured is a basic factor in all moral judgment. In fact, "the abiding satisfaction of an abiding self" may be regarded as the key-note of Green's ethical theory.

The question next arises as to whether pleasure, or a sum of pleasures, can be regarded as constituting this chief object of desire which will afford a permanent satisfaction. Green maintains that it can not.

In the first place, as Green points out, the greatest possible sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning, for pleasures cannot be summoned. Pleasures are not entities but <u>states of feeling</u> which from their very nature are incapable of quantitative measurement, because they have no common unit of value by which they may be grouped together. All that we can do toward measuring pleasures is to say that one is preferred to another because of its greater intensity or duration, but since the preference varies so widely in different individuals and in the same individual at different times, there can be no real standard of measurement.

Furthermore, since the sum of pleasures admits theoretically of indefinite increase, it is as meaningless to speak of a greatest possible sum of pleasures as of a greatest possible quantity of time or space.[1] But a still more serious objection arises from a practical standpoint, for irrespective of numerical measurement or definiteness of end, it is impossible for the pleasures of the past to be accumulated, as so much "stuff", to add to the amount of pleasures experienced at any given moment. "We may talk, if we like, of a larger sum of pleasures as more of a good than a less sum... but in doing so we are bound to remember, if we would not be misled by the words, that we are talking of "goods" of which, from the nature of the case, there can be neither possession nor any approach to possession".[2] Accordingly, the hedonic calculus is unsound.

But even granting that a sum of pleasures be possible, this conception is inadequate as an idea of the true good. From a formal standpoint, it can not serve as the supreme object of desire since a <u>sum</u> of pleasures is not itself a pleasure and is not capable of being desired but only of being thought or conceived intellectually.[3] This objection (which borders on being a mere verbal quibble) is reinforced by a more substantial one; namely that a sum of pleasures fails to afford the permanent satisfaction which

[1] Prolegomena, p. 441.
[2] Ibid. p. 265.
[3] Ibid. p. 258.

the self requires. The good must be conceived as being at least relatigely permanent, and there is no assurance that the pleasure acquired from the pursuit of a given object will be lasting. "Now it is not in dispute that we may and constantly do seek self-satisfaction for the moment in some imagined pleasure, though in our calmer mind we know that the pleasure cannot afford the self-satisfaction sought."[1] But on the other hand if we are dominated by the idea of what is good on the whole, or in the long run, the satisfaction abides even after the particular enjoyment involved has ceased.

Green has sometimes been charged with having advanced a theory which is as hedonistic as that which he seeks to refute. Sidgwick,[2] in particular, claims that self-realization is either equivalent to hedonism or else it is meaningless, for if "abiding satisfaction" is the end of ethical endeavor the only intelligible meaning this can have is the enjoyment of permanent pleasures. While I think that the charge does not do justice to the self-realization aspect of Green's theory it is a natural outcome of his emphasis on self-satisfaction. It seems to me that Green over-emphasizes the element of satisfaction in his conception of the summum bonum, for while it is undoubtedly true that satisfaction (if not pleasure) follows from virtuous living, this satisfaction is a by-product rather than the essential element in it. He goes too far also

[1] Prolegomena, p. 260.
[2] Supra, p. 89.

in asserting that "in all self-satisfaction, if attained, there is pleasure."[1] If the distinction between pleasure and satisfaction (which may involve pain) is clearly drawn, it is possible to accept what Green says without charging him with hedonism, but he could have made his position stronger by keeping the element of satisfaction in the background. In his theory as a whole, it occupies a much less prominent place than it appears to hold in his discussions of hedonism.

Another, and closely related, objection to the idea of a sum of pleasures as the true good is the fact that it is an ever-receding goal, and one which can not be attained by its pursuit. Aside from the fact that the universe seems to be so constructed that the persistent pleasure-seeker often fails of securing the pleasure which he seeks, it is true also that a long series of pleasure brings not increased enjoyment but a sense of satiety. Pleasures can not be accumulated in the sense that the more pleasures a man has had, the nearer he is to the goal of self-satisfaction. "He cannot really look forward to any millionth repetition of a pleasant feeling as bringing him nearer to the satisfaction of himself than he was the first time the pleasure was felt."[2] Nor is the situation materially different if the good is regarded, not as a sum of pleasures, but as a state of continuous enjoyable existence;

[1] Prolegomena, p. 180.
[2] Ibid., p. 265.

for if the latter is sought for its own sake, it fails to afford the satisfaction that is expected of it. The idea of a continuous enjoyable existence to have any validity, must be transformed to refer to a state of well-being consisting in the attainment of desired objects for one's self and others in harmony with an ideal of the common good.[1] Through this means alone can permanent satisfaction be acquired.

It may be charged, as it has been charged by Rashdall and Dewey,[2] that the sum of pleasures as a goal is no more unattainable than self-realization. It is true that in each we have a "flying goal" which advances before us as we seek it, and Green has failed to give due consideration to this resemblance. But there is also a marked difference, in that self-realization assumes the existence of an absolute objective standard while hedonism does not. Furthermore in self-realization the values of the preceding stages are conserved instead of being lost through lack of novelty as is the case with hedonism.

Green's strongest argument against hedonism, however, lies not in the impossibility of attaining the goal, but in the nature of the goal itself. Self-realization, with its ideal of the perfecting of man, provides a reasonable ground for virtue; hedonism, with pleasure as its objective, can not consistently account for man's moral strivings toward goodness.

Prolegomena, p. 267.
Supra, pp. 93, 101.

If virtue and pleasure be identified, experience itself negates this position, for in the life of every man the choice between virtue and pleasure must repeatedly be made. If it be maintained that virtue should be sought as instrumental to pleasure, experience again tells us that the path of goodness often leads to pain. Hedonism may indeed say that a man ought so to alter his character that he will take pleasure in doing virtuous acts, but hedonism itself offer no motive for incurring the pain involved in such an alteration of character, on the possibility or chance of increasing the total amount of pleasure. Some hedonists to be sure (especially among the utilitarians) have advocated virtue, but in so far as they have done so they have been better than their theories.

The outstanding element of discrepancy with regard to the hedonistic basis for virtue relates to altruism. Self-realization with its emphasis on the common good and its doctrine that the perfecting of man reguires the perfecting of other men as well, has a reasonable foundation for altruism; but hedonism can introduce this conception only by a subterfuge. It is impossible on a hedonistic basis to identify self-regarding and altruistic motives, Green says, for we have a different type of desire in seeking pleasure for self and in seeking it for others. "Desires are determined by their objects, and desire for pleasure having an absolutely different desire from desire for the production of pleasure to others."[1]

[1] Prolegomena, p. 274.

But even granting that it might be possible on a hedonistic basis to seek the pleasure of others, in cases where it does not conflict with one's own, we have still no motive for incurring the pain of self-sacrifice in behalf of another. Furthermore, we have no motive on this basis for seeking the true welfare of others in cases where it does not involve an increase of their pleasure.

Green's refutation of this fatal weakness in hedonism seems conclusive. As Muirhead points out,[1] all the great hedonists of modern times have attempted to reconcile egoism with altruism by a tour de force: Bentham by assuming that selfishness can be identical with benevolence; Mill by regarding the pleasure desired by each to be equivalent to pleasure as desirable (without saying to whom); and Sidgwick by assuming like Kant the existence of another order to give a proper hedonistic distribution of compensations.[2]

But the question has another side, for we have seen that Green's critics repeatedly charge him with having introduced an illegitimate combination of egoism and altruism in his own theory. Sturt, Sidgwick, Dewey and Rashdall,[3] in particular, attack him on this ground, and maintain that if it is man's business to realize himself to the fullest extent he can not do so without neglecting others. Hobhouse[4] also discusses the problem but is more favorable to Green.

[1] Supra, p. 130
[2] Muirhead; The Service of the State, p. 36.
[3] Supra, pp. 67, 90, 93, 105.
[4] Supra, p. 107.

In evaluating the question there are two issues involved: (1) whether self-realization as the perfecting of virtue is egoistic; and (2) whether the attainment of the other values of life involves a necessary conflict between self-realization and self-sacrifice. We shall discuss them separately.

Regarding the first there is less difference of opinion. Dewey, to be sure, says that it just as egoistic to get goodness for the self as it is to get pleasure.[1] But this attitude involves a serious misconstruction of Green's theory, for he repeatedly asserts that goodness is to be sought, not merely for the sake of the individual but for the sake of the common welfare. It can not consistently be maintained that virtue is an exclusive value, and most of his critics have not attempted to make this charge.

However, the real issue lies in the question as to whether self-realization is compatible with self-sacrifice when intellectual or aesthetic values are involved. It is a commonplace of our experience that one must frequently sacrifice (not merely his pleasure) but the possibility of real self-development along lines other than virtue if he would serve the interests of others. This distinction between the broad and narrow conceptions of self-realization is a question which Green notes but never definitely discusses. After stating

Supra, p. 105.

the question in the Prolegomena, he says, "it shall be dealt with in the sequel, and is noticed here in order to record the writer's admission that it cannot be passed over."[1] But death cut short his work and we can only conjecture what the answer would have been.

While this omission is regrettable, we can from his general theory form a fairly adequate idea of his attitude toward the problem. He insists repeatedly upon the organic nature of society, wherein there is no distinctly individualistic good, but the good of each (when rightly interpreted) is the good of the whole. This as we have seen is the basis of his political theory. If this conception be true, it is possible to answer the question as to why one should sacrifice for the good of others by saying, "Because they are not other."[2] This does not imply a pantheistic oneness, but does involve a conception of the self as being so organically related to society as a whole that one can not truly realize himself without realizing that element in himself which is social.

This in general appears to be the most adequate means of meeting the charge of incompatibility. However, other solutions are possible. If it be granted that virtue is a catholic value, then it may be maintained that the goodness of will involved in sacrificing self for others is sufficient to outweigh any loss of other values that may be incurred.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 344.
[2] Cf. Fairbrother: The Philosophy of T. H. Green, p. 183.

Green himself, as we have seen,[1] makes the good will the supreme end, as well as means, of moral activity. On this basis, it is possible to say that to do one's duty, though it involves sacrifice, is the best thing for the individual as well as for society, since to shirk one's duty involves a greater sacrifice of values.[2] This explanation is legitimate, I think, unless it is carried so far as to rob the good will of its content by overlooking the object toward which it is directed.

The question as to whether self-sacrifice is compatible with self-realization depends ultimately upon the object for which goods are possessed, and for which the sacrifice is made. On the hedonistic assumption that values (either material or spiritual) are to be acquired as a means of enjoyment, it is true that a real conflict is involved and the charges of Sidgwick and others are justified. But if the values to which self-realization points are to be acquired for mutual service, then he best realizes himself who serves most.

A discussion of the relation of self-realization to hedonism would be incomplete without a more specific consideration of the relation of Green to Mill. Green himself devotes two chapters to utilitarianism, besides making numerous references elsewhere to Mill and his theories. We can here note only the outstanding points of agreement and difference.

Supra, p. 224 f.
Supra, p. 107.

It should be observed that Green frankly admits the practical value of Utilitarianism. He regards it as having rendered the greatest public service to modern Europe of any philosophical theory. He says of it, "Whatever the errors arising from its Hedonistic psychology, no other theory has been available for the social or political reformer, combining so much truth with such ready applicability. No other has offered so commanding a point of view from which to criticise the precepts and institutions presented as authoritative."[1] While he admits that Utilitarianism has tended to improve human conduct and character, he is not enough of a pragmatist to advocate its adoption for this reason. On the contrary he points out the errors in its hedonistic basis which we have noted, and maintains that self-realization is equally suitable as a basis of reform, and more free from speculative difficulties.

Thus we find that Green joins with Mill in advocating political and social reform, but he finds the Utilitarian justification for such reform, not in a typically hedonistic element, but in a principle borrowed from Kant. Green says, "The principle embodied in the formula, that 'everyone shoud count for one and no one for more than one'--has been the source of its real beneficence in the life of modern society because, quite independently of the identification of the highest good with a greatest possible sum of pleasures--

[1] Prolegomena, p. 396.

it has practically meant for Utilitarians that every human person was to be deemed an end of absolute value." In this principle Green is in full accord with Mill.

Green agrees with Mill also in another principle which is inconsistent with hedonism per se; namely, in the qualitative distinctions between pleasures. Green says that in regarding some kinds of pleasures as more desirable and more valuable than others because of their intrinsic nature, Mill exalts the Utilitarian theory but departs from the doctrine that pleasure is the only object of desire. The inconsistency is due, Green thinks, to the fact that the desire for the sense of dignity which comes from having chosen the better object is confused with desire for the pleasure the chosen object may bring.

Turning to the differences between Green and Mill, we find the most outstanding difference in the nature of the summum bonum. This involves the whole distinction between self-realization and ethical hedonism, and the points of disagreement which we have noted need not here be restated.[4] While the egoistic elements of hedonism do not apply to Mill personally, they are nevertheless inherent in his system.

Another outstanding difference (which we have previously touched upon)[5] relates to the nature of society.

Prolegomena, p. 247.
Ibid., p. 184.
Ibid., p. 188.
Supra, p. 239 f.
Supra, p. 121.

Mill's conception was atomic and individualistic, and accordingly he regarded society as an aggregate of individuals. On this basis he had much to say of "self-regarding" rights. Green's theory on the other hand was organic, and he regarded the welfare of the individual and society as being so intimately bound up together that one could not be injured or helped without an effect upon the whole. On such a basis no act is really self-regarding.

The distinction between their conceptions of freedom rests on a similar basis. Mill regards freedom in the merely negative sense of "absence of restraint." This conception rigidly applied would mean simply the tyranny of the strongest.[1] Mill tries to avoid the anarchistic implications of this view of freedom by saying that since liberty consists in doing what one desires, one must sometimes be restrained from following a lower desire, (e.g. to cross an unsafe bridge) in order to further a higher desire (to remain alive and dry).[2] But this is inconsistent, for it affords no valid criterion of desires and would justify an endless amount of interference and restraint. Green, however, goes at the question of freedom from a different angle. He distinguishes between the use of the term in a <u>generic sense</u>, i.e. as it applies to all acts of will, and in a <u>particular</u> sense in which only those acts are free which tend to man's self realization.

[1] cf. Ritchie: Principles of State Interference, p. 85.
[2] Ibid., p. 86.

On the latter basis Green regards state action as expedient when it tends to promote the true freedom (i.e the self-realization) of man, but inexpedient when it interferes with this. It is for this reason that he advocates legislation for the "removal of obstructions" to free development.

In one other respect Green stands in marked contrast to Mill, i.e. in the relation of religion to ethical theory. To Green the metaphysical postulates which underlie religion are equally necessary as a basis for ethics, and even in regard to his political theory he has been termed a "religious radical."[1] Mill, on the other hand, rests nothing on religion and regards God as too impotent to be of any ethical significance. For this reason he has been more popular with those who scorn "theological mysteries" in favor of something "practical." In a later section, we shall see how successfully Green combined ethical with religious concepts.

[1]Supra, p. 120, 124.

3. Religious problems.

a. Religion and metaphysics.

There is an inseparable connection between Green's religious views and his metaphysical conceptions. Any view of the world which makes the belief in God an important factor must rest upon a metaphysical rather than a positivistic basis, and Green's metaphysics is well fitted to support a religious outlook. While logically his philosophy of religion rests upon his metaphysics, it is probable that the solidity of his religious convictions furnished the basis, in his personal life, which caused his metaphysics to take the turn which it did.

In discussing the religious problems connected with Green's thought, we shall first attempt to state the general relation between his religious and metaphysical views, and then shall take up in turn his conception of mysticism and religious experience; of dogma and authority; of the incarnation and the person of Christ; of sin and salvation; and of immortality.

The connecting links between his religion and his metaphysics are found, on the one hand, in his conception of the self-conscious subject; and in conjunction with this, in his doctrine of the immanent God who reproduces himself in the moral life of men. The most definite statement of his conception of the metaphysical basis of religion is found in the fragment entitled, "The word is nigh thee", and it is very unfortunate that this

was never completed. He expresses the key-note of his religious belief in its opening phrases where he says the essence of Christianity is the thought of God "not as 'far off' but as 'nigh', not as a master but as a father, not as a terrible outward power forcing us we know not whither, but as one of whom we may say that we are reason of his reason and spirit of his spirit; who lives in our moral life, and for whom we live in living for our brethren, even as in so living we live freely, because in obedience to a spirit which is ourself; in communion with whom we triumph over death and have assurance of eternal life".[1]

In this article Green develops the idea of God as the "possible self", who is manifested in the struggles of our moral life to realize our highest possibilities. "God is the final cause of the moral life, the ideal self which no one, as a moral agent is, but which everyone, as such an agent, is however blindly seeking to become".[2] To the charge that this makes God unreal, he replies with the teleological argument previously stated, that in any process of development it is the end being developed which is the true reality. To the objection that it identifies God with man, he admits that it does in a sense identify him, "not with an abstract or collective humanity but with the individual man".[3] But identity in this sense, he says, is compatible with difference; for God may be regarded as the realization of every man's determinate possibilities without affirming that God is no more than man. In the attainment of the ideal, man must overcome

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 221.
[2] Ibid. p. 225.
[3] Ibid. p. 225.

the contradiction between the actual and the possible, "On the recognition of the difference depends the significance of the assertion of identity".[1]

Green regards the self-conscious subject as the bearer of religious values, and in this he finds a close analogy between faith and knowledge. Reason, he says in his article on Faith, is the source alike of faith and knowledge, for reason is self-consciousness. In our knowledge of nature, everything we know is known to us as a constituent of one world, from which we build up the conception of the uniformity of nature. While we know only in part, this partial knowledge leads us to believe in the existence of a wider sphere of knowledge beyond our present attainment. Just as the assurance of there being a reality, one and complete and absolute, is the basis of our finite strivings after knowledge; so also faith in an unseen reality sets before us a goal for our moral strivings. "Though communicated to us in a mode which does not allow of its being itself in a strict sense known, it keeps before us an object which we may seek to become. It is an element of identity between us and a perfect being, who is in full realization what we are only in principle and possibility".[2]

Not only do we find an analogy between religious and intellectual values, but we find also an analogy between religious and artistic values. "In a certain respect there is a correspondence between faith, as the practical consciousness of

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 225.
[2] Ibid. p. 268.

God, and the artist's consciousness of an ideal".[1] Green shows that the ideal which dominates the artist's work is something he experiences in his consciousness but never completely attains; yet the fact that the ideal exists, above and beyond his attainment of it, makes it in the highest sense real. Green gives us an excellent statement of the personal yet more than human basis of the ideal in the statement, "There is an identity between it and his consciousness of it; otherwise it would not exist for him at all. Yet it must be more and other than his consciousness of it, or that consciousness would not be of an ideal."[2] Thus God, as the object of religious faith, may be said to manifest himself, though never fully, in the conscious life of finite persons.

In view of the fact that Green has sometimes been considered to have made the reconciliation of religion and science his primary object, a word should be said on this topic. Green stood staunchly for the maintenance of the scientific spirit, so long as science is kept within its proper bounds. In his article of Faith he protests vigorously against the tendency of traditional theology to raise an impossible barrier between religion and science. He maintains that both have a common basis and should not be set in opposition to each other. "The human spirit is one and indivisible, and the desire to know what nature is and means is as inseparable from it as the consciousness of God and the longing for reconciliation with him. The scientific impulse on the one side, and the faith that worketh by love on the other,

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 268.
[2] Ibid., p. 269.

exhibit the same spirit in different relations".[1]

Accordingly Green rejects the belief in miracle as being not only hostile to science but unnecessary to religion. It is in this connection that he says, "A proposition which asserts divine causation for any phenomenon is not exactly false, but turns out on strict analysis to be unmeaning".[2] By this he means that science is right in objecting to any intrusion of the supernatural within the natural. But science goes too far, he says, in trying to assert that there is nothing which is not natural. "Its own existence is a witness to the reality of the spiritual....The true lesson which it teaches is that God is not to be sought in nature, nor in any beginning or end of nature, but in man himself".[3] The scientist who rules out the reality of religion because it can not be made an object of science is equally in error with the theologian who demands assent to propositions which science declares impossible.

b. Mysticism and religious experience.

If we attempt to evaluate Green's personal attitude toward religion he may be adjudged a mystic; yet it may be asserted with equal correctness that mysticism figured very slightly in his religious experience. The explanation of this apparent paradox may be found in the diverse connotations attached to the term. With mysticism, in the sense of religious ecstasies and emotional outbursts, Green had very little sympathy. Both in

[1] Works, vol. iii, p, 264.
[2] Ibid., p. 264.
[3] Ibid., p. 265.

his personal life and in his thought system he laid emphasis upon the primary function of reason, and the emotional side of religion appealed to him far less than its intellectual and ethical aspects. But on the other hand, if mysticism be defined as the consciousness of the indwelling presence of God, his whole religious outlook makes mysticism a basic factor.

In his essay on Faith he gives an unusually clear statement of the inward, spiritual character of true religion. In this he protests strongly against the view that faith is the intellectual acceptance of certain doctrines. In its place he puts the conception that faith is "a certain attitude or disposition which belongs distinctively to the 'inner man' and gives us our worth as moral and spiritual beings".[1] Such a conscious relationship to God makes a real difference both in one's own personal outlook on life and in his dealings with others, as Green repeatedly asserts. "If we are honest with ourselves, we shall admit that something best called faith, a prevailing conviction of our presence to God and his to us, of his gracious mind toward us, working in and with and through us, of our duty to our fellowmen as our brethren in him, has been the source of whatever has been best in us and in our deeds".[2]

Reference has been made in the preceding section[3] to the fact that Green drew an analogy between faith and knowledge, and recognized that both rest upon a common foundation. Between faith and genius we find an even more direct connection.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 260.
[2] Ibid., p. 268.
[3] Supra, p. 256.

The moral insight, or "high creative energy" which in his essay on The Force of Circumstances is called faith, appears as genius in his paper on The Influence of Civilization on Genius. In both he assumes that there is a "divine idea" in the world, manifested in every created thing, but manifested most perfectly in man. The religiously-minded person is conscious that God has a purpose in his life, and seeks by his living to realize this divine idea. "But when the divine idea manifests itself in the mind of man in an intellectual form, or when, to reverse the picture, man apprehends the idea through the medium of his intellectual faculties, then we discern the man of genius".[1] In either case, it is the possession of depths of insight experienced only by the "liberated few" which makes them masters of destiny.

On the relation between faith and outward ordinances, or between mysticism and religious forms, Green adopts a very sane view-point. That ordinances can successfully take the place of faith he emphatically denies. He repeatedly asserts the folly of trying to substitute the outward forms of worship for inner communion. But on the other hand, he says it is equally erroneous to try to dispense with ordinances entirely. This idea is brought out very prominently in his lectures on the English Commonwealth, in which he asserts that the fundamental error in the puritan position was a disregard of existing forms of worship. "Its danger lay in the attempt to construct a religious life, which is nothing without external realization,

[1] Works, vol. iii, pp. 11, 12.

on an inward and momentary intuition."[1] English puritanism, originating in the consciousness of a spiritual life which no outward ordinances could adequately express, set up a false antithesis between the spirit and the form. It ignored but could not escape the law of human life which makes them inseparable, and soon found itself crystalized into the outward form represented by the Commonwealth, under an authority more heavy and secular than that from which it had revolted. Thus, whenever an attempt is made to divorce religious experience from religious forms, the result is either a disappearance of the experience or a creation of new forms.

Of the relation between mysticism and moral activity, more will be said later when we enter upon a detailed discussion of Green's religion and ethics.[2] Suffice it to say at this point that he believed, as firmly as James, that "faith without works is dead". The inseparable connection between religious experience and Christian living is brought out in a very practical way at the end of his lecture on Faith, where he gives advice to students who have felt their faith to be waning. He shows that the subtlest foe of religion is not intellectual doubt, but ethical indifference to the call of God and duty. He says to his students, "You can not find a verification of the idea of God or duty; you can only make it.....The true verification of the consciousness of God is the life of prayer and self-denial which expresses it. Though the failing heart cries out

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 286.
[2] Infra, p. 365.

for evidence, at the worst live on as if there were God and duty, and they will prove themselves to you in your life".[1] After advising them not to scorn to engage in Christian activity along side of those who may differ widely form them in theology, he ends with the trenchant statement, "Faith in God and duty will survive much doubt and difficulty and distress. ....But if once we have come to acquiesce in such a standard of living as must make us wish God and duty to be illusions, it must surely die".[2]

A discussion of Green's attitude toward religious experience would not be complete without a more specific reference to his conception of prayer. Prayer to Green means two things, and two things only; communion and moral activity. Man's inner relationship to God reveals itself "in prayer and praise -- the prayer which asks for nothing, the praise which thanks for nothing, but God's fulfillment of himself -- and in that effort after an ideal perfection which is the spring of the moral life."[3] Elsewhere he says, "Prayer, indeed, if of the right sort, is already incipient action; or more properly, it is a moral action which has not yet made its outward sign."[4] Of the answer to prayer, he says that we must not look for an external answer, for the prayer will be its own answer, just as virtuous action is its own reward.

This conception of prayer, it seems to me, is disappointing, and is practically the only point in Green's treatment of religious experience which is open to serious criticism.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 273.
[2] Ibid., p. 276.
[3] Ibid., p. 265.
[4] Ibid., p. 273.

While the consummate value of the prayer of communion must not be discounted, to rule out the prayer of petition seems not only religiously destructive but philosophically unnecessary. To persons who believe that God is real, and that God is personally interested in the welfare of finite seekers, there is no obstacle to the belief that God not only hears but answers their petitions. To deny the possibility (or the probability) of specific answers to specific prayers would eliminate religious values which we can not afford to lose. While Green is right in cautioning us against making prayer a matter of "signs and wonders", he goes too far in the limitations which he places upon its nature.

But on the other hand, the merits, even of this conception, surpass its defects. In it we find a statement not merely of the metaphysical oneness of man with God, but of the intimate fellowship which lifts man above his finite limitations and leads him into the "holy of holies". The possibility of prayer, as of duty, is founded on man's spiritual kinship with God. "It is the God in you which strives for communication with God".[1] God has long been revealing himself in the high endeavor and long-suffering love which have moralized mankind, and God still speaks to the hearts of men. "The word of God is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart," and it is to the person who will open his heart to hear it that the word of God is revealed.

Works, vol. iii, p. 273.

c. Dogma and authority

Green's treatment of dogma is one of the most satisfactory, and at the same time one of the least satisfactory, elements in his whole discussion of religious thought. He undoubtedly rendered a great service to rational and vital Christianity in showing that its inner essence is something which can not be fettered by any system of creeds. He gives an excellent account, in his essay on Christian Dogma, of the manner in which dogma arose in the early church, and of the factors which have given it its grip upon the church from that time until the present. But while he admirably defends the right of the thinking Christian to cast off the shackles of dogma and put in its place the inner life of faith, he is exceedingly vague as to the relation between this life of Christian faith and the claims of historical Christianity which have found expression in the creeds. He seems at one moment to admit the need of an historical background, and at the next to speak as if this were a superfluous element. Again, he seems to admit the need of retaining the organized beliefs of the church for the sake of concreteness, and yet to protest against their tendency to vitiate religious experience. While in a sense it is true that both these standpoints are tenable, he fails fully to reconcile them.

Leaving for the present the unsatisfactory elements in Green's conception of dogma, we find him taking a very wholesome attitude toward historical criticism. A half-century ago

when Green was making his contributions to current thinking, the historical method of Biblical criticism was just coming into prominence, and the violence of opposition to it (which has not yet spent its fury) was causing a turmoil among both its friends and foes. The fear that it was undermining religion was not wholly ungrounded, owing to the destructive attacks upon Christianity made by some of the advocates of the historical method; while on the other hand the proportion of well-meaning but unintelligent Christians who opposed "higher criticism" as an invention of Satan was even greater then than now. The effect upon the current attitude toward dogma was to make the opponents of Biblical criticism fall back more firmly upon dogma and authority to bulwark their Christian convictions, while the advocates of the historical method stressed the claims of reason as opposed to those of dogma.

The great need of the times (then as now) was for Christian leaders who could unite the claims of reason with those of faith. Green through his translations of the works of Baur became interested in Biblical criticism, and he exerted a profound influence upon his generation in showing that it is possible to accept the findings of the historical method without any loss of the spiritual elements of Christianity. While he did not himself become a great Biblical scholar, he was able to furnish a philosophic basis upon which Biblical criticism could proceed without endangering the faith of its adherents.

The fundamental element in his conception was the belief that religious faith depends upon the inner experience of the believer rather than upon the intellectual acceptance of certain historical statements. He points out in his essay on Christian Dogma and again in the lecture on Faith, that it is one's Christian experience which determines one's attitude toward the historicity of Biblical statements rather than the reverse. "When events are said to have happened as a medium of God's revelation of himself to man, it is not by an intellectual process of estimating evidence, but by our convictions about God and by what our hearts demand of him, that we are determined to believe or disbelieve their reality".[1] While this statement taken literally, would nullify the objectivity of Biblical research, it contains an important truth in that it stresses the need of taking into account the moral and spiritual demands of human nature.

Dogma arose, according to Green, from the fact that an immediate intuitional experience, such as that exemplified by Paul, was transformed by the early church into something external and authoritative. Thus the three characteristics of dogma which he enumerates are:[2] (1) it presupposes an immediate intuition, and while retaining the limitations of this intuition it reduces its concrete object to an abstraction; (2) it rests upon the authority of the church; and (3) it is unsystematized. In tracing the development of dogma he shows that scholasticism attempted to free it from the third characteristic, and succeeded in a

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 260.
[2] Ibid., pp. 175-177.

measure by reducing it to an artificial system, which however was not truly systematic in the sense of being reasonable and coherent throughout. It was the task of Luther and the Reformation to free dogma ~~free dogma~~ from its second characteristic, and here again the attempt was only partially successful, for the authority of the Bible and of Protestant ecclesiasticism was substituted for that of the Catholic hierarchy. It is the task of the modern spirit, Green says, to complete the systematization and emancipation of our religious beliefs, and even more to do away with the first characteristic of dogma by getting back of its external and abstract features and experiencing again the immediate intuition of God from which it took its rise.

This conception of the origin and present status of dogma gives us a clue whereby to interpret Green's apparently contradictory attitude toward creeds. He says on the one hand that it would be idle to depreciate their value. In the early days "they served to gather up the various elements of the Christian consciousness, as represented by the various churches, and thus preserved Christian truth".[1] In a more general sense he says, "Thought first becomes definite in language, and it is in the language which the creeds furnish that the bare consciousness of God which is involved in the consciousness of ourselves -the yearning after him which is inseparable from the impulse to fulfill ourselves- has become a working theory of the relation

[1] Works, vol. p. 163.

between God and man".[1] But while admitting the value of creeds as a framework of truth, he deprecates the fact that the formulation of creeds, even in the early church, meant a loss of the spiritual and intuitional elements of Christian experience, and that as the creeds have become crystalized through the centuries, the emphasis has been laid more upon the form and less upon the spirit. Thus the challenge of the present day is to get away from creeds and back to their spiritual significance.

In this attitude it seems to me that Green speaks the truth but not the whole truth. It must be admitted that spiritual truth is far more vital than its creedal formulation, and that the latter has in many instances obscured the former. But Green's theory seems to proceed on a line analogous to Rousseau's "back to nature" argument, and is (at least partially) fallacious for the same reason. It may well be doubted whether Christianity in its early stages, before the formulation of the creeds, really was more spiritual than after their formulation. Green cites Paul and the author of the fourth gospel as being untheological and creedless exponents of the religion of the inner life. But while granting, with Green, the depth of spiritual experience found in both, I question whether they are also free from theological implications. Paul's theory of the atonement, for example, seems as dogmatic as any of its later formulations.

Furthermore, Green seems to believe that creeds should

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 261.

be taken in their original sense, or not at all. Thus we find him saying, "Inability to adopt the creeds of Christendom in their natural sense - and in any other sense they are best left alone,- need not disqualify us from using its prayers. A creed is meant to serve either as an article of agreement with other men, or as a basis of theological argument; and from each point of view there are objections to using its words in any other meaning than that which they are ordinarily understood to bear."[1] I think however, that creeds have a third and very important function; namely, that of enabling the individual Christian to express his allegiance to the corporate faith of the church. In this sense, it is unnecessary and trivial to refuse to repeat the statement of a creed simply because there are some minor elements in it with which one does not agree. Chadwick in the Unitarian Review (31) 1889 calls attention to the fact that if Green were taken literally at this point we should soon lose from our churches all the more enlightened of our clergy.

Green's attitude toward ecclesiastical authority is typical of his attitude toward creeds. In so far as the authority of the church tended to hamper the expression of the individuality of its members, he disapproved of it. His intense zeal for democracy, in addition to his zeal for freedom of thought and action in religious matters, led him to think unfavorably

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 274.

of the Established church.[1] Yet he did not withdraw from it, nor join any of the non-conformist denominations, for he felt that there was none which embodied with sufficient accuracy his own religious convictions to make the change worth while. We find him offering an interesting pragmatic reason for failure to unite with any of the more liberal denominations in the words, "Though I admire and agree with the leaders of the unorthodox, I do not like the tone and spirit of their following".[2] He repeatedly advised his students not to neglect the external forms of religion, lest they lose the inner content as well. While he terms his own views a "modified Unitarianism", he signed the articles of faith of the Episcopal Church in order to get his M.A. degree from Oxford. He apparently had some conscientious scruples in doing so, but the fact that he did it affords an evidence that he did not take too seriously his own dictum of refusing to accept creeds in any but their original sense.

The two aspects of dogma with which Green came most sharply into conflict center about the belief in miracle and the historicity of Jesus. He looked upon both with disfavor, and his lack of orthodoxy on these points has led some of his opponents to consider him unchristian. The justice of the charge must rest upon the deeper question as to what are the essential elements of Christianity. We shall here attempt to state his position with regard to miracle, and shall reserve his

[1] Supra, p. 11.
[2] Works, vol. iii. p. xxxvi.

conception of the historicity of Jesus for further discussion in connection with the incarnation.

While the belief in miracle and the reliance upon the historical events in the life of Jesus are regarded by Green as twin dogmas that have distorted the true conception of faith, the former is regarded as the more basic error, for most of the dogmas relating to Christ have arisen from placing too great dependence upon the miraculous elements of his life. Green objects to miracle on both metaphysical and religious grounds. Two questions are involved in the problem: first, whether miracles are possible; and second, whether granting their possibility we may regard them as having religious value. To both Green gives a negative answer.

Aside from religious considerations, Green's metaphysics leaves no place for miracle, for the view that nature is an "unalterable all-inclusive system of relations" carries with it the implication that there can be no break in the continuity of the system. Both the possibility of knowledge and the possibility of moral activity depend upon the fact that the uniformity of nature can be relied upon. If we could conceive of God as interrupting the order which he has established as an all inclusive system, we should have to regard him as being untrue to himself and in a sense as "uncreating himself". As we have previously noted, Green says, "A proposition which asserts divine

causation for any phenomenon is not exactly false, but turns out on strict analysis to be unmeaning".[1] ~~For~~ The only sense in which we may correctly ascribe divine causation to any physical event is that in which we may regard the entire universe as being a manifestation of the divine energy. God "reproduces himself" in nature but does so through a continuous system in which all events are general manifestations rather than particular effects of his causal activity. It is for this reason that Green, in his review of Caird's Philosophy of Kant, objects to the fact that Mansel for the purpose of justifying miracle distorts Kant's conception of God as a noumenon : for Kant, as Green states, emphatically affirms the uniformity of nature in the principles "in mundo non datur saltus" and "in mundo non datur hiatus".[2] With this view, Green is in full agreement.

But Green has religious reasons also for rejecting miracle. As we have seen, he objects to dogma in general on the score that it tends to obscure the spiritual elements of religion. For the same reason he objects particularly to the belief in miracle, which he regards as largely responsible for the existence and spread of dogma. We find him saying, "Hence dogma, a theory of faith originating in miracle, has come to be regarded----as part and parcel of faith itself".[3] He protests against the tendency prevalent among both theologians and men of science to regard faith as standing in opposition to reason, and he traces

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 274.
[2] Ibid., p. 128.
[3] Ibid., p. 263.

this tendency to the confusion of faith with miracle. Examples are cited of a pure and lofty faith which did not rest upon miracle, for to Paul "the belief in miracle was not its source but a mode ..... in which it found expression";[1] and to John "the relation of faith to miracle is not that of effect to cause: faith is rather the condition of the significance of the miraculous sign".[2] But theologians, reversing the order, have made faith depend upon miracle, and the tendency of the church has been to defend its belief in miracle at the expense both of reason and of true religion.

Green however is honest enough to admit that from a practical standpoint it is sometimes unwise to seek to overthrow the belief in miracle. When faith and miracle have become so closely intertwined that a rejection of miracle involves a loss of faith, he says "let no one rashly tamper with it".[3] His view is expressed succinctly in the words, "In those who must put God at a distance, or into a mystery, in order to recognize him; who hold that a revelation which is not through signs and wonders, is no revelation at all, - it is not religion but logic which is at fault. Just so far as they make their own the Christian doctrine of the indwelling spirit, ...they are superior to their own logic."[4] But while he frankly admits that deep faith and distorted logic may go hand in hand, he calls upon the thinking people of his day to bulwark their religion by a clearer logic instead of by blind adherence to a faith that rests on signs and wonders.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 221.
[2] Ibid., p. 255.
[3] Ibid., p. 244.
[4] Ibid., p. 244.

d. The incarnation.

Green's views regarding the incarnation and the person of Jesus are expressed most clearly in his essay on Christian Dogma and in an article entitled The Incarnation which is an extract from a lecture on the fourth gospel. In neither does he express his own position with entire clearness, although the vagueness which attaches to his discussion may be due in part to the nature of the subject. In rejecting the dogmatic conception of Christ which makes his nature rest upon miraculous elements in his life, Green is very emphatic; but he is not so clear regarding the positive conception of Christ to be put in its place.

Green, as we have seen, refers to his own position as a "modified Unitarianism".[1] The question as to whether Green should properly be classed in his theology as a Unitarian, depends in turn upon what we mean by Unitarianism, and would lead us too far afield for discussion at this point. Green himself had very little interest in the affixing of theological labels, and took little part in the current gladiatorial combats between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. If people "had the root of the matter in them" (as he phrased it), he cared not in what dress their faith clothed itself.[2]

With regard to the historical life of Jesus, Green considers that we know so little about it that it is unwise to

[1] Supra, p.30.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. c. (Memoir)

place much dependence upon it. It must be observed that he does not reject the historicity of Jesus (as implied by some of his critics, e.g. Lilly and Porter[1]) but he regards it as being so shrouded in obscurity that it affords no sure foundation on which to build. As we have seen, he prefers instead to rest his conception of Jesus upon such spiritual intuitions as are found in the writings of Paul and the fourth Gospel. We find him making occasional references to the synoptics, but he regards their value as limited to the glimpses they give of the spirit of Jesus revealed in his teachings (especially the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount), rather than in what they can tell us regarding the facts of his life. Of the nature of the actual Jesus he says that while we can not "penetrate the ideal vesture that shrouds from us the son of Mary", yet nevertheless "it is better to say vaguely but simply, that to no form less than divine could that vesture have adjusted itself, than to construct a shape, on Parisian models, hopelessly disproportionate to it".[2] He believes that John, whose picture of Jesus is superior to that of any of the other Gospel writers, has nevertheless portrayed a "glorified" Christ, such as Jesus of Nazareth was potentially but not actually.[3] So it is futile to attempt to penetrate behind the veil of historical obscurity with the hope of finding there a basis on which to build our faith.

[1] Supra, pp. 148, 149.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 164.
[3] Ibid., p. 219.

But this does not mean that we must relinquish our Christian faith for lack of historical evidence. On the contrary, the burden of Green's doctrine is that we must substitute the ever-living Christ of faith for the miraculous Christ of historical or Biblical tradition. He believes profoundly that the faith which is the essential element of all real religion depends for its witness upon the inner experience of the individual Christian and not upon historical evidence. Therefore his conception of Christ is that of "a Christ within us", a continuous manifestation of God, who thus reveals himself to the hearts of those who seek him. On this basis Christ's death and resurrection become, not past events to which a magical or even theological significance can be attached, but a continuous "death unto life", an eternal process by which the Christian may find God, and finding him may die unto sin and live unto righteousness.

In this connection Green's views regarding the theology of Paul and the author of the fourth Gospel are interesting, and form a large part of his discussion of the subject. He regards Paul as having had a faith which depended wholly on religious experience for its evidence and was entirely independent of the miraculous and even of the historical aspects of Jesus' life.[1] To the charge that Christianity depends upon a set of written propositions taken from the New Testament, he asks the question "Was Saint Paul a Christian or was he not?" In reply he says,

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 221.

"If he was a Christian, he was so not only without any acquaintance with this collection of propositions as such, but in spite of ignorance of the facts of our Lord's life prior to his death, as detailed in the synoptical Gospels, and with no developed consciousness of the theosophy which forms the basis of the fourth, or of the doctrines found in the canonical epistles other than his own".[1] Paul's conversion (as recorded by himself in the epistles) came about as a result of a direct revelation of Christ to him, i.e. as an intensely spiritual (but not miraculous) experience. Accordingly Paul's preaching bears the marks of the intuitional nature of his own experience, and while accepting the reality of the historical Christ he puts his major emphasis upon the living Christ of religious faith. "With Saint Paul, the past historical existence, the determinate individuality of Christ, are so overshadowed by his spiritual presence, by his ideal 'filling of all things', that the former elements tend to vanish altogether".[2] These words of Green regarding Paul could be applied with equal truth to Green's own position.

Green's view of the relation of Paul to dogmatic theology in general is worthy of notice, for he denies the view that Paul was the founder of Christian theology. He admits of course that the epistles contain much argumentation, but says that this consists merely of a polemic against the Jews and Judaizers rather than a statement of Christian doctrine. "His reconstruction of

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 221.
[2] Ibid., p. 167.

the spiritual fabric, his positive view of God, man, and the world is, as we have seen, intuitive, and cannot really be fitted into the argumentative mould."[1] While Green is doubtless right in asserting that Paul does not give us a systematic theology, he seems to me to underestimate the combination of Jewish tradition and Christian theology which forms a large part of Paul's writings and has exerted a profound influence on subsequent theological controversies.

Another point of interest in Green's view is the extent to which he regards Paul as contributing to the origin of Christianity. He speaks of Jesus and Paul as "the two parents of our faith"[2] and while recognizing the priority of Jesus he regards the and work of Paul as a necessary complement. Since he considers the latter as independent in its origins of any historical connections with Jesus, he thus makes Christianity rest upon two corner-stones instead of one. But while Christianity undoubtedly needed Paul to spread its message, it may well be questioned whether, without the historical Jesus, Paul would have had any message to spread.

This, it seems to me, is typical of the fundamental difficulty in Green's discussion of Paul. He admits, on the one hand, that Paul connected the Christ of faith with the Jesus of history; yet he seems, on the other hand to underestimate the extent to which Paul's work was actually dependent upon the

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 166.
[2] Ibid., p. 164.

historical life of Jesus. To be sure, Paul makes little reference to the miraculous elements of Jesus'life, but the burden of his message is, "I preach Christ and him crucified." While Paul wisely emphasizes the significance of the cross in the lives of individual believers, this doctrine could hardly have been preached with effectiveness without reference to the actual death of Jesus. Even though Paul was not an eye-witness of the work of Jesus, it is obvious that his contact with the other disciples (at least after his conversion, e.g. Acts 9;28; Gal. 1:18) must have given him an accurate knowledge of the events of Jesus' life, and it could scarcely be expected that he would disregard these in his preaching. Even the conversion experience itself requires an historical setting which Green seems unwilling to ascribe to it. For granting that the experience consisted of an immediate intuition of Christ, as Green maintains, such an experience would have been psychologically impossible without some previous preparation. Unless we assume some previous knowledge of the life and teachings of Jesus (acquired probably during Paul's career as a persecutor) such a direct revelation can be explained only as a miracle, and for miracle Green has no place.

Turning now to Green's conception of the Johannine Jesus, we find him regarding the fourth gospel as greatly inferior to the writings of Paul in its portrayal of the real nature

of Jesus, but still above the level of the synoptics and of dogmatic theology in this respect. He regards the great value of John's gospel as lying in its attempt to clothe religious truth in a form picturable to the imagination. He says, "All religion (as distinct alike from thought and morality) consists in the presentation of the objects of thought under the forms of imagination. The value of the religion depends on the adequacy of the imagined form to the object thought of(to which it never can be quite adequate)".[1] In John he considers that we have a combination of the sensuous and spiritual conceptions of Jesus, wherein the attempt is made to present spiritual truth in sensuous forms, Accordingly we find in the fourth gospel the conception of the divine immanence made manifest in human flesh, in the form of a person whose consciousness was both divine and human. The miraculous element is present in John's gospel, but is subsidiary to its spiritual truth; and in the effort to present the divinity of Jesus in a form that can be grasped by the imagination, it succeeds in its main object, yet fails (as any such effort must) to give a fully adequate account of Jesus' personality. Thus its picture is that of a "glorified" Christ, such as Jesus was potentially but not actually, and the religious imagination has made this conception of the divine-human Christ

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 219.

the corner-stone of its theology.

This conception, to Green, has both its merits and its limitations. So far as it emphasizes the spiritual elements of the living, immanent Christ, he considers that John, like Paul has rendered a great service to religion. "It is because the evangelist blended, or (if you like) confused, the sensuous seeing and the spiritual cognition, while yet he makes the latter the one thing needful, that this gospel has filled the special function of presenting the highest thought about God in language of the imagination, and has thus become the source of the highest religion."

On the other hand, Green regards the view of Christ's divinity, as presented in John's gospel, as having serious difficulties. Aside from the miraculous element, (which is unimportant because incidental and subsidiary to the spiritual), it involves "the hopeless irrationality" of ascribing a double consciousness to Christ. Green makes a good deal of this point, (which of course has been repeatedly advanced against the Trinitarian position) but it is interesting to find him urging the same objection against Christ's divinity which his critics have often raised against his own conception of the finite consciousness. Green seems to think it consistent enough to regard the consciousness of ordinary men as having both a divine and human element

[1] Works, vol iii, p. 219.
[2] Ibid. p. 183.

whereby God reproduces (or manifests) himself in man, but when the consciousness of Jesus of Nazareth is taken as a special case of such a manifestation, he finds in the view a "hopeless irrationality."

Another ground on which Green objects to the conception of Christ's divinity is that if we regard Jesus as a manifestation of God in any special sense not vouchsafed (at least in kind) to other men, we must regard him as summing up in himself all the metaphysical attributes of God. That is, he must be regarded as including in his consciousness the divine unity of the natural world as well as the moral order. Green dismisses this possibility with the remark, "No rhapsody of imagination can present this cosmos as involved in the consciousness of a man who walked the earth."[1] I think, however, that the objection is not valid, for it is not necessary to assume that Jesus, in order to give a unique manifestation of God, must have been a complete duplication of him in every aspect.

We are ready now to summarize and evaluate in general terms Green's conception of Christ. He seems to have regarded Jesus of Nazareth as a man who, like other men but in greater degree, reproduced within himself the eternal consciousness; and who (together with Paul) gave to the world a conception of God which makes Christianity vastly superior to any other religion.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 183.

But to Green the real significance of Christ lies not in the life of Jesus of Nazareth (which we can not really know), but in the immanent Christ who lives as an eternal spirit in the hearts of men. Thus his sacrifice on Calvary is to be considered merely as a symbol of the eternal sacrifice of God, and his resurrection is to be interpreted as symbolic of an eternal renewal of life in the hearts of his followers.

The merits of this conception are patent. In making Christianity a matter of vital faith other than historical evidence, Green lifted the reality of religion out of the realm of doubtful controversy and grounded it upon the far surer foundation of personal experience. Whatever may be our view of the possibility of miracles, it must be admitted that Christ's divinity rests not on the miracles that he may have performed, or upon miracles that may have been connected with his birth or death. It rests rather upon what he has meant to the hearts of men, and Green in affirming the power of the indwelling Christ is as orthodox as any dogmatic Trinitarian.

But the question has another side. Jesus of Nazareth was to Green a man as other men, possessing to be sure an exceptional purity of spirit, but nevertheless divine only in the sense in which all men may be said to be divine. Here we have a disparity of conceptions which Green fails to reconcile. The immanent Christ of religious experience is God; yet the Christ of Nazareth and

Jerusalem was man. It is impossible consistently to amalgamate the two conceptions. If Christ is God, then Christ was God. If the sacrifice on Calvary is to have any value as a symbol of the eternal sacrifice of God, then it must be regarded as more than a symbol. If Christ is actually present in the world today as a living spirit, the resurrection also must be regarded as more than a symbol. Green rendered an incalculable service to Christianity in helping to emancipate its spiritual elements from unreasoned dogma, but in regard to the person of Christ his attempt to amalgamate two disparate conceptions fails to free the problem from its difficulties.

e. Sin and salvation.

In Green's writings we look in vain for any definite or detailed treatment of the problem of sin. In fact, one of the charges raised against his ethical theory is that he overlooks the willful choice of evil,[1] and the same charge could be raised with some justice against his treatment of the religious aspects of the problem. But after all, it was not Green's purpose to write a complete or systematic philosophy of religion, and if we glean carefully among his miscellaneous writings we may find enough references to sin and salvation to gather a fairly definite idea of his conception. The most important of these sources are the fragment entitled, "The word is nigh thee", the essay on The Force of Circumstances, and the essay on Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life. Incidental references are found also in the essays on The Philosophy of Aristotle, The Witness of God, and Faith.

The essential characteristic of Green's conception of sin is that of incompleteness, or the will to realize one's potential capabilities only partially instead of to the fullest possible extent. This is inseparably connected with Green's metaphysics, for if man's main business in life is to reproduce God, then he sins who deliberately fails to do this. Instead of trying to manifest the divine elements of his nature he is content to remain

[1] Supra, p. 89.

"of the earth, earthy". In the essay on Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life Green defines the consciousness of sin as "the consciousness of an infinite vacancy only possible to a being capable of an infinite fulness".[1] The relation of sin to the divine immanence is also brought out in the essay on The Philosophy of Aristotle in which he draws a parallel between sin as the substitution of the finite for the infinite self, and intellectual error as taking a partial truth where the whole truth is available. He speaks in rather scathing terms of the man who refuses to recognize the divinity that is within him. "Stretching out his hands to an unknown God, he heeds not the God in whom he lives and moves and has his being".[2]

It is evident that in this sense Green's idea of sin as incompleteness is closely akin to the idea of sin as a thwarting of the divine will. For if sin is the will to be a fragment instead of a whole, it is the will to pursue finite partial ends instead of the infinite ideal established in the will of God. Thus it is sin which thwarts moral progress, and it is sin which separates the individual from God. In The Witness of God Green traces the growth of manifold agencies through which the will of God has been progressively revealed to man, and ends with the trenchant statement, "If it does not reach within the heart, it is because the heart has a darkness of its own, some unconquered selfishness which prevents its relation to him from being one of sincerity

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 121.
[2] Ibid., p. 87.

and truth."[1]

This brings us to a further conception of sin (which is in reality only a modification of Green's primary view) i.e., the idea of sin as selfishness. This, of course, is the current conception and would not require special notice except for the fact that Green unites the idea of selfishness with that of incompleteness. That is, the man who centers attention on self instead of others, thereby fails fully to realize evem himself. He who would truly realize the divine potentialities within him must quench the impulse to self-seeking and must give himself in service of the common good. This is significant in view of the fact that self-realization has often been charged with being an egoistic theory.

Still another (and also related) conception of sin which we find in Green is that of pleasure-seeking. In fact the most concrete definition which he gives is expressed in the words, "Sin is the effort to actualise one's possibilities in that in which they cannot be actualised, viz. in pleasure".[2] In his essay on Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life Green discusses the relation of this idea to the sensationalistic and hedonistic philosophy of the eighteenth century. The main point which he makes is that the attempt to identify righteousness with pleasurable feeling, and the consciousness of sin with regret for a mistaken balance of pleasures and pains, led inevitably to a dulling of men's sensibilities to the real nature fo sin. Accordingly

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 248.
[2] Ibid., p. 226.

when the evangelistic impulse in England again began to emphasize the sinfulness of sin, philosophers as a whole found themselves out of sympathy with the movement.[1] Green regards the quest for pleasure as responsible for false conceptions of man's true destiny, and hence for failure to realize his divine possibilities; but it should be noted that Green is not an ascetic, for he nowhere represents pleasure itself as being intrinsicly wrong.

Turning from the religious to the ethical aspects of the problem of sin, we find substantially the same idea although couched in different language. All moral activity, according to Green, is based on moral motive which involves an idea of personal good. This moral motive arises from a conscious choice between conflicting objects of desire. Accordingly if one sins, he does so on account of choosing a lower instead of a higher motive. In other words, his idea of personal good is erroneous because it lacks completeness. His moral ideal fails to measure up to its highest possible standard.

In the Prolegomena Green discusses the possibility of sin in connection with the freedom of the will.[2] There he shows that the consciousness of sin would be impossible, were it not for man's power to choose deliberately among various courses of action. Accordingly the statement that a man sins because of the temptations of animal appetites is only a half-truth, for while these animal appetites are undoubtedly responsible for presenting to him objects

[1] Works, vol. iii, pp. 121, 122.
[2] Prolegomena, Book II, Chapter 1.

of desire the choice of which would involve sin, it is his conscious power to choose among conflicting motives which gives him the possibility both of sin and righteousness. On any other basis, remorse and self-reformation would be impossible.

If we return now to the religious implications of Green's conception of sin, we find that salvation stands as a necessary correlate. To be sure, Green discusses no theological process which he labels salvation, but he believes profoundly in the possibility of man's overcoming his sinful impulses and thereby turning from sin to righteousness. To Green salvation means not an escape from hell, nor even the attainment of heaven, for while he believes in a future life (as we shall see in discussing immortality) he does not link the future life theologically with sins committed in the present. His idea of salvation is rather that of the expulsion of sin through a greater realization of the indwelling presence of God and a reconciliation with his will.

The connection of sin with salvation is brought out clearly in his essay on The Force of Circumstances, in which he shows that obstacles which seem to thwart our progress, and even the infection of past sin, are elements in our spiritual training. He says, "The common doctrine, which connects the sense of sin with the confidence of salvation, has often been denounced by theologians; but it seems to have its root in the truest feelings which bind

earth to heaven."[1] He says further that "our very imperfections may win us to that child-like dependence on God which is only another aspect of the assurance of salvation".[2] Thus we see that Green makes the essential element of salvation the dependence on God, or cooperation with God, which enables man to triumph over sinful tendencies.

The connection of sin and salvation to their common metaphysical basis is further developed in the article entitled "The word is nigh thee". Here we find him saying, "The source of selfishness and sin is also the source of that which overcomes sin. Through 'mortal yearnings' we ascend towards a higher object; through influences born of self-consciousness the presentation of a self satisfied by that which cannot satisfy is superseded as the moral motive by that of a self actualised in a life like itself eternal. Sin then, in itself, is no final reality".[3] The relation of sin to God is brought out in the statement that except for man's identity with God (involved in the spiritual nature of the self) men would not be sinners; yet we can not impute sin to God, for in God sin is already overcome, and in man so far as the divine nature is realized sin is in process of being overcome.

The relation of salvation to the atonement is not discussed by Green to any great extent. However, as we have previously seen,[4] he regards the sacrifice of Christ, not as any miraculous

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 6.
[2] Ibid., p. 7.
[3] Ibid., p. 226.
[4] Supra, p. 283.

prerequisite to the assurance of salvation, but as symbolic of the eternal process which is being enacted by the indwelling presence of God in the hearts of those who seek him. "The consciousness of sin", he says, "is already the promise and potency of faith. It determines the soul to believe the narrative which tells how the Son of God took on him our nature and obtained our free forgiveness".[1] But he says further that it is "not on historical evidence that anyone has ever been brought to believe in Christ to the saving of his soul." He maintains correctly, I think, that the great concern of the best Christian teachers has not been to convince people that Christ was miraculously born and died and rose again, "but so to affect them as that they shall die and rise again with him and live as those to whom their sins have been forgiven and the gate of eternal life thrown open".[2] How this may be done without attaching more importance to the work of the historical Christ than Green is willing to grant is a serious problem, but as it has already been discussed in the preceding section it need not detain us longer at this point.[3]

In criticism of Green's conception of sin and salvation, it may be said that it is in the main satisfactory. It accords with the view that life is an organic whole, and that no one can truly fulfill his function in life unless he strives to realize his capabilities to the utmost. It emphasizes the need of consciously putting one's self in right relations to God and his

[1] Works, vol.iii, p. 261.
[2] Ibid. p. 261.
[3] Supra, p. 274 f.

fellow-man. It makes the divine immanence a matter of every-day experience, and goes to the heart of religion in making righteousness consist of conscious cooperation with God in the attainment of the highest values of life.

But there are some points in which Green's theory seems to be defective, and these may be briefly noted. In the first place, the conception of sin as incompleteness is somewhat ambiguous, for it is impossible to assume that any man can completely realize the divine possibilities implanted in his nature. All that Green himself appears to mean is that to avoid sin one must live as complete a life as possible. While this serves very well as a working principle and is probably as satisfactory a theory as can be established, it nevertheless fails to set any definite standard by which to measure moral responsibility. Consciousness of incompleteness can not afford a safe guide, for, as Green admits,[1] it is a fact established by experience that the consciousness of incompleteness grows more keen as one attains to higher standards of righteousness.

Another criticism may be found in the fact that Green nowhere clearly distinguishes between completeness in the attainment of virtue and of the other values of life. This, of course, is merely a corollary of the objection raised by Sidgwick and others that he confuses the broad and narrow conceptions of self-realization. This, I believe, constitutes a real difficulty, which has already been discussed in connection with his ethics.[2]

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 226.
[2] Supra, p. 247 f.

Still a third problem is presented with reference to Green's theory of the willful choice of evil. Every moral act, he says, arises from an ideal of personal good, and sinful acts accordingly arise from false or limited moral motives. While this theory accounts satisfactorily for evil acts which originate from ignorance or low ideals, it seems to me that it fails to provide for cases in which people who have high standards and a full knowledge of the right nevertheless deliberately choose an evil course which is not in harmony with their own ideals. But nevertheless even here the merits of the theory outweigh its limitations, for it emphasizes the need of building right ideals which, in general, are the basis of right conduct.

f. Immortality

The most obvious place to look for a statement of Green's views on this subject is his fragment entitled Immortality. This indeed is fragmentary, but since he nowhere else gives a definitely labeled statement of his views, his critics have generally (though incorrectly) assumed that this is representative of his thought. However, a far clearer statement is found in the Prolegomena, Book III, Chapter II A, where in connection with the moral ideal he makes personal immortality a necessary postulate of the full realization of the ideal. Yet for the most satisfactory statement of his own personal attitude toward immortality, we must look to two sources which have not found a place in his collected works (except as quoted by Nettleship in his Memoir). These are the essay written in competition for the Ellerton theological prize in 1860, and excerpts from letters to his fiancée written at the death of her father.

The essential idea in Green's conception of immortality is that death is merely a transition from a lower to a higher stage of development. This appears in the Fragment on Immortality in the view that even extinct races of animals, as stages in the process of development, live on in higher forms. "The process is eternal, and they as stages in it are so too".[1] This, however, taken by itself gives a false conception of Green's view, for it

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 159.

seems to imply that the immortality of persons likewise is merely immortality of influence. For a clearer statement we must look to the Prolegomena, where we find nim saying, "We empty the idea of development of any real meaning, if we suppose the end of the development to be one in the attainment of which persons - agents who are ends to themselves - are extinguished, or one which is other than a state of self-conscious being".[1] Immortality, then, means the conservation of personality in a higher, more spiritual stage of development.

Closely joined with this idea is the thought that death consists in the throwing off of the fleshly impediments which separate man from God. In fact, the real meaning of the Fragment on Immortality is found in the words, "What then is the meaning of death? It is the transition by which the highest form of nature, i.e. the highest realisation of spirit, short of its realisation in itself, passes into a perfectly adequate realisation, i.e. a spiritual one".[2] The same idea is brought out in his lecture on the Incarnation, where he alludes to the words imputed to Christ in John 14: 16-18, i.e. that Christ must relinquish the fleshly vesture in which the disciples have known him, in order to come again as an indwelling spirit.[3] The clearest statement of this conception of immortality as an emancipation of spirit by a putting off of the flesh, is found in his letter of condolence to

[1] Prolegomena, p. 217.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 160.
[3] Ibid., p. 210.

his fiancée, where he says, "I think the best notion we can form of the state after death is that it is one in which all the spiritual result of our present sensuous life remains in a higher and freer form; in which all that the good have been to each other by means of sensuous symbols here, they will still be, though the symbols are different .....Don't you sometimes feel that communion 'spirit to spirit' may be purer and freer when it is not 'face to face'?"[1] This clearly indicates that Green believes not only in immortality as a development of personality, but as a continuance of personal relationships, in a more spiritual form.

The personal-social nature of immortality is brought out very distinctly in the Prolegomena. After stating the general premise that the human spirit has capacities which can not be realized amid earthly limitations, he suggests three possible courses: (1) We may say that the personal life begun on earth is continued in an ideal society which carries forward the attainments of this life, (2) We may say "that the personal self-conscious being, which comes from God, is forever continued in God", or (3) We may declare the problem insoluble.[2] Some of Green's critics[3] have assumed that he did not attempt himself to choose between these three possibilities, but this is clearly a misinterpretation of his meaning. He rules out the third, and while he has some leanings toward the second, it is the first which states the essential elements of his thought. The inseparable

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. cix.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 213.
[3] Supra, pp. 90, 146.

connection between persons and society is well expressed in the words, "In saying that the human spirit can only realise itself, that the divine idea of man can only be fulfilled, in and through persons, we are not denying but affirming that the realisation and fulfillment can only take place in and through society. Without society, no persons; this is as true as that without persons, without self-objectifying agents, there could be no such society as we know".[1] Since society is the condition of the development of personality, we may conclude that the future life consists of a society of immortal spirits, who freed from the limitations of earth are striving to realize their divine destiny.

The idea of immortality as absorption in the infinite creeps in occasionally where his pantheistic tendencies are uppermost. In the Fragment on Immortality he seems to confuse continuity of life with eternity of thought. Here we find him saying, "The 'immortality of the soul', as the eternity of thought the being of God, is the absolute first and the absolute whole. To deny the 'immortality of the soul' in this sense is to maintain the destructibility of thought, and this is a contradiction in terms".[2] A little later in the same article he says, "The living agent, man, then like everything else, is eternal as a determination of thought". In the Ellerton essay there is a suggestion that immortality begins in this life through a mystical experience in which the finite self loses its identity in God.[3] But while we find occasional hints of a

[1] Prolegomena, p. 218.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 159.
[3] Ibid., p. xxvii.

pantheistic conception of immortality, this is not his dominant idea.

The relation of Green's conception of immortality to his metaphysics is significant in view of the fact that in regard to immortality, personalism triumphs over pantheism. If his main idea of the future life is that of a personal and social existence in which the continued development of personality may be achieved, this is clearly an evidence that his major conception of the divine spirit in man is one in which personal distinctions are maintained instead of being merged in a Universal Self. The timeless self, to be sure, is the basis of man's continued existence, but it is not the pantheistic self imputed to Green by Seth, Sidgwick, Upton and others (q.v.).[1] In discussing Green's metaphysics we have reached the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency between his personalism and his pantheism, and while our findings with regard to immortality do not alter this conclusion, we see that in the application of his metaphysics to an important problem, Green assumes in general a personalistic rather than a pantheistic basis.

The relation of Green's conception of immortality to his ethics will be treated more fully later,[2] and does not require much comment at this point. We have seen that he regards it as an essential element in the achievement of the moral ideal, and it is for this reason that he introduces a discussion of immortality into the

[1] Supra, pp. 43, 61, 145.
[2] Supra, p.282.

Prolegomena, from which other religious considerations are excluded. In the Ellerton essay he shows that the same "ever present spirit of life" is the basis both of moral progress in this life and of immortality in the next, and that the stimulus to moral endeavor afforded by the belief in immortality is essential both to religion and to ethics.[1] While Green frankly admits that immortality can not be definitely proved,[2] we are told that his own staunch conviction of the reality of the future life enabled him to meet death unafraid.[3] His consciousness of the eternal spirit within him gave him the confidence that he was following the way "to which all the world's ways converge,.....the way that leadeth unto eternal life."[4]

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. xxvi.
[2] Ibid., p. 159.
[3] Ibid. p. clix.
[4] Ibid. p. 160.

V. The Relations between Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion.

We come now to the problem which pertains most directly to the subject of this study. We have analyzed Green's metaphysics, his ethics, and his philosophy of religion in order to get a synoptic view of his thought. We have seen how closely his metaphysics is related both to his ethics and to his philosophy of religion. We have found in numerous instances parallels and points of connection between his ethical and religious doctrines, but we have as yet made no definite attempt to group these together or to show their larger implications. It is the purpose of this section to point out as specifically as possible the elements of similarity and interdependence between Green's ethics and his philosophy of religion. In doing so, we shall attempt also to show to what extent Green's system gives an adequate conception of the relation between ethics and the philosophy of religion in general.

It must be noted at the outset that the relations which we shall attempt to indicate are in many cases present in Green's works by implication rather than by explicit statement. In his religious works, to be sure, he gives morality a very prominent place, and it is from these works that we must draw most of our specific references to his conception of the relation between religion and morality. But in his ethical works, while he has much to say of the eternal consciousness, he makes slight reference to religious experience as such. In a few passages, which we shall later indicate, he approximates a discussion of the relation between religion and ethics. But

nowhere does he give a definite and systematic statement of what he considers this relation to be. We shall therefore be obliged frequently to indicate elements in his ethical theory and religious thought which Green himself does not explicitly connect, but in which valid points of connection in harmony with the spirit of his philosophy can be found.

1. Their common metaphysical basis

a. General considerations

In discussing the relations between morality and religion we shall give much more attention to points of agreement than to points of difference, for the reason that Green himself does so. His conception of the essential unity of experience leads him to regard both religious faith and the moral life as manifestations of the eternal spirit; but he never draws clearly the distinction between these manifestations. Religion he defines as "a God-seeking morality"[1], yet morality also is represented as the effort of man to manifest the life of God. He says it is useless to attempt to contrast the zeal of the moral reformer with the devotion of the saint, for the value of each is intrinsic and identical.[2] An example of the vagueness of his consideration of whether religious values are unique is found in his sermon on Faith where he says, "In its true nature faith can be justified by nothing but itself. Like the consciousness of God and of duty--of which indeed it is but another mode-it is a primary formative principle, which cannot be deduced or derived from anything else". But he fails to indicate

Works, vol. iii, p.270.
Prolegomena, p. 363
Works, vol. iii, p. 263.

how faith can at the same time be "but another mode" of duty and also a primary and underived principle.

Elsewhere he defines faith as "a personal and conscious relation of man to God".[1] This is suggestive of a distinction between morality and religion which is implied though not very clearly stated in his works. While both are equally personal and involve God as their basis, the relation in the case of religion is more conscious than in morality. Green says that God is "the final cause of the moral life, the ideal self which no one, as a moral agent, is, but which every one, as such an agent, is however blindly seeking to become."[2] But he assumes that in religion, the quest for God is not blind, but conscious and definite. On such a basis, "a God-seeking morality" must be interpreted to mean "a consciously God-seeking type".[3]

Again we find him saying, "All religion (as distinct alike from thought and morality) consists in the presentation of the objects of thought under the forms of the imagination".[4] Here the distinction between morality and religion appears to be the greater degree of action involved in the moral life. This however is not typical of his dominant conception.

While these distinctions are suggested in Green's works, they are so over-shadowed by his conception of the essential unity of morality and religion that the latter must receive the major part of our attention. We pass now to a consideration of their common metaphysical basis.

We have seen that Green's ethics and his philosophy of religion rest upon the same fundamental metaphysical conceptions.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 263.
[2] Ibid. p. 260.
[3] Prolegomena, p. 363.
[4] Works, vol. iii, p. 219.

We have found that in both the activity of the conscious self and the existence of God are primary necessities, and that in both man's primary task is to realize the divine potentialities of his nature. We have found also that both look forward to an ideal which consists of a better state of personal and social existence, and which requires a future life for its fulfillment. Both religion and ethics urge men to bend their energies to the increase and conservation of values, and both assume that these values are objective.

The question at once arises, "Do we need this common metaphysical basis?" In fact, do we need a metaphysical basis at all? We shall consider the second question first.

The need for a metaphysical basis of ethics has already been discussed in connection with the nature of ethics.[1] To restate our conclusions, we found that Green began his ethics with a consideration of metaphysics because he believed that ethics can not properly be considered a science of conduct in which moral choices are involved unless man's essential nature can be shown to be, not a natural mechanism, but a spiritual principle endowed with the power of free activity. To establish this spiritual principle in man, Green found it necessary also to extend the idealistic conception to physical nature and to God. In evaluating Green's conception we found that it was possible both to engage in ethical activity and to study ethics empirically without raising metaphysical issues, and that since ethics furnishes data which metaphysics must interpret, it is more correct from the standpoint of method to follow Lotze's

[1] Supra, p.200 f.

dictum that "ethics is the beginning of metaphysics." But Green is right in maintaining that the possibility of ethical conduct itself rests upon underlying metaphysical considerations which are present even though not reflected upon. While we need not accept all of Green's metaphysics, e. g. the theory of relations, in order to accept his ethics, the latter is untenable from a speculative standpoint unless we accept the basic metaphysical postulates of the free activity of the self and the objective reality of the moral ideal.

Of the need of a metaphysical basis for religion there is little question. Comte, to besure, attempted to found his religion of humanity on a positivistic basis, and there have been numerous sporadic attempts to conserve some of the values of religion without the belief that these values are objectively founded in God. The movement of the present day (represented by Leuba and Dewey) which attempts through the psychology of religion to do away with an objective basis for the psychological phenomena manifested in religious worship, may be regarded as the most serious attempt to deprive religion of its metaphysical foundations. But in reality, religion must be metaphysical, or it is not religion. It is possible for a person to engage in a high type of ethical activity without the belief in God, and in fact, without any definite metaphysical conceptions; but as soon as he believes that the values of religion are merely subjective

they cease to be values. It is impossible to worship one's own psychological reflexes. For this reason religion, however crude its forms, has always held to some sort of an objective metaphysical basis, and there is little doubt that it will continue to do so. Green, therefore, in making religion consist of communion and cooperation with God, adopted a metaphysical position which is essential to religion.

We find, accordingly, that both ethics and religion need a metaphysical basis, though the need in ethics is primarily speculative while in religion it is both practical and speculative. The question as to whether ethics and religion require the same metaphysical basis need not detain us long. The very possibility of philosophy rests upon the assumption that the various elements of our thought system must not be kept in water-tight compartments but that the system must be coherent and systematic throughout. If this be true, it is obvious that we can not have one type of metaphysics for ethics and another for religion. We may find that ethics and religion emphasize different aspects of the common metaphysical basis, as in the fact that ethics lays its major emphasis upon the free activity of the self and religion upon the reality of God. But if we find discordant elements in either ethics or religion, we must in the interests of coherence adjust our conceptions to form a systematic whole. We shall now attempt to see to what extent Green did this in specific points.

b. Green's conception of the self.

Since we have found the activity of the self to be a primary postulate of Green's philosophy, it will be worth while to consider more definitely the relations which this bears both to ethics and religion.

Green's starting-point, as we have seen,[1] is epistemological. He asks the Kantian question, "How is knowledge possible?", and answers it with the theory of relations of which the most significant element is the dictum, "Only for a thinking consciousness do relations exist". Green's epistemology has important ethical consequences which we have considered.[2] It gives rational guidance to conduct, and makes possible the moral distinctions between virtue and vice which, on the basis of empiricism, are reduced to pleasurable and painful sensations. It also has important religious consequences, which though not so definitely traced are nevertheless implied. Without the "synthetic unity of apperception", religious experience, like all other connected experience, would be impossible. We have seen also that Green makes the possibility of knowledge a strong argument for the existence of God,[3] and thus supplies a rational basis for the most important element of religion.

Turning now to the more distinctly metaphysical aspects

[1] Supra, p. 150
[2] Supra, p. 205 f
[3] Supra, p. 168

of the self, we find that he makes the need of a unitary and abiding self the corner-stone of his philosophy. Of course the charge has often been raised that Green's conception of the self is not in reality unitary, but dualistic. We have evaluated these charges[1] and have found that while his theory of the "timeless self", is open to serious criticism, Green from a practical standpoint is more personalistic than pantheistic. He assumes a unitary self in his ethical theory even though many of his metaphysical statements may be otherwise construed. Of the abiding nature of the self there is no question. We have seen that Green makes "the abiding satisfaction of the abiding self" the test of the summum bonum,[2] and his repeated reference to the "timeless" self is doubtless intended to indicate the abiding nature of the finite self fully as much as to emphasize its relation to the eternal consciousness.

If we ask why this unitary and abiding self is necessary as a basis for morality and religion we find several reasons. We find, in the first place, that a unitary self is necessary in order to ensure moral freedom and responsibility. If Green's conception of the self is in reality dualistic or pantheistic he has no better basis for moral activity than does materialism. It is the Eternal Consciousness which

Supra, p. 217
Supra, p. 240

thinks in man's thoughts and acts in man's activity, he is as much in the grip of an external force as he would be if his acts were all determined by the chain of natural causation. Where man is not free he is not responsible, and on such a basis human sin must be attributed to God. This obviously is not the conclusion which Green intends to draw, nor do the major elements of his system necessitate this conclusion.[1]

But if this conclusion were the necessary outcome of his theory, religion would suffer along with morality, for religion likewise requires freedom for the exercise of its functions. There can be no conscious cooperation with God unless there are two separate persons to cooperate. Even the communion with the Infinite in which we seem to have a pantheistic blending of the finite self with God, requires as a necessary correlate the metaphysical separateness of the two elements in order that the communion may be voluntary. Mystical experience is not a blend, but a bond.

The existence of a continuous and abiding self is necessary also both for morality and for religion. Without it, we could have neither continued moral development nor religions growth. We have seen that the essence of self-realization consists in the effort to attain to higher and higher stages of personal development. If there were no abiding

[1] Supra, p. 176

self, it would be impossible in each forward step to conserve the results of the preceding. One great difficulty with hedonism, as Green has shown,[1] is ~~in~~ the fact that pleasures *per se* can not be progressively conserved. Only as they enter into the content of the self is this possible.

In religion, as in morality, the continuance of the self is necessary for the conservation of values. If one is to "grow in grace" (and if the spiritual nature does not grow it loses its vitality), he must have some basis on which to grow. Paul is stating the essential principles of self-realization in religious terms when he urges the Ephesians to "attain unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ". (Eph.4:13) While immortality will later receive fuller consideration, it may also be noted here that both morality and religion require a continuance of the abiding self into the future life if the growth is to be in any wise complete.

Approaching the problem from the standpoint of the contrast of Green's conception to that of sensationalism, we find that the latter from an ethical standpoint has deterministic and hedonistic implications, and from a religious standpoint it has exerted a deistic or atheistic influence. We have seen how Green analyzed Hume's sensationalism and found that where consciousness was made to consist solely of a disconnected series

[1] Supra, p. 241

of sense impressions, the inevitable outcome was psychological hedonism.[1] If there is no rational self to distinguish higher from lower values, there can be no voluntary choice of a difficult or unpleasant course in the light of an ideal. On a purely sensationalistic basis, we will "trammel up the consequence" and choose the pleasure of the moment.[2]

While Green says less of the religious than of the ethical influence of sensationalism, it is apparent that his effort to place religious faith on a rational basis is due in a large measure to the anti-religious influences of English empiricism. Since God can neither be a sense impression nor a combination of sense qualities, there is no logical basis in sensationalism for his existence. The empiricists who attempted to retain the divine existence did so on a deistic basis by assuming that God, at some time in the past, set in operation the material universe which is the cause of sense impressions. The empirical philosophy when applied to evolution became in general hostile to religion by trying to substitute evolution for God. It became Green's task not only to provide, through the spiritual principle, a rational basis for God; but also to make evolution an asset to religion by showing the need of God as the objective basis of evolutionary progress toward a definite goal.

[1] Supra, p. 207.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 126.

We see therefore that both morality and religion depend upon a spiritual principle in man which extends also to nature and to God. The presence of this spiritual principle, which is evidenced ~~by~~ epistemologically by the possibility of harmony between man's thoughts and the outer world, is evidenced also from a moral standpoint by the fact that in man's moral nature we see a revelation of God. The very fact of our strivings points to an objective moral order through which these moral strivings may be satisfied. Man's religious aspirations also point to the objective existence of a God through whom these aspirations may attain fulfillment. The nature of the self, as we know it, points beyond the finite self to the infinite. This brings us to a consideration of the second corner-stone of Green's philosophy, his conception of God.

c. Green's conception of God.

We have seen that Green goes farther than most philosophers in asserting categorically the existence of God. If challenged point blank with the question "Can we prove the existence of God?", he probably would have answered in the negative, but would have added that neither can we prove the existence of ourselves or of the world. But from a practical standpoint he considers that we need have no doubts about the existence of all three factors. As we have seen,[1] the lines along which Green attempts to prove the existence of God are mainly (1) epistemological, to explain the possibility of finite knowledge; (2) metaphysical, to explain the existence and interaction of the system of relations; (3) moral, to explain the existence of man's moral nature and to provide for the objective existence of the moral ideal; and (4) religious, to afford a legitimate basis for religious experience. Passing over the distinctly epistemological and metaphysical considerations (which have been discussed in section IV), we must give more specific attention to the moral and religious basis of theistic faith.

The only way to approximate a "proof" of the existence of God is to show inductively that there are certain undeniable factors of our experience that are otherwise unexplainable. Such

[1] Supra, p. 168 f.

a proof is accordingly synonymous with a demonstration of man's need of God. If it be charged that this procedure is anthropocentric, it may be said in reply that all philosophy (even that of positivism) proceeds from the need of explaining human experience. We shall consider first why God is needed as the basis of morality, and then shall examine the points wherein there is a parallel or related need from the standpoint of religion.

We have found, in the first place, that Green regards God as necessary to explain the possibility of man's moral nature. He believes, as firmly as Lotze, or any of the other advocates of the priority of ethics to metaphysics, that in the very fact of the existence of the moral consciousness which experience reveals we find a valid argument for the idea of God.[1] Whatever may be the phenomenal antecedents of the emergence of sense of ought, it is impossible to explain why persons should persistently have the impulse to seek the good in the face of overwhelming obstacles unless a Supreme Person who cares for moral values has made the sense of moral obligation an intrinsic element of man's nature. Custom and environment may explain in large measure the <u>content</u> of this sense of moral obligation, but the fact of the moral nature itself cannot be thus explained. The claims of pleasure and selfish advantage are sufficient to explain why men seek the evil, but they give no legitimate answer to the question of why men seek

[1] Works, vol.ii, p. 74 n; vol.iii, pp. 223, 258, 269 <u>et al.</u>

the good. The latter can only be explained by the belief that there is in man "a power not ourselves which makes for righteousness"; or in Green's more stilted phraseology, "a spiritual principle striving to reproduce the eternal consciousness".[1]

God is necessary, furthermore, to refute moral scepticism and relativism by providing an objective moral ideal. While we shall later give fuller consideration to the moral and religious aspects of the ideal, it may be noted here that an argument for theistic faith is found in the fact that there can be no legitimate assumption of an absolute good which men should seek unless there is a Supreme Person who establishes and gives objective reality to this absolute good.[2] To be sure, we may believe with the Sophists that each man is privileged to set his own standard of morality, but the chaotic incoherence of moral judgments which results from this assumption makes a science of ethics impossible, and if actually adhered to would make all social life itself impossible. Nor is the problem solved if we try to find an objective standard of morality in the social code, for codes, varying widely with different times and different places, possess no true uniformity or objectivity. No one recognized more fully than Green the empirical value of social institutions as embodiments of the moral judgments of the past, but he insisted that these were to be regarded, not as merely human achievements, but as progressive

[1] Prolegomena, p. 3 f.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 224

revelations of the Divine Ideal.[1]

We come now to a closely related argument for theistic faith which occupies an important place in Green's conception; namely, the argument from teleology and moral progress. As we have seen, Green was among the first (and Muirhead[2] thinks he was the very first) to turn the flank of the evolutionary hypothesis in favor of theistic faith, by showing that it revealed a teleology, not only in the organic world but still more in the world of values, which could be explained only on a theistic basis.[3] Whatever may be the apparent dysteleology of the natural world, the history of mankind reveals unmistakably an upward climb toward higher stages of moral attainment in which ideals triumph over brute strength. Green shows that on a purely naturalistic basis there could not only be no science of ethics but there could be no explanation of the indubitable fact that right has gradually gained the ascendency over the opposition presented by the force of circumstances.[4] While, as we have seen,[5] Green is not entirely clear as to whether God is himself the metaphysical cause of these opposing forces, he maintains staunchly that the possibility of man's moral progress toward a definite goal depends upon the guidance and cooperating activity of the eternal consciousness. Green has been charged with having merely revived the old argument from design of which Kant had shown the inadequacy, but I believe that

[1] Works, vol. iii, pp. 248, 270.
[2] Supra, p. 129
[3] Works, vol. ii, p. 437
[4] Works, vol. iii, p. 5 f.
[5] Supra, p. 195

in his union of teleology with the increase and conservation of moral values he presented a much stronger basis for theistic faith. While Dewey[1] argues for a naturalistic teleology without the classic metaphysical basis, it is difficult to explain how man can be progressing toward an apparently objective goal unless there is a God who establishes this "far-off divine event" and aids man in his struggles to attain it.

This brings us to another closely related element in Green's conception of the theistic basis of morality; i.e., that divine cooperation is necessary for the attainment of the highest moral values. This is significant in view of the fact that the dividing line between morality and religion has often been considered to be the presence in the latter of a divine cooperating factor which is absent in the former. For Green, no such sharp dividing line exists. In his thought the unity of experience is such that both the life of faith and the life of moral endeavor are characterized by the indwelling presence and cooperating activity of the eternal consciousness. To be sure, in moral conduct one may be less conscious of the presence of God within him than in his religious aspirations; yet in so far as he is moral, he is (however blindly) working with God to realize the "possible" self.[2]

[1]American Philosophical Association, New York, 1922
[2]Works, vol. iii, pp. 225, 258 f.

Thus we have found that in Green's conception, God is needed as the basis of morality for several reasons: (1) to explain man's moral nature; (2) to refute moral scepticism and subjectivism; (3) to provide for teleology and moral progress; (4) to afford a cooperating factor in man's moral struggles.

We turn now to the religious aspects of the divine existence. If religion is regarded as a real element in human experience, the need of God as its basis is almost self-evident, for an atheistic religion is a contradiction in terms. We shall examine the conditions of religious experience to see in what respects the moral and religious demands for God are parallel.

If God is needed to explain man's moral nature, he is needed even more clearly to explain the existence of the religious consciousness. Whatever may be the verdict of psychologists regarding the nature or the universality of the "religious instinct", experience reveals the fact that there is an element in man's nature which craves religious expression. This religious impulse, however crude its manifestations in its lower forms, has always tended to lift men above the level of their environment and to direct their worship toward a higher power. The impulse to seek God is unexplainable unless it has a theistic basis. While Green enters upon no specific discussion of the psychology of religion, he repeatedly asserts the belief that religion, morality and the

quest for truth, are all grounded in that element of man's nature which is infinite and eternal.[1]

We have seen that morality requires God in order to have any truly objective basis; yet moral values do not wholly disappear if the belief in God is rejected. Religion, to be of any value whatsoever, must have an object of worship which is believed to be real. Religious experience disappears when believed to be merely subjective. While the forms of religious worship have varied as widely as the forms of morality, religious experience itself has always pointed to some objective reality as the source of its values and the object of its aspirations. This, to be sure, does not constitute a logical proof of the existence of this objective reality; but unless we are to believe that the universe is fundamentally awry, we can scarcely conclude that the spiritual yearnings of mankind have all been directed toward an illusion. It requires a bold assumption to believe that the religious values for which the choicest spirits of the world have given their lives have been merely their imaginings. But to be consistent, we must either reject the validity of religious experience outright or assert an objective basis for these values.

Green, as we have found, chose the latter course. He was honest enough to recognize here that the need of an objective basis for religious experience did not constitute a logical demonstration of the existence of God,[3] but he repeatedly stated that

[1] Works, vol. iii, pp. 90, 225, 266, 272, et al.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 272.

the truest evidence of the reality of faith is found in its exercise. We have found him saying, "The true verification of the consciousness of God is found in the life of prayer and self-denial which expresses it."[1] Again he speaks of a consciousness of God "which defines itself in the moral life expressive of it; which is not indeed an external proof of the existence of God, but is in principle that existence itself, a first communication of the Godhead."[2] To those whose faith is wavering he says, "Live on as if there were God and duty, and they will prove themselves to you in your lives".[3]

In considering the moral demand for God, we found that a theistic foundation was needed to account for teleology and moral progress. It is even more evident that God is needed as the basis of a progressive religious revelation. We do not need to have recourse to Biblical authority to belief that God has revealed himself "by divine portions and in divers manners",[4] for the history of mankind is a record of his progressive revelation through those who have sought to manifest his spirit. This, as we have seen,[5] is a fundamental element in Green's conception, for in his theory of God as the possible self, he holds that every man, to a greater or less degree, is revealing God. While this divine revelation was manifested in its highest form in the life of Jesus of Nazareth, God is also revealing himself continually

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 273.
[2] Ibid, p. 269.
[3] Ibid;, p, 273.
[4] Hebrews:1,1
[5] Supra, p. 255.

in ever-increasing richness through the spiritual progress of mankind.[1] It is for this reason that Green regards the Christ of religious faith as having more significance than the Jesus of history.

We have seen that Green found God necessary as an aid in man's moral struggles. It is equally true that God is needed as a cooperating factor in religious endeavor. In both, the divine immanence is a fundamental element. As we have noted, Green does not draw the line very sharply between religion and morality. To him, prayer is "incipient action", and moral activity is "the reproduction of God". Religion is defined as "a God-seeking morality",[2] and reference is made to "the yearning after him which is inseparable from the impulse to fulfill ourselves".[3] It is unfortunate that Green does not give more specific attention to the question of whether religious values are unique. But while he would have strengthened his position by pointing out more clearly the difference, as well as the identity, between morality and religion, it is of importance to note in this connection that by putting them on a common objective basis he found an argument for the existence of God more valid than the epistemological considerations which occupy so much space elsewhere in his works.

If we recapitulate the points of contact between morality and religion which we have noted in connection with the divine existence, we find that the idea of God is needed to explain both

[1] Works, vol. iii, pp. 248, 270.
[2] Ibid., p. 270
[3] Ibid., p. 261.

the moral and the religious consciousness, to provide for objectivity, to afford a metaphysical basis for progress, and to aid man in his upward climb. These common elements reduce eventually to two, the objectivity of values and the divine immanence. In his ethical and religious philosophy Green everywhere assumes that both morality and religion are real factors of our experience, the possibility of which rests upon a more-than-human basis, and that the essence of both consists of the reproduction of the life of God in the consciousness of man.

We turn now to Green's consideration of the nature of God. We have noted that he gives much more attention to the divine existence than to the divine nature, and thereby weakens his system.[1] But we shall attempt to consider briefly what sort of a God is necessary to fulfill these demands of morality and religion. The general postulates of theistic faith require a God who is personal, ethically perfect, infinite in power, completely rational, and eternal. These attributes appear with varying degrees of prominence in Green's philosophy.

The personal character of God is a prime essential if we believe that only persons are the bearers of values. To adduce all the evidence for the need of a personal God would require a volume in itself, but it may be asserted on a theistic basis

[1] Supra, p. 170

that morality and religion alike require a Supreme Person as their objective ground. The extent to which Green regards God as such a Supreme Person is open to some question, as we have seen,[1] but however much we may charge him with pantheism, it is unfair to Green to say that in his ethics and philosophy of religion he makes God merely an impersonal unifying principle. The very fact that he regards God as "the possible self" which all men should seek to realize, indicates that he thinks of God in personal terms. There may be a blending in Green's thought of the finite and infinite selves, but the Infinite remains nevertheless a self and is not a material or impersonal element. His insistence upon the personal character of the moral ideal also bears out this conclusion.

Of the need of a God who is ethically perfect there is no question. A sinful God would be no worthy object of worship nor adequate conserver of moral values. While Green has occasionally been charged with ascribing to God man's ethical limitations on the score that he identifies divine and human activity,[2] the charge is unfounded unless we regard him as a thorough-going pantheist. He himself refutes the charge of imputing sinfulness to God by saying that if sin is incompleteness, it is overcome in God who is all-complete.[3]

The omnipotence, or at least the self-limited, character of God is also an attribute of prime importance from a moral and

[1] Supra, p.171 f.
[2] Supra, pp. 63, 88.
[3] Works, vol. iii, p. 226.

religious standpoint. While the conception of the Finite God may help to solve the problem of evil, it raises more problems than it solves, for it removes the possibility of dependence upon an unlimited power for the realization of values. Green's entire metaphysical system rests upon the belief that the universal consciousness is the source and sustainer of the harmonious system of relations which constitutes the world: and while he does not directly discuss the question of the Finite God he says, "The agent (which determines the world) must act absolutely from itself in the action through which that world is—not, as does everything within the world, under determination by something else".[1]

The rational character of God is another corner-stone of morality and religion, for if God be ascribed any place at all in our philosophy we must assume that he is true to himself and to his laws. The importance of the rational element is very prominent in Green's thought and is especially conspicuous in his treatment of religion, where he insists that everything irrational must be rejected as unworthy of God.[2] We have seen[3] that in applying this principle he not only rules out the belief in miracle, but on a constructive basis he goes for toward harmonizing the claims of religion and science by showing that they have their origin in a common reason.

But perhaps the most outstanding attribute which Green

[1] Prolegomena, p. 88.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p 239.
[3] Supra, p. 270 f.

ascribes to God is his eternity. The prominence of this conception is indicated by the very fact that he constantly uses the terms "eternal consciousness" and "timeless self" to indicate the divine element in man. While the eternity of God is important as a basis for the realization of eternal values, Green probably detracts somewhat from the personal character of God in emphasizing his eternity, for he has thus laid himself open to the charge of confusing eternity of thought with continuity of conscious existence.

We are ready now to summarize and evaluate our conclusions regarding the moral and religious factors involved in the divine existence and the divine nature. With regard to the former, we have found that the existence of God is needed from the standpoint of morality to explain the possibility of man's moral nature, and to afford an objective ideal by which to refute moral scepticism and provide for moral progress. From a religious standpoint we have found a parallel need for God to explain the existence of the religious consciousness and to afford an objective ground for the values of religious experience. In both, the divine immanence and man's need of divine assistance are fundamental factors. With regard to the moral and religious requirements of the divine nature, we have found the most essential attributes of God to be

personality, goodness, omnipotence, rationality, and eternity.

When we evaluate Green's conception of God with reference to these requirements we find that it is on the whole satisfactory. With the few exceptions which we have noted, his philosophy is in accord with the general postulates of a theistic interpretation of morality and religion. The chief points of weakness may be summarized as follows: (1) he over-estimates the possibility of proving the divine existence and gives too little attention to the divine nature; (2) he fails to consider adequately whether religious values are unique; and (3) he is not entirely consistent with regard to the question as to whether God is personal

d. Green's conception of freedom.

We have touched upon the moral and religious implications of the problem of freedom in considering Green's conception of the self. However, since the possibility of freedom is so fundamental to Green's ethical theory, the subject merits further consideration.

We find, in the first place, that freedom is needed both as the basis of moral responsibility and of religious aspiration. As we have seen, Green's whole purpose in writing the metaphysical part of the Prolegomena was to establish the proposition that man, as a free cause, is capable of ethical activity.[1] If man is merely the puppet of inexorable circumstances, there is no reason for blaming him for his evil acts, nor on the other hand for trying to inculcate in him the ideals which will lead to virtuous living. Green holds firmly to the view that a deterministic ethics is in reality no ethics at all, for it eliminates the element of choice which is the distinguishing feature of moral activity. (Green's general conception of the relation of freedom to ethics has been discussed in section IV and need not be repeated here.)[2]

The religious need for freedom does not receive specific discussion in Green's works. But in his insistence upon the rationality of religion and the need for its union with virtuous conduct, we have an evidence that he regards religious experience like morality as possible only to a "self-objectifying" consciousness having the power to initiate activity. Even though religion be regarded merely as a passive infilling of the divine spirit

[1] Supra, p. 178.
[2] Supra, p. 180 f.

(and in Green it is always more than that) freedom is necessary in order that one may put himself in such an attitude that he can receive this influx of the divine. A deterministic religion would be a strange anomaly, for the essence of religion is voluntary communion and cooperation with God.[1] Furthermore, the possibility of sin and the need of salvation would vanish along with moral responsibility.

But granting the need of freedom for morality and religion, the question arises, "Is freedom possible?" This Green answers in the affirmative through his doctrine of the "spiritual principle" on which both morality and religion rest, and to which we have already given much attention in discussing the self. But if we grant the validity, from the standpoint of ethics and religion, of the personalistic elements of his conception, we have still to inquire regarding the relation of materialism and pantheism to the moral and religious aspects of freedom.

Green is unequivocal in his insistence that materialism destroys the possibility of freedom and accordingly of ethics. We find him saying, somewhat sarcastically, "The elimination of ethics, then, as a system of precepts involves no intrinsic difficulties other than those involved in the admission of a natural science that can account for the moralisation of man." (Prol. p.11) In the opening pages of the Prolegomena he sets natural science and dogmatic theology in opposition to each other, referring to the latter as the chief means by which people have sought to escape from the mechanistic conception

[1] Works, vol. iii, pp. 258 f.

presented by the former. But in his constructive statement we find no condemnation of natural acience as such, nor commendation of dogmatic theology. We find instead the insistence that the realm of values, whether moral or religious, can not be accounted for on a naturalistic basis, and can only find a legitimate place in a world view which admits freedom and is at bottom theistic.

The anti-ethical and anti-religious implications of pantheism are more subtle, and of course Green has frequently been charged with having failed to escape them. If the eternal consciousness usurps the prerogatives of man, finite freedom disappears, and with it the possibility of moral choice and religious experience. Green foresaw the possibility of this interpretation and devoted a chapter of the Prolegomena to its refutation. (Bk.I, Ch.3, The Freedom of Man as Intelligence). The main thought of this chapter is that though man's organic life is determined like other natural phenomena by the eternal consciousness, as a knowing subject he is not determined by it but is a reproduction of it, and is therefore a free cause.[1] But as we have seen, Green's affirmation of freedom on such a basis is not sufficient to constitute a proof; and when he says, "Human action is only explicable by the action of an eternal consciousness, which uses them (man's organic processes) as its organs and reproduces itself through them",[2] it is not surprising that he has been charged with having destroyed the finite freedom which he has elsewhere labored so vigorously to establish.

[1] Prolegomena, p. 89 f.
[2] Ibid., p. 93.

When we inquire regarding the nature of freedom, we find that Green's conception is closely connected with the demands both of ethics and of religion. As we have found, he regards true freedom as consisting, not of the liberty to do what one pleases, but of the possibility of attaining one's highest capacities and ministering to the common good. In his lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract where he speaks of it as the power on the part of all to make the most and best of themselves, he says, "We mean by it a power which each man exercises through the help or security given him by his fellow-men, and which in turn helps to secure for them."[1] Furthermore the social and altruistic nature of freedom is not only ethical but religious, in Green's conception, for he insists that true freedom consists of the service of God as well as of man. In his essay on The Force of Circumstances he gives a noble challenge to men to overcome the bondage of inertia and selfishness and put themselves in harmony with the eternal spirit, "whose service is perfect freedom."[2] ~~(Vol.iii p.6)~~

The freedom of thought, as well as of action, in Green's conception becomes a form of harmony and cooperation with the divine spirit who gives rationality to the world. No one accepted more firmly than Green the meaning of the words, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." The quest for truth on such a basis becomes a form both of ethical endeavor and of religious insight.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 371.
[2] Ibid., p. 6.

Summarizing our results, we find that Green regarded freedom as being necessary both for moral activity and (by implication) for religious experience. We find that he also pointed out the impossibility of freedom on both a materialistic and a pantheistic basis, though his refutation of the latter is not conclusive. The personalistic elements of his system afford a firm basis both for religioun and for ethics; and in his conception of the nature of freedom as self-realization, service, and cooperation with the Infinite through activity and reason, we have a union of ethical and religious postulates.

e. Green's conception of the moral ideal.

We have already discussed the problem of the objectivity of the moral ideal in connection with the arguments for ~~the~~ theistic belief,[1] and what was said there if the metaphysical existence of such an ideal need not here be repeated. While of course the objectivity of values has not been completely demonstrated, we have found that morality and religion alike require the postulate of an objective ideal which is grounded in the purposes and plans of God.

We come now to the question, "What is the relation of the ideal to the actual?" Important consequences both for ethics and for religion depend upon this relation.

Green answers this question with the statement that "the end is the true reality".[2] This doctrine he doubtless took from Aristotle, though he combined it with a Platonic theory of the objectivity of values. In Green's theory a man, or a movement, is not to be judged by what is present at any given moment, but by potential capacities. We have seen that he regards man's true nature as the ideal or possible self which he must strive to bring to actuality. In society as a whole, lower stages of development are not to be scorned but are to be valued for what they may grow into.[3]

Applied to the problems of morality and religion, we find that this theory of the reality of the ideal affords a most important dynamic. It is possible for a man to "scorn delights and live laborious days" if he has before him some ideal which

[1] Supra, pp. 187 f, 312 f.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 225
[3] Works, vol.ii, p. 450.

there is a possibility of realizing by his sacrifice. We find the truest index of a person's character in the kind of ideals which he is willing to bend his energies to realize. This dynamic is religious as well as moral, for the truly religious person is the one who endeavors to obey the command "Seek ye first the kingdom of God", with the faith that this ideal is attainable because it is grounded in a more-than-human power.

We found in examining Green's theory of the will, that the good will is in a sense both a means and an end.[1] The same may be said of the ideal, which is both the dynamic and the goal of moral and religious striving. The effort to attain self-realization would be valueless, were there not some ideal self as the goal of the endeavor. The religious consciousness has also pictured to itself some ideal state(usually in another world) as the end to be attained. This brings us to the need of examining the characteristics of this ideal goal.

As we have found, Green's conception requires, first of all, that this ideal goal be personal. His statement,"our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of <u>personal</u> worth," has been so often quoted as to become a classic aphorism.[2] And if we accept his statement that "all other values are relative to value for, of, or in a person" it is evident that from the standpoint of both morality and religion personality must be conserved if values are not to be lost. Accordingly both morality and religion

[1] Supra, p. 224.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 210.

require that persons be treated as ends rather than means, and that the worth and dignity of humanity, even in its most degraded forms, be recognized. The social reformer who strives to ameliorate physical conditions and the evangelist who strives to save souls from sin are both actuated by the impulse to bring about a better state of personal existence. Furthermore, both morality and religion require the continuance of personal existence beyond the grave if the values attained in this life are to be conserved and continued to their full fruition in an ideal "kingdom of ends".

Furthermore both morality and religion require an ideal which is social as well as personal.[1] Whether in this life or in the next, man can not live "unto himself alone". The net-work of social relations amid which we find ourselves calls for the up-building of personality through an extension of the field of mutual service, and for an alleviation of the world's pain through the impulse of sympathy. It is in the extension of the common good through the idea of human brotherhood that Green finds the chief difference between Greek and Christian ethics.[2] But whether the problem is approached from the side of morality or of religion, the social character of the ideal presents a challenge to the cultivation of righteousness and well-being not only in one's self but in others. The charge that self-realization is egoistic will not stand.[3]

Furthermore, both morality and religion require an ideal which is teleological. As was noted in connection with the bases of theistic belief,[4] neither moral progress nor a progressive

[1] Prolegomena, p. 217 f.
[2] Ibid. p. 321 f.
[3] Supra, p. 246 f.
[4] Supra, pp. 315, 319.

religious revelation is explainable on any other ground. Morality and religion are alike in considering final, and not merely temporal, ends. Hedonism and atheism can be content with the satisfaction of the moment, but self-realization and theism look beyond the moment to the final end. This is significant in view of the fact that the positivistic philosophies of the present day often pride themselves, without just grounds, on being more progressive than those which are based on theistic faith.

Finally, both morality and religion require a goal which is both changing and permanent. The problem of reconciling change and identity is one of the most persistent that has confronted philosphers, and if we believe that in personality alone we find an adequate solution, we may believe also that in a personal God we find a legitimate basis for an ideal that is both changing and permanent. That ideal must be changing, at least in its human manifestations and in man's apprehension of it, can scarcely be denied. Changing conceptions of religious truth are evident on every hand as well as revealed in history. But unless there is something "changeless in the midst of change" we can scarcely hope for the permanence of human values. In Green's thought morality and religion alike find this ground of permanence in the eternal consciousness.

Summarizing our observations regarding the moral ideal, we find that Green regards the end as the true reality, and that in this relation of the ideal to the actual we have a dynamic and goal which is of great ethical and religious significance. Examining the characteristics of the ideal, we find that it is personal, social, teleological, and both changing and permanent.

f. Green's conception of the problem of evil.

While Green makes no sharp distinction between moral evil and physical evil, the problems involved are of a somewhat different type. Moral evil, or sin, though it has a metaphysical basis in freedom, belongs obviously to the province of ethics and of religion. Physical evil is a more distinctly metaphysical issue involving the nature of causality; yet it presents problems which both ethics and religion must take into account.

In examining Green's conception of moral evil, we found that from a religious standpoint he regards sin variously as incompleteness in the realization of the divine potentialities, a desire to act in opposition to the divine will, as selfishness, and as pleasure-seeking.[1] In his ethical theory, moral evil consists of the will to act from a low motive; i.e. to choose an unworthy object of desire instead of that which is in harmony with one's highest ideals.[2] The essential unity of these views is evident. If one fails to realize his best self, he is thereby guilty both of failing to reproduce the divine spirit to the limit of his powers and also of failing to act from the highest possible motive. If, knowing the divine will, he refuses to do it, he not only sins against God but against the best impulses of his own nature. To put self before others and to choose pleasure before virtue are courses antagonistic to the highest demands both of morality and of religion.

[1] Supra, pp. 285 f.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 175 f.

Perhaps the closest bond of union between morality and religion which is anywhere to be found lies in the function of religion in overcoming moral evil. The supreme business of Christianity (in its best forms) has always been considered to be the conversion of sinners. While this has sometimes been construed to mean an emotional excitation devoid of moral content, or an anti-social preparation for another world, the dominant conception of the meaning of this experience has always involved the turning of men from sin to righteousness. There has been vastly more agreement regarding the need of such an escape from sin through the power of religion than there has been regarding theories of the atonement or other means by which it could be effected. In Green we also find that he puts the major emphasis upon the power of the indwelling spirit of God which enables men to live Godlike lives. To him, a type of religion which does not aid men to overcome their selfish impulses and to live more completely in harmony with the divine will in ethical endeavor, is not religion but a travesty.

Turning to the question of physical evil we find that in spite of the difference in metaphysical issues which we have noted, there is a reciprocal relation between moral and physical evil. Sin is a cause of a great deal of the world's suffering, and conversely suffering in weakening the physical and moral power to resist temptation leads commonly to sinful acts.

From this situation arises the moral and religious stimulus to seek the removal of physical suffering. Whatever may be said of the disciplinary value of suffering, the fact remains that it destroys more values than it creates. Both the moral life of service and the religious life of love present a challenge to make the world happier as well as better. We have seen how strongly this impulse figured in Green's sympathy for the masses and in his desire to lift them to a higher plane of living through the removal of physical impediments.

Religion is connected with the problem of suffering in a special sense in that this presents one of the most potent obstacles to theistic faith. Green does not give this aspect of the problem the attention which it merits, In fact while he asserts that faith in God and duty if properly directed will survive much difficulty and distress,[1] and indicates that there is no inherent incompatibility between ~~the problem of~~ suffering and the objectivity of values, he makes no definite attempt to consider the barrier to theistic faith which the problem presents. He seems to assume the validity of the disciplinary conception without discussing its metaphysical basis.

However, as we have seen, in <u>The Force of Circumstances</u> Green presents a noble challenge to the human spirit to triumph over opposing forces.[2] Here he represents the high creative energy which presses forward bravely in the face of obstacles as being a manifestation of the divine spirit. Religion has its function,

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 276
[2] Ibid., p. 6 f.

not only in removing as many of the sorrows of life as possible, but in enabling men to triumph over unavoidable suffering. Though the flesh be weak, no physical obstacle can separate men from God. Green believes that in endeavoring to alleviate the sufferings of humanity and to triumph over the ills which beset one's own life, it is one's moral duty, as it is his religious privilege, to seek to manifest the spirit of the divine. Here again we find the essential unity of moral endeavor and religious faith in the cooperation of the finite with the infinite for the attainment of higher values.

2. Religious implications of Green's ethics.

a. Elements common to self-realization and Christianity

We have noted that the place of religion in Green's ethical theory is not nearly so prominent as the place of morality in his religious philosophy.[1] The reason for this is obvious, for he undoubtedly realized that to introduce theological considerations into his ethical system would immediately lay it open to the charge of supernaturalism and authoritarianism. As it is, the dependence of his ethics upon the eternal consciousness has caused him to be charged with having given "theological mysteries" and "traditional acquiescence in convenient dogma" instead of sound ethical principles.[2]

However, in considering the common metaphysical basis of ethics and religion we found that self-realization involves many elements which are fundamental to religion as well as to ethics. While these need not again be discussed in detail, we shall briefly review them with special reference to their relation to Christianity.

Among the aspects of Green's thought which are common to both ethics and religion, we found in the first place, that both require a self to be developed.[3] If self-realization makes its aim the "perfecting of man" it is equally

Supra, p. 300
Supra, p. 41, 110
Supra, p. 306 f.

true that the whole burden of Christian teaching centers about the need of religious growth. The words of Christ abound in parables and aphorisms which point the way to an increase of personal holiness. The sacredness of personality is a dominant concept both of self-realization and of Christianity.

Both ethics and religion insist, furthermore, that the self must be developped for the increase of social as well as individual values. We have seen how intimately in Green's thought the self-realization of the individual is connected with altruism.[1] Speaking in religious terms, if the love of God and the love of one's fellow-man constitute the heart of Christianity, we have here an expression of the need both of strengthening the inner life and of showing forth the religious impulse in deeds of service.

Again (to use Green's phraseology) both self-realization and Christianity demand that the self must seek reproduce God.[2] Leaving out Green's pantheistic implications, we find that there is much real truth in the theory that man's moral nature grows by attempting to measure up to the possibilities divinely implanted in his nature. Religion likewise demands that man who is made in the image of God must bring this spiritual likeness into fuller realization.

[1] Supra, p. 226.
[2] Supra, p 255.

Furthermore, both self-realization and Christianity require that in the process of perfecting the soul of man, the divine perfection must be used as a standard. Ethics formulates this perfection in terms of a moral ideal which embodies man's highest aspirations.[1] Christianity sets before man an example of this divine perfection in the person of Jesus, and bids men to grow "into the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."

We find again, that both self-realization and Christianity require a real though not a hedonistic satisfaction.[2] Both require that the final end be taken into account and bid men relinquish temporary pleasures for the sake of ultimate good. Whether the future life be conceived as a place of rewards and punishments or as a place of continued personal development, self-realization and Christianity unite in a protest against the belief that death ends all. Immortality will later receive more specific discussion.[3]

Moreover, the satisfaction or happiness which comes (in this life or the next) from having followed the path of rectitude as regarded by both self-realization and Christianity, not as the real objective, but as a by-product of righteousness. When Green tells us that self-satisfaction follows from virtuous living, he merely expresses a correlate

[1] Supra, p 220 f.
[2] Supra, p. 240.
[3] Infra, p. 382.

of the greater principle, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." But whenever religious enjoyment, like hedonistic pleasure, is sought for its own sake it loses its vitality.

Furthermore, in Green's theory of the moral motive we find elements which are common both to self-realization and to Christianity. It is apparent that both demand freedom to act, for it would be fruitless to ask men to form motives and purposes which could never be executed. We have noted the primary place which freedom occupies in Green's ethical theory.[1] While in religion the need for freedom may be less explicit, it is equally essential, for reasons which we have previously discussed.

Both self-realization and Christianity recognize the influence of evil tendencies inherent in man's nature. In ethics (as in psychology) we call these tendencies the instincts of our inherited psycho-physical organism, or in Green's language "the solicitations arising from animal wants."[2] Religion in the older days branded these impulses as "original sin" or as the temptings of the devil; and while we have largely outgrown these conceptions the fact remains that every person who seeks to live the religious life feels at times the warfare between flesh and spirit which Paul has described so graphically.[3]

[1] Supra, p. 178.
[2] Supra, p. 179.
[3] Romans 7.

But the redeeming feature of the situation lies in the fact that both self-realization and Christianity recognize the transforming power of consciousness in overcoming these sinful tendencies.[1] Green, in ethical terms, expressed this process as the identification with the self of a worthy motive rather than a lower one, so that in choosing among conflicting objects of desire one selects that which is in harmony with the ideal of humanity. Religion expressed the same thought when it calls upon men to overcome evil with good through loyalty to a great ideal.

Furthermore we find that Green's conception of self-realization harmonizes with Christianity in recognizing a divine element in human motivation. When the Christian says, "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me," an attitude of cooperation is expressed which is essential to Christian faith. We have observed that in Green's thought this element of cooperation is present also in moral endeavor as men seek to realize in their lives the divine ideal.[2] However religion demands that this cooperation be consciously present, while in morality it may be merely implicit in the nature of the ideal. Herein we find not only a point of identity but also the chief point of distinction between religion and morality.[3]

Supra, p. 180
Supra, p 316
Supra, p 302

b. Religious problems discussed in the Prolegomena.

While Green's chief ethical work affords also the best statement of his metaphysics and thus presents a theistic foundation for religion, we have noted that specific preferences to religion in the Prolegomena are not numerous. General considerations relating to the eternal consciousness and the moral ideal are found, but these have already been sufficiently discussed.[1] However, aside from a few random references, we find in the Prolegomena three passages in which Green somewhat definitely discusses the relation between ethics and religion. These are worthy of further consideration.

This first of these appears in his comparison of Greek and Christian ethics. The general characterictics of this comparison we have mentioned[2]; i.e., that the Greeks, in Green's opinion, gave to the world the general principles of self-realization and formulated the connected scheme of virtues which have since been accepted by civilized society; but it remained for Christianity to extend the application of these principles through the concept of human brotherhood and to furnish the dynamic by which to put them into practice. The Greek definition of the true good is one which modern Christianity can still accept, "It is the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful; to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (i.e. to be

[1] Supra, p. 312f, 331f.
[2] Supra, p. 111.

brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the state, yet in the interest of some form of human society."[1]

Green also gives a somewhat extended discussion of the Greek and Christian conceptions of self-sacrifice. This is especially pertinent to our study in view of the fact that religion is a most vital factor in the conflict between self-sacrifice and self-realization. Religion, more than any other power, calls upon man to deny himself and take up his cross in response to the call of duty. We find the heart of Christianity in the self-sacrificing love of God which challenges man to give up their personal pleasures, and sometimes even their lives, for the sake of devotion to God and duty. But on the other hand in this conflict, genuine as it is, Christianity is the chief power in overcoming the conflict, and in glorifying duty until the doing of it becomes not a sacrifice but a joy.

The aspect from which Green takes up this problem is the question as to whether the greater sacrifice which is demanded of the Christian because of the greater breadth of his social sympathies really represents a higher type of virtue than that of the Greek. The answer which he gives is that the renunciation of pleasure, as such, has in it no merit, and that accordingly

[1]Prolegomena, p. 303.

the value of public-spirited service can never be judged by the amount of self-denial which is involved. He does admit however that there is a real superiority in the Christian attitude. "It is not the renunciation as such, but the spiritual state which it represents, that constitutes the value of the life spent in self-devoted service to mankind."[1] Again he says, "The title of the modern or Christian type of virtue to a positive superiority is not to be found in the burden, unknown to the Greeks, which it bears, but in that which the presence of this burden implies; the new spiritual activity, namely, on the part of the multitude.....and the wider range of interests in human good which are awakened in the hearts of the virtuous."[2] This distinction is a very significant one and could well be applied in the present day by those who make a fetich of self-denial and glory in a petty martyrdom regardless of service rendered.

Green faces squarely the question as to whether self-sacrifice can be justified on a hedonistic basis, and maintains that it can not. However much one may delight in giving pleasure to others, it is not the pleasure he gets from the act which motivates the self-denying altruist. Furthermore, there is no assurance that the reformer who endeavors to make men better will also make them happier, for an intrinsic element of his work is the cultivation in them of the willingness to deny themselves for

[1] Prolegomena, p. 323
[2] Ibid., p. 326.

the sake of duty. How closely this fact is related to the spread of religion is suggested by the significant statement, "He must be much stiffened in hedonistic theory who could maintain that the life which ended on the cross was one of more enjoyment than that which would have been open to the Crucified but for the purpose which led to this end; and the Crucified himself foresaw that he came not to send peace on earth but a sword."[1] There is of course another side to the question and there is little doubt that the Christian life is in the end the most satisfying; yet Green was thoroughly right in pointing out that it is not necessarily the most pleasurable.

Another passage in the Prolegomena where Green discussed (though somewhat vaguely) the relation between religion and ethics is found in the section on conscientiousness.[2] Here he examines the question as to whether there is a real difference between the "moral reformer" and the "self-questioning saint". By the latter he seems to mean the person who conscientiously seeks to purify his heart because of religious motives.

After paying his respects to the over-conscientious person who is always fingering his motives in an abnormally introspective fashion instead of engaging in disinterested service,[3] Green asserts that it is through a conscious effort to purify the inner

Prolegomena, p. 328.
Ibid., p. 355 f.
Ibid. p. 355.

life that one derives the impulse to moral living. He says, "The comparison of our own practice.....with an ideal of virtue, is the spring from which morality perpetually renews its life. It is thus that we 'lift up our hearts, and lift them up unto the Lord'".[1] Green is somewhat indefinite as to whether this purification of spirit is necessarily religious, but his phraseology implies that he regards it as essentially a religious act.

In comparing the attitude of reformer and saint, Green says that there is a real identity in the spiritual principle which dominates the work of each. Examining outward results, there may seem to be little difference between the two. But Green continues, "If we could watch him (the saint) closely enough, indeed, even in outward conduct there would appear to be a difference. Doing the work expected of him'not with eye-service, as a man-pleaser, but in singleness of heart, as unto the Lord', he will rise to a higher standard of doing it."[2]

This attitude, which Green (perhaps to avoid religious terminology) calls "self-abasement in the presence of an ideal of holiness", he asserts to be an intrinsic value, identical in kind with that of the zeal of the moral reformer yet more basic. It is to be regarded not only as the chief source of moral endeavor but as the final goal of man's efforts to overcome the contradiction between himself and the infinite spirit.[3] In view of the general paucity of Green's treatment of the religious <u>a priori</u>

[1] Prolegomena, p. 356.
[2] Ibid. p. 359.
[3] Ibid. p. 360

it will be worth while to quote at some length what he says in this connection. With regard to this attitude of self-abasement before an ideal of holiness he says, "We claim such an (intrinsic) value for it--a value independent of any that it might possess as a means to a good other than itself--on the ground that it is a component influence in a perfect human life; on the ground that whatever the universe of activities in which that life displays itself may prove to be, the self-abasing, which is also the aspiring or God-seeking, spirit, most always be their source and spring."[1] He says, furthermore, that while the limitations of our earthly environment remain, this same spiritual principle must dominate the work of the reformer; yet it is more fundamental than the reformer's zeal for it would continue even in a perfect society where no further reforms were to be enacted. "The spiritual act, then, which in different aspects may be described either as self-abasement or self-exaltation--the act in which the heart is lifted up to God, in which the whole inner man goes forth after an ideal of personal holiness--this act, while it is in principle one with the whole course of man's moral endeavor, may be deemed in a certain sense its most final form, because, in that rest from the labour of baffled and disappointed endeavor which a perfectly ordered society might be supposed to bring, it would still not be superseded."[2]

Green's final conclusion regarding the relation between the

Prolegomena, pp. 360,361.
Ibid. p. 362.

spirit of reformer and saint is that they are in essence identical, and differ merely in the circumstances under which they are expressed. Both are communications of the infinite spirit to man: both are intrinsic values in themselves and at the same time instruments in the perfecting of human life. "If the supreme value for man is what we take it to be--man himself in his perfection--then it is idle to contrast the more observably practical type of goodness with the more self-questioning or consciously god-seeking type. The value of each is intrinsic and identical....Under certain conditions of society, of individual temperament and ability, it takes one form, under other conditions the other".[1]

In evaluation of Green's view it may be said that it accords with his general theory of the unity of life in all its aspects, and is in this respect commendable. It counteracts the tendency to draw a sharp line of demarcation between religion and "mere morality". It also affords a wholesome antidote to the tendency to reduce religious values entirely to phases of morality. In contrast to Kant who tries to make the moral <u>a priori</u> cover religion as well, Green leans in the opposite direction and tends to make morality a form of religious cooperation and communion. While he does not do so explicitly, and admits that there is a difference in the form in which the "spiritual principle" expresses itself, his thought is so colored by his conception of the infinite spirit which communicates itself to man and constitutes his real nature, that he finds it difficult to draw a distinction between the moral

[1] Prolegomena, p. 363.

and the religious manifestations of this spirit.

A third passage in the Prolegomena which deals with the relation of religion to morality is found in his discussion of the perplexity of conscience[1], in which he asks whether we have a right to regard our specific duties as commands of God. The problem arises from the fact that in an emergency, when there is no opportunity for philosophical reflection, decisions must be made in accordance with the ideal of virtue which dominates the life, and this ideal is more often shaped by religious influences than by any other consideration. Philosophy, he thinks, can render a real service in affording an intellectual justification for religious idealism, in the absence of which scepticism weakens the hold of the highest moral ideals by undermining their very foundations.

Green brings out very clearly the influence of religion as a regulative principle in the lives of men and nations. Among thousands who are incapable of philosophic speculation, "the idea in its various forms of something that human life should be, of a perfect being for whom this 'should be' already 'is'"[2] regulates conduct and operates to bring men to righteousness long before such an idea is speculatively formulated. Green maintains that such religious ideals have not only been the guiding force in the formulation of the moral and civil codes which undergird our social fabric, but they contribute the most potent factor in bringing

[1] Prolegomena, p. 381 f.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 381.

home to men the obligation to duty when it conflicts with personal inclination. Putting it very concretely he says,"In sudden calls upon the will, when the sustaining force of habit is of no avail, when no rewards or penalties are to be looked for, can any of us be sure that, except under the impression of the 'great task-master's eye' upon him, he would do the work which upon reflection he would admit ~~he~~ should be done? "[1]

In this passage Green presents the idea, which we have found suggested in his religious works,[2] that religion consists in the presentation of the highest truth under the forms of the imagination. Accordingly he warns his readers against too great literalness in the interpretation of religious ideas, which though practically operative in a high degree are incapable of being verified or subjected to the same tests as concrete "matters of fact". It is the business of philosophy "to disentangle the operative ideas from their necessarily imperfect expression, and to explain that the validity of the ideas themselves, as principles of action, is not affected by the discovery that the language in which men under their influence naturally express themselves, has not the sort of truth which belongs to a correct statement of matters of fact".[3] With such a distinction in mind it is quite possible to answer the question as to whether our duties are commands of God by saying that they are not commands, in the same

[1] Prolegomena, p. 382.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 219
[3] Prolegomena, p.383.

sense in which a master might order his servant to perform a certain task, and yet we have here a legitimate metaphor by which to express a real relation which exists between God and the finite spirit. In fact, the gist of Green's whole ethical and religious theory is summed up in the words, "If the infinite Spirit so communicates itself to the soul of man as to yield the idea of a possible perfect life, and that consequent sense of personal responsibility on the part of the individual for making the best of himself as a social being from which the recognition of particular duties arises, then it is a legitimate expression by means of metaphor--the only possible means, except action, by which the consciousness of spiritual realities can express itself--to say that our essential duties are commands of God."[1]

Green closes his discussion with the observation that while philosophy can not hope to justify every expression of the religious imagination, it can examine the language of religion "in order to satisfy ourselves whether it worthily expresses the emotions of a soul in which the highest moral ideas have done their perfect work."[2] If religion, so examined, stands the test, philosophy will have rendered a great service to practical morality "in counteracting the advantage which scepticism may otherwise give to passion against duty."[3] To Green, there is

[1] Prolegomena, p. 384
[2] Ibid. p. 385.
[3] Ibid., p. 385

no doubt that religion will be able to meet the test of speculative reason.

Green's conception on the whole is satisfactory. He brings out very well the influence of religion as a practical moral dynamic, and the need of its philosophical justifications in opposition to scepticism. His caution against too great literalness in the interpretation of religious terminology is also much needed at the present day. However, there is a certain vagueness in his conception of the "religious imagination". If he means by it the power to grasp truth which is not self-evident, the term may perhaps be properly applied to the religious consciousness. But he seems to refer mainly to the expression in figurative language of that which can not be apprehended as "matters of fact", and in this sense the term is misleading. Religion is more than a set of metaphors and symbols.

c. The relation of religion to problems of practical ethics.

We have seen that Green has frequently been charged with having given no direct guidance to conduct. But while he left no treatise on practical ethics, it is an unjust accusation to say that he failed to apply his theory to practical problems. He conceived the main functions of the philosopher to be the establishment of a sound theory by which practical issues could be met; yet in his political and educational theory, and in his own civic activity, we find numerous evidences of his attitude toward the problems of everyday living. We shall consider the extent to which religion entered into his views regarding politics, education, science, and art.

We have noted the fact that Green regarded political institutions as a spiritual revelation. In fact, he considered that in the political and social life of mankind, despite its inperfections, we have our fullest manifestation of the "divine idea" which man is striving progressively to bring to fulfillment.[1] In the writings of his early college days we find Green giving expression to the essential unity of life which dominates his later thought: and Nettleship quotes from some unpublished college essays in which Green speaks of the "tendency to form societies and the reverence for supernatural beings" as being the twofold evidence of man's higher nature and the twofold source of loyalty[2]. He there expresses the view that the impulse which has given rise to family life and to the free constitutions of Europe is identical in kind

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 17
[2] Ibid., p. xxv.

with that which has produced and maintained true religion. This impulse, in Greece and Rome, led to political greatness; in Christianity it found expression not only in the church but in the conviction of an "ever-present spirit of life".[1] Green makes the interesting observation that the ancients had a right to be conservative since they had only the divinity of the past as their guide, but the modern Christian with his conviction of the divine immanence ought eagerly to seek new forms of divine truth.

This conception of the essential unity of the political and religious life as manifestations of the same divine spirit working in man is not limited to his early essays. We find it repeatedly in his religious utterances, where he says that the consciousness of God has not only been the moralizing agent of society but the formative principle of society itself.[2] In discussing the revelation of God in history, he says man has felt the impulse to improvement through "an unrealized ideal of a best which is his God, giving divine authority to the customs or laws by which some likeness of this ideal is wrought into the actuality of life".[3] We find the same thought expressed in the Prolegomena[4] and in the Principles of Political Obligation.[5] We have seen that MacCunn includes Green among his "six radical thinkers"[6] because of the spiritual foundation on which his political philosophy rests.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p.xxvi.
[2] Ibid., p. 270.
[3] Ibid., p. 270
[4] Prolegomena, p. 206
[5] Works, vol. ii, p. 442.
[6] Supra, p. 117.

Green was more than a "closet philosopher", and we have seen repeatedly that he carried his conception of the divine immanence into the every day life of men. Here we find that Green does not stop with regarding the divine idea, in the abstract, as the basis of political and social life; he goes farther and pays tribute to the influence of religion as a direct factor in civic reform. In The Force of Circumstances we find him saying, "We see everywhere, in the abolition of serfdom, in the reconcilement of nations, in the general recognition of personal equality, how Christianity, as an external influence, has lightened the worldly burden of multitudes who were ignorant of its inward power."[1] ~~(iii pp.9,10)~~ In the Prolegomena he recognizes the inward power of Christianity as well, for he says that the impulse to do one's duty by one's fellowman is not only guided by the institutions of Christian society but motivated by an attitude of heart and will which finds its strongest dynamic in religion. "The function of bringing home these duties to the conscience of men , of helping them to be honest with themselves in their recognition and interpretation of them, is rather that of the preacher than of the philosopher."[2]

We find a close parallel between Green's conception of political liberty and religious liberty. He believed in both and labored zealously for an extension of both. We find him remarking that a conscientious "heresy" either religious or political, always represents some gradually maturing conviction of the social good.[3] Yet at the same time he was sensible enough to recognize that the demands of practical life make impossible

[1] Works, vol. iii, pp. 9,10.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 376.
[3] Ibid., p. 387.

an unlimited exercise of either political or religious freedom.

In the relation of sovereign to subject, Green maintains that civil subjection must be based, not on fear, nor on any "natural" superiority of the sovereign, but on the principle of the general well-being of the whole. Thus political subjection finds its source in the same principle which is the foundation of subjection to the law of conscience; and while restraint must be exercised in the case of those in whom the civil sense is lacking, every man is entitled to as much liberty as he is capable of using wisely, and in harmony with the ideal of humanity.

A similar situation holds with regard to religious freedom. Green of course insists that freedom of thought and conscience must be untrammeled; yet he warns against tactlessly airing one's opinions where more harm than good will come of it. In spite of his own lack of harmony with the tenets of the English church he opposed its disestablishment, for he felt that more could be accomplished by reforming it than by refusing it state support. He advocated making it more democratic and more liberal, but while he was in favor of the removal of doctrinal tests from its clergy, he protested against unduly exciting the religious public by making religious freedom a mere intellectual luxury.[1]

In Green's educational theory, as in his political theory, we find the spiritual basis which dominates his philosophy. Education is itself the process of the perfecting of human possibilities; and if self-realization as an ethical theory demands a divine foundation for the attainment of its end, so does education.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p.xxxvi.

Green of course does not go so far as to say that education must be explicitly religious in order to be of value, and in his educational writings the theistic element is much less prominent than in his general ethical theory. But while Green centers his attention on the practical aspects of current educational problems, his educational theory rests on the same conception of the moral ideal which we have found permeating his philosophy. The union of the metaphysical with the empirical in his educational purpose is expressed in a characteristic sentence, "Under God, it is to good books and a knowledge of the laws of nature that we must chiefly trust to make the children of the next generation, when they become their own masters, healthy and wise and virtuous."[1]

From Green's article on The Elementary School System in England we get some interesting observations on religious education, and especially on week-day religious education in the public schools.[2] Green's occasion for discussing it arose from a protest on the part of nonconformists against the teaching of religion in the schools. Green advocates religious instruction as a part of the school curriculum, but insists that it must be unsectarian in type and must not afford an occasion for proselyting. He discusses an enterprise (apparently very similar to the system now coming in vogue in this country) by which the Birmingham nonconformists were attempting to give voluntary religious instruction on school time through teachers provided by the churches, rather than through the regular

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 454.
[2] Ibid., p. 439 f.

schoolmasters. Green speaks with favor of the principle involved in this plan but points out the difficulty (which is precisely its greatest drawback at the present time), that the churches themselves are not apt to take enough interest in the work to provide religious instruction for all. Accordingly he thinks the work can be accomplished more efficiently through the regular school-masters, if supervised sufficiently by the school boards to prevent their proselyting.

While the English system would not be successful in this country with our separateness of church and state, there is much truth in what Green says about the need of having religion taught by trained teachers, and of having public school teachers who are capable of giving moral and religious instruction. He observes "The endeavor of the state should be to render its servants, the school-masters, as efficient in the works of education, moral no less than intellectual as possible. Now few of us will doubt that the master of a board-school becomes less efficient for this purpose if excluded from giving lessons on the bible, than if he is allowed to do so. I should even add....that is intrinsically better to have religious instruction given by trained school-masters than by volunteer teachers, whose zeal is apt to outrun their discretion."[1] He appears to assume as self-evident that religious instruction will likewise afford moral training.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 441.

We come now to Green's conception of the relation between religion and science. This topic has previously been touched upon,[1] and is so fundamental to Green's thought that it is worthy of much more attention than can here be given to it. His whole philosophy is dominated by the belief that the essential unity of life makes it inherently impossible that there be a real contradiction between the quest for truth and the quest for goodness or for God. When he says, "The scientific impulse on the one side, amd the faith that worketh by love on the other, exhibit the same spirit in different relations",[2] Green expresses a conviction which extends throughout his works and is fundamental to his thought.

Green believes that scientific truth, like moral goodness, is a form of divine revelation. Some of the finest expressions of this idea are found in his early essays. For instance in The Influence of Civilization on Genius he identifies genius with moral insight, and deplores the tendency of the times to go chasing after piecemeal fragments of the truth instead of grasping the unity of the divine idea. He says, "Men are astonished at the mere thought of seeking any absolute identity between their moral and intellectual natures, between wisdom and religion".[3] Nevertheless Green maintains that such an identity not only can but must be established if truth is to be really coherent.

[1] Supra, p. 257.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 264.
[3] Ibid., p. 16.

Again, in The Force of Circumstances Green insists that the truly scientific (like the truly religious) spirit is that which regards the physical world as a manifestation of God. "This outer world is no independent existence, but a means..... through which the deity, who works unseen behind it, pours the truth and love which transform man's capabilities into realities."[1] Accordingly the discovery of scientific laws is merely a process of evoking laws previously latent in our minds, because the human mind, like the physical world, is the creation of a higher mind. Thus the scientist, like the reformer, may truly be regarded as inspired by divine insight. In fact, Green says that "those flashes of religious enlightenment which from time to time break on the slumbers of mankind often resemble in their history the discoveries of scientific truth."[2]

In examining and rejecting the current naturalistic philosophy of his day, Green nowhere objects to it because it is scientific. He strongly insists that any tenable idealism must rest on a basis which accords with the uniformity of nature and the findings of modern science; and we have observed how he rules out the supernatural (i.e. the miraculous) element in religion because he believes it does not harmonize with this position.[3] But the score on which he does object to the English empirical philosphy is its failure to recognize the fundamental unity of science, art, morality, and religion. Exalting scientific postulates beyond their legitimate sphere and overlooking the

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 4.
[2] Ibid, p. 10.
[3] Supra, p. 270 f.

demands of man's inner nature, it threatened to destroy the foundations of faith. As in religion the greatest danger lay in a divorce from reason and faith which led to scepticism and superstition, so too in morals the elimination of man's higher aspirations was tending to reduce ethics to a one-sided naturalism. Against such an attitude Green vigorously protested.

Of the relation of religion to art Green has less to say. We have noted that he draws an analogy between religious faith and the artistic ideal and regards both as objectively grounded in the consciousness of a person.[1] Likewise in the beginning of the Prolegomena he remarks upon the fact that many were turning to poetry for that justification fo religious faith which the current philosophy seemed to deny them.[2]

However for a clearer statement of his views on art and its relation to life we must go to his essay on The Value and Influence of Works of Fiction. This essay on novels won a prize in his college days in spite of the fact that he was never much interested in the subject, while he failed in repeated efforts to win prizes on theological subjects in which he did have a vital interest. Its main thought is that in man' fragmentary apprehension of the unity of the world, knowledge, faith, and artistic genius afford glimpses of the divine.[3] The drama, for instance, purges our emotions and lifts us above the humdrum level of everyday life, while the novel by revealing

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 268 f.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 2.
[3] Works, vol. iii, p. 22.

the identity of human nature under various circumstances stimulates our social sympathies and paves the way for social reform. The work of the artist, like that of the scientist, prophet, or statesman, must ~~not~~ be judged by the extent to which he is dominated by the "impulse to make the most and best of the human soul." In so far as it contributes to this aim, Green regards it as essentially divine.

3 Ethical implications of Green's philosophy of religion

a. Religious experience and moral activity

We have noted that Green in his religious writings lays the strongest possible emphasis upon the need of morality in a vital religious experience. We shall consider further his conception of the importance of religion as a stimulus to morality, and conversely, of the importance of morality as a stimulus to religion.

The idea which is uppermost throughout the essays of the third volume of Green's works is that religious faith, when properly conceived, is not only a form of mystical experience but a source of moral activity. For instance, in his essay on The Philosophy of Aristotle we find him saying that the freedom and confidence which come to philosopher, poet, and saint from a spiritual view of the world, "are not like faith without works, dead, but like faith as the Christian knows it, a permanent source of unhasting activity."[1] The influence of religious mysticism upon moral activity appears again and again in his essay on Faith. He says, "The consciousness of God has in manifold forms been the moralising agent in human society, nay the formative principle of that society itself."[2]

[1] Works, vol. iii, pp. 90,91.
[2] Ibid. p. 269.

He speaks of"the striving after God which animates the moral life"[1], and says that this quest for God "has been attering itself in all the high endeavor, the long-suffering love, the devoted search for truth, which have so far moralised mankind, and that now speaks in your conscience."[2] Elsewhere he says that faith "as the spiritual source of the christian life, is the highest condition of human character."[3] The most comprehensive statement of the influence of religious experience upon the moral life is found in his definition of faith, where he says, "if we are honest with ourselves, we shall admit that something best called faith, a prevailing conviction of our presence to God and of his to us, of his gracious mind towards us, working in and with and through us, of our duty to our fellow-men as our brethren in him, has been the source of whatever has been best in us and in our deeds."[4]

However, it is not through religious mysticism alone that Green regards religion as a stimulus to morality; he finds its influence also, from a more philosophic standpoint, in the presence of religious ideals, We have noted the function of the "better" or"possible" self in his philosophy. He says of it," this conception, I believe, points the way to that true interpretation of our moral nature, which is also the only source of a true theology."[5] He reinforces this statement with

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 275.
[2] Ibid. p. 272.
[3] Ibid., p. 264.
[4] Ibid., p. 258.
[5] Ibid., p. 223.

the doctrine that in the realization of this possible self we have "the source of all action that can properly be called moral," and that "in our identity with it lies the true unity with God."[1] Accordingly the more definitely one realizes his own imperfections and the need of overcoming these contradictions of his nature by a fuller realization of his potential unity with God, the more completely does he attain to moral perfection. Thus Green identifies the consciousness of God with the consciousness of perfection, and makes it the source of knowledge, morality, and religion. A forward-looking religious ideal affords the highest dynamic for the overcoming of the present limitations of man's nature; while to acquiesce inertly in the incompleteness of the actual self instead of striving to attain the possible constitutes the essence not only of irreligion but of sin.

Green emphasizes also the practical moral value of a consistent theistic philosophy. We have found[2] this clearly expressed in the latter part of the Prolegomena where in connection with "the perplexity of conscience" he inquires whether we have a right to say that we must do our duty because it is a command of God. He shows that in the case of most good people the chief practical incentive to duty is the consciousness of "a supreme invisible but all-seeing ruler to whom service is due,"[3]

[1] Works, vol. III, p. 224.
[2] Supra, p. 352.
[3] Prolegomena, p. 382.

and that accordingly philosophy has an important practical service to perform in establishing the validity of this conception in opposition to the claims of scepticism. The same idea is expressed in the article on Faith where he says that while a rejection of theistic belief may not lead to positive immorality, it nevertheless affects the inner life and tends to dull the consciousness of duty along with the consciousness of God. "Is there a God with whom....he may converse? Is he partaker of an eternal life, so that what he is, and not merely what he has done, is untouched by physical death? These are questions which a man may perhaps answer affirmatively with little practical result, but which he can scarcely answer in the negative without serious effect, not necessarily on his outward course of action or on the character which he presents to other men, but in the long run on the inner life, on the character which he would present to one who could see it from within, and which he can scarcely help regarding, in spite of his creed, as alone of eternal value".[1] Green also says, rightly I think, that the most dangerous foe of religion is not "a much-questioning and often-failing but still believing search after God", but it is "the slow sap of an undermining indifference which does not deny God and duty but ignores them".[2]

We turn now to Green's conception of morality as a stimulus to religion. As we have previously noted,[3] Green in his religious

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 222.
[2] Ibid., p. 271.
[3] Supra, p. 313.

essays found the surest evidence of God in man's moral nature. The consciousness of God, which is not definable like an ordinary conception, nevertheless "defines itself in a moral life expressive of it."[1] Accordingly if ~~a~~ man would find God he must not seek him in some external guise, but "in the institutions of society, in the moral law, in the language and inner life of christians, in our own consciences;"[2] and it is our very familiarity with God's expression of himself in these forms that blinds us to his divinity.

Furthermore if faith be weak, it is the life of Christian love and altruistic service which affords its firmest support. As we find an evidence of God in the nobility of life of those who consistently seek to serve him, so in our own experience, we find the surest bulwark of wavering faith "in the everyday life of christian citizenship, in its struggle against ignorance and vice."[3] Accordingly Green warns his students against adopting a hypercritical attitude which will cause them to withdraw from active christian service to nurse their theological difficulties, and advises them to work shoulder to shoulder with those of a different creed, or of no creed, for the advancement of human welfare. In the close of his address on <u>Faith</u> he says, "Whatever we do, let us not make the difficulties of the (theological) transition an excuse for concessions to the spirit of self-indulgence.... If once we have come to acquiesce in such a standard of living as must make us wish God and duty to be illusions, faith must surely die."[4]

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 269.
[2] Ibid., p. 270.
[3] Ibid., p. 276.
[4] Ibid., p. 276.

A closely related aspect of the union of morality with religious faith is found in the idea that we serve God through the service of our fellow-men. Green's view in this respect accords with the current Christian conception. We have found that he regards God as an immanent spirit "Who lives in our moral life, and for whom we live in living for the brethren."[1] The same idea, in more technical terms, is expressed repeatedly in the Prolegomena when he insists that a true ideal of humanity requires altruistic service as an intrinsic element in the realization of the possible self. While Green does not give much specific attention to the charge often raised by positivists that theism is anti-social, his attitude is clearly revealed in his doctrine that the true realization of God involves "the life of the good neighbor and the honest citizen;"[2] and his own life of altruistic labor adds weight to the significance of his theory.

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 221.
[2] Works, vol. i, p. 371.

b. Moral aspects of the incarnation.

In an earlier portion of our study we noted that Green in connection with the doctrine of the incarnation laid his main emphasis upon the value of Christ as the indwelling presence rather than as the historical manifestation of God.[1] While he does not explicitly discuss the moral implications of this doctrine it is of sufficient importance to be worthy of some consideration.

We observed in the preceding section[2] that Green regarded religion as an attempt to picture to the imagination our highest thoughts about God. This conception appears not only in the Prolegomena in the passages cited[3] but also in his essay on the Incarnation. We find here one of the rare instances in which he attempts to draw the distinction between morality and religion. He says, "All religion (as distinct alike from thought and morality) consists in the presentation of the objects of thought under the forms of imagination. To think of God, and to give expression or realisation to the thought in moral life, that is our first and eternal business; but that is not distinctively religion. For religion to exist, we must in some mode imagine God."[4] This conception, I think, is less valid because less consistent and definite than the idea he elsewhere expresses that religion is the conscious quest for God through the

[1] Supra, p. 274 f.
[2] Supra, p. 352.
[3] Prolegomena, pp. 381-385
[4] Works, vol. iii, p. 219.

moral life.[1] Green himself in the Prolegomena admits that God is unimaginable because unpicturable.[2]

However this conception of religion has its bearing upon the doctrine of the incarnation, for he says,"The most nearly adequate imagination of him is as a man in whom that which seems to be the end of moral discipline and progress has been fully attained, viz. the union of the will with God, perfect unselfishness, the direction of desire to ends which one rational being can consciously share with all other rational beings."[3] Green'considers that while this conception may not have been actually realized in the earthly life of Jesus, it constitutes an ideal which has been not only a great aid to the religious imagination but a great moral dynamic. Accordingly he thinks that while the religious imagination originally required the belief in the divinity of the historical Jesus as its starting-point, the permanent value of the conception lies in the belief in a person now spiritually present to and in us.[4] How the latter is possible without the former he does not explain.

However our chief interest at this point is in the moral, rather than the metaphysical,aspects of the incarnation. We find that ethics and religion meet in recognizing the power of Christ as a moral teacher. While Green discounts the historical value of the synoptics, he is willing to accept from them great passages like the Sermon on the Mount

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 220. Prolegomena, p. 363.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 382.
[3] Works, vol. iii, p. 219
[4] Ibid., p. 220.

and the Beatitudes which reveal the spirit of Jesus as a moral teacher. He accepts these passages, not on any external authority, but on the basis of the appeal they make to the moral nature of man. The latter he says must be our final court of appeal, for "it has not been on historical evidence that any one has ever been brought to believe on Christ to the saving of his soul."[1]

Ethics and religion also meet in regarding Christ as the perfect example of moral living. If the religious imagination is right in its conception of Christ, we have in him, as Green says, complete union of will with God, perfect unselfishness, and the direction of desire to universal ends.[2] Green regards these qualities as present in Jesus of Nazareth to an unusual degree but he evades the question as to whether the historical Jesus was ethically perfect. He says that the lack of historical evidence shrouds his life in mystery, but he thinks that it would have been impossible to attain such perfection within the limitations of our human existence.[3] Whether or not we accept Green's position in this respect, we can agree with him that the moral dynamic afforded by the belief in a sinless Christ has been of incalculable value to mankind.

Ethics and religion again find common ground in regarding the present and ever-living Christ as an immanent manifestation of God, working in the hearts of men to turn their lives from

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 261.
[2] Ibid., p. 219.
[3] Ibid., p. 219.

sin to righteousness. Here there need be no hesitation in accepting Green's position. The perfection and power which he is chary of ascribing to the earthly Jesus he attributes in unstinted measure to the immanent Christ of faith. Whatever aberrations may be charged against Green's theory of the atonement, he renders great service to religious thought in showing that the essential element of the atonement consists in the eternal sacrifice of God and its moral effect on the believer who through conscious acceptance of Christ "dies unto sin" that he may "live unto righteousness."

In connection with the idea of Christ as a divine revelation, we may briefly note Green's conception of the moral value of Christianity as compared with that of other religions. In The Witness of God Green gives an excellent comparison of Christianity with Jewish prophecy and with Greek philosophy. He shows that since the revelation of God is from a common source there can be no inherent contradiction between what is best in every type of religion. The difference lies however in the fact that in the nations outside of Christendom this revelation has been limited and fragmentary. "The idea of death into life, which is the seed of the divine in man, has there lain barren." [1] Christianity is superior both to Jewish prophecy and to Greek philosophy because it has a far higher form of

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 240

practical spiritual life for its basis. Yet in its origins it grew from the seed of worship and of self-sacrificing citizenship which had been sown in Jewish prophecy and in Greek philosophy. "The glory of Christianity is not that it excludes, but that it comprehends; not that it came of a sudden into the world, but that it is the expression of a common spirit which is gathering together all things in one".[1] We have seen that the same idea is found in Green's comparison of Greek and Christian ethics,[2] where he shows that their main difference lies not in the principles involved but in the extent of their application.

[1] Works, vol.iii, pp. 26, 241.
[2] Supra, p. 344 f.

c. The moral aspects of dogma and religious authority.

We have found that Green was staunchly opposed to the attitude of mind which acquiesces in traditional dogma in defiance of the claims of reason. His greatest contribution to religious thought is summed up in the words, "God is not wisely trusted when declared unintelligible."[1] The rejection of irrational dogma has important ethical consequences which we must now consider.

The moral attitude toward creeds which Green expresses involves, in the first place, the need of adapting faith to reason and to the claims of the present age; but along with it goes the warning against making faith so much a matter of abstract speculation that it will lose its spiritual grip. This attitude is expressed in the words quoted in Robert Elsmere from The Witness of God, "God is for ever reason, and his communication, his revelation, is reason; not, however, abstract reason, but reason as taking a body from, and giving life to, the whole system of experience which makes the history of man."[2] Green has the highest sympathy for those who, with faith superior to their logic, have held to the spiritual elements of their religion in spite of false theology.[3] But he insists that there is a moral imperative which challenges us to reconstruct our

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 239.
[2] Ibid., p. 239.
[3] Supra, p. 273.

theology in accordance with the claims of reason. In words which could well be applied to the modern Fundamentalist situation he says, "An inquiry into the relation between the life of faith and the order of the world is not one as to which it rests with the good pleasure of certain curious persons whether it shall be undertaken or not."[1] The demand for consistency between our religious and our scientific thinking places upon religious leaders the obligation of bringing faith into harmony with reason, which is the common source of faith and knowledge.

Green insists that in making faith rational it is imperative that we avoid detracting from the spiritual vitality of religion. An evidence of the union of moral honesty with spiritual fervor in Green's thinking is found in the statement, "Inability to adopt the creeds of Christendom in their natural sense-and in any other sense they are best left alone- need not disqualify us from using its prayers."[2] He justifies this position by saying that the opportunity for misinterpretation which attaches to the creeds of the church is not found in its prayers, which are sources of spiritual refreshment rather than bases of intellectual agreement. While I do not agree with Green that moral dishonesty is involved in accepting creeds in other than their original meaning, I think he stresses a most

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 264.
[2] Ibid., p. 274.

important moral requirement in pleading for the maintenance of spiritual devotion in the midst of theological controversy. The disagreements of the present day would be much less bitter and less marred by personal antagonisms if Green's advice were followed more fully.

We have noted that Green regards Christian activity as an essential element in preserving the vitality of Christian faith.[1] He makes it equally important in healing the breach caused by theological differences. While he was over-sanquine in thinking that the day of inquistorial methods was past, there is much truth in his statement, "The days of tests and declarations, except for clerical functions, are over, and it us purely a weakness, when we are not pressed for our opinions, to make so much of them to other people, or to ourselves, as to be excluded or to exclude orselves from joining in a common activity, the spirit of which we inwardly reverence and would gladly make our own, while, in separation we are almost certain to lose it."[2]

Green's attitude toward Biblical interpretation has already been given much consideration in an earlier section[3] and we can here pass over it rather briefly. From an ethical standpoint it has its significance in the fact that he makes the authority of conscience the final test of the validity of Christian truth. He says, "The more strongly

[1] Supra, p 261.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 275.
[3] Supra, p 264 f.

we insist that faith is a personal and conscious relation of the man to God, forming the principle of a new life, not perhaps observable by others, but which the man's own conscience recognizes, the more awkward becomes its dependence on events believed to have happened in the past.... It is not on any estimate of evidence, correct or incorrect, that our true holiness can depend."[1] On the contrary he believes that it is the life of Christian experience which predisposes us to accept the essential truth of the gospel story. In this principle I think Green is entirely correct, although he himself fails to adhere to it consistently in rejecting so much of the Biblical account of the life of Jesus which is in harmony with the demands of our moral nature. The authority, not of the Bible, but of reason and conscience, must be our final arbiter in mooted questions.

We have seen that Green insists upon an open-minded facing of the truth. "Such inquiry is necessary for the vindication of faith itself, and even for its presentation in its properly scriptural character."[2] But he insists also upon loyalty to what is good in existing religious institutions We find in Green no iconoclast who would ruthlessly destroy our heritage from the past in the interest of progress.

We have noted how closely Green, associated the growth of institutions with the realization of the moral ideal.[3]

[1]Works, vol. iii, p. 260.
[2]Ibid. p. 266.
[3]Supra, p. 222.

In this he made no exception of religious institutions. In fact, he regarded Christianity itself as being a divine revelation, similar in kind but superior in accomplishment, to that which God has vouchsafed to the other nations of the earth. He says we are not to assume that God "suddenly set up the christian church as a miraculous institution owing nothing to the other influences of the world," but on the other hand we are to regard it as a gradual manifestation of the divine ideal as it has taken shape in human society, and as such we are to honor it. "Christianity is cheaply honoured when it is made exceptional.... The revelation is not made in a day, or a generation, or a century. The divine mind touches, modifies, becomes the mind of man, through a process of which mere intellectual conception is only the beginning, but of which the gradual complement is an unexhausted series of spiritual discipline through all the agencies of social life."

From this conception of the origin and significance of the Christian church, it is easy to understand Green's attitude toward it. He believed on the one hand that its authority was not to be slavishly followed, nor on the other hand were its ordinances to be scornfully rejected. We find that Green himself did not withdraw from the church in spite of his inability to accept its theological tenets, and we do not find him advising anyone else to do so.

Works, vol. iii, p. 239.
Ibid, pp. 239, 240.

In fact we find him insisting that religious experience to maintain its vitality must be clothed in outward forms. We have noted that he found the chief weakness of Puritanism in its attempt to dispense with the conserving and stabilizing force afforded by the external forms of religion.[1] To his students he says, "The christian ordinances are at hand for our refreshment, and if we are wise we shall not neglect them. We cannot afford to individualise ourselfes even in respect of outward symbols. We do wrong to ourselves and them, if we allow any intellectual vexation at the mode in which they may be presented to us to prevent us from their due use."[2] On such a basis the moral imperative itself requires, not that we shall dispense with the church in the interest of conscientious scruples, but that we shall make the church an instrument in the development of Christian character.

[1] Supra, p. 260.
[2] Works, vol. iii, p. 251.

d. Moral and religious aspects of immortality.

We have found that Green asserted his belief in immortality both on religious and on ethical grounds. In his religious writings he describes death as being merely a transition to a higher stage of development and an emancipation of spirit from its fleshly limitations. In the Prolegomena he presents the ethical demand for the continuance of personal relationships in an ideal society. We shall now attempt to see wherein the moral and religious aspects of immortality have common elements.

We have seen repeatedly that the basic criterion of the true good, in Green's thought, is its ability to provide "the abiding satisfaction of an abiding self". If this be accepted, it is evident that immortality is required for its fulfillment. Personal values vanish if death ends all. Religion, as well as ethics, looks beyond the moment, and beyond our transient earthly existence, to a future state in which values attained in this life may be conserved, and in which satisfactions denied in this life may be experienced.

Immortality is required also by ethics and religion not only for the conservation but for the increase of values. Green's theory of the moral ideal, in pointing forward to an ever-increasing development of personal values, demands that there be a future state of personal and social existence in which

the imperfect attainment of the present life may reach its larger fruition. Religion also has pictured heaven as the abode of "just men made perfect", and while theology, in its older forms, has more often conceived this perfection as being attained by a sudden change than by a gradual growth, there is nothing in the latter conception which is out of harmony with the religious outlook.

Furthermore, ethics and religion unite in requiring immortality for the just distribution of rewards. As we have seen,[1] this element does not figure so prominently in Green's conception as in Kant's, apparently because he is afraid of the hedonistic implications involved. He says, "objection may properly be taken to the ordinary representation of God as a source of rewards and penalties....The objection to it, however, is not that it represents God under a figure which is not a statement of fact, but that the figure is one which interferes with the true idea of goodness as its own reward, of vice as its own punishment".[2] Yet in his belief that immortality is needed in order to secure an abiding satisfaction, we have the suggestion that the hope of reward, when not merely external, is a legitimate motive of moral action. Religion also since the time of Job has tended to seek solace for the inequalities of the present life in the hope of a future state in which virtue will receive its due reward.

[1] Supra, p. 232.
[2] Prolegomena, p. 384.

Turning to the nature of immortality, we find again that there is a close relation between the postulates of ethics and religion. From the stand-point of ethics, the future life, where admitted at all, has generally been conceived in either hedonistic or perfectionist terms. The former view has dominated where the need of future rewards has been stressed either as a means of explaining the inequalities of our present life (as in Kant), or as a stimulus to virtuous living in order to secure these rewards (as in Berkeley). The perfectionist conception of the future life as affording the arena of self-realization is uppermost in Green's thought, and in that of most philosophers who regard life as a process of growth toward an objective ideal.

In theological conceptions we find exactly the same disparity of views regarding the nature of heaven. The imagery of the book of Revelation which has so largely influenced men's thoughts through the centuries pictures the New Jerusalem in sense terms which have a hedonistic implication. Much of the "other worldliness" of the Middle Ages was based on the desire to escape from the woes of the present life to a state of perfect bliss. On the other hand, there is a growing tendency among theologians as well as among philosophers to reject the idea of heaven as a "tea-table Elysium", and to substitute for it the conception of a state of existence in which the moral struggles of the present life will be continued but with a greater opportunity

for the realization of man's kinship with God. While Green's view is essentially the latter, we find also an incorporation of the best element of the hedonistic conception in the theory that man's true happiness is found in the attainment of virtue rather than in external rewards.

A further distinction regarding the nature of the future life is that represented respectively by the Buddhistic ideal of absorption in Nirvana and the Christian ideal of a life of personal fellowship. This distinction is, of course, metaphysical as well as ethical and religious. It involves the metaphysical question of whether the self is to be regarded as merely a phase or element of the Absolute, or as a real entity having a distinct existence of its own. It involves the problem as to whether the conservation of values is best provided by the merging of values in the Absolute or by their continuance in the separate existence of persons. In evaluating Green's position[1] we have found that while some passages point to the Buddhistic view (though never so called), his main conception of immortality accords with the personalistic theory which is characteristic of Christian faith. This disparity of conceptions regarding the nature of immortality is typical of the underlying inconsistency of Green's position; but likewise the fact that his dominant conception of the future life is personalistic is typical of the strongly personalistic element in his philosophy which has been largely overlooked by his critics.

[1] Supra, p. 297.

VI. Summary and Conclusion

1. General evaluation of Green's thought.

One of Green's critics sagely remarks of him that he pursues his task "with unwearying but sometimes wearisome patience".[1] Having traced through to the end the somewhat circuitous processes of his thought, we shall now attempt to bring together the outstanding merits and limitations of his philosophy.

a. Most valuable elements of Green's philosophy.

In spite of the inconsistencies of his own philosophical position, Green's most valuable contribution is found in his emphasis upon the need of consistent thinking. This appears especially in his insistence upon the need of an outlook on life in which religion, morality and scientific knowledge shall be harmonized in a unified whole. His whole ethical theory rests upon the conviction that a consistent treatment of ethical principles requires every aspect of experience to be taken into account, and accordingly he insists that the highest aspirations of man's nature, as well as the uniformity of the natural order, shall be given due consideration. In his religious philosophy, we have observed repeatedly that he insists upon the rationality of religion and the need of harmonizing faith with reason.

In Green's metaphysics we find that his conception of the reality of the self and the theistic basis of the universe are

[1] Sorley, W.R.: History of English Philosophy, p. 287.

the outstanding elements; and in the primary function which he ascribes to the self, both finite and infinite, we have an important contribution to personalistic philosophy. These elements meet in his theory of the divine immanence, and while at times this is carried so far as to become pantheistic, his belief in a God "who is nigh thee" and who is present in the moral life of man is a conception of great ethical and religious significance. We find also in Green's theory of the theistic basis of the moral ideal a forceful statement of the objectivity of values, for through the existence of an objective ideal men are not only challenged to the increase of values but assured of their conservation.

Green's ethical theory as a whole, in its emphasis upon the need of self-realization in harmony with an ideal of perfection, affords a permanent contribution to philosophy by providing a worthy motive of moral activity. In his demonstration of the possibility of freedom as the basis of self-realization, Green takes ethics out of the category of the natural sciences and shows conclusively that man is more than a mechanism. In making the extension of the common good an essential element in self-realization, he emphasizes the organic nature of society and affords a firm basis for altruism. In his ethical theory we find also a high respect for the value of existing institutions; and his conception of man's upward climb as a spiritual revelation affords a stimulus to greater moral progress and an assurance of continued teleological development.

Green's refutation of hedonism shows conclusively the practical and speculative difficulties of trying to make pleasure the goal of life, and we have seen that he rendered an especially important service in tracing the ethical inadequacy of English empiricism. Conversely his constructive emphasis upon the good will and the need of the cultivation of virtue includes the most valuable elements of Kant's ethics without the one-sided formalism of the latter. He joins with Kant in emphasizing the worth and dignity of humanity and in regarding duties as more fundamental than rights.

From the standpoint of practical ethics Green's greatest contribution is found in his insistence, both in theory and in practice,upon the need of consistent moral living. In his participation in civic and educational reform, as well as in his writings upon these subjects, we have an evidence, as Nettleship puts it, that he was "not a philosopher in his study, a politician on the hustings, a moralist on Sunday, but his speculation gave the back-bone which his practice clothed with flesh and blood".

In his religious philosophy, we have an outstanding contribution in his emphasis upon the need of a vital religious experience in which faith shall consist, not of the intellectual acceptance of certain theological tenets, but of the realization of the indwelling presence of God. He insists that whatever is found in creed or dogma which fails to accord with the demands of reason and conscience must be rejected, and in its place must be put a faith which is vital and spiritual and which rests upon the authority of man's inner nature. Accordingly we find him taking

a wholesome attitude toward Biblical criticism, which he says can not shake the sure foundations of religion and will lead to a wiser interpretation of religious truth. From his conviction of the inwardness of religious faith grows also his conception of the presence of Christ in the world today as an immanent manifestation of God.

We find that Green takes a constructive attitude toward religion in many practical matters. In his insistence that faith must be joined with moral activity, that the outward forms of religion must be preserved to protect its inner vitality, that the spiritual fervor of those whose faith is superior to their logic must be respected, that theological transitions must not be made an excuse for self-indulgence or personal antagonisms, he gives wholesome advice to his students which is equally pertinent to the present-day situation.

From a more theoretical standpoint, we find him recognizing the reality of sin as a factor in human experience, and the possibility of overcoming sin through cooperation with the Infinite. We find also a meeting-place of metaphysics, ethics and religion in his conception of the future life, in which he believes that man is to be freed from his fleshly limitations, and in a freer, more spiritual society is to continue his growth toward the ideal of perfection which he is unable in this life completely to attain.

b. Inadequate aspects of Green's thought.

Turning to the unsatisfactory elements of Green's thought, we find there is some justification for the fact that those who have attacked his philosophy have outnumbered by five to one those who have attempted to defend it. Much of the vulnerability of his philosophy can be traced to a source which, though intrinsically unimportant, is instrumentally very significant; namely, his style. His use of long involved sentences has detracted from the clearness of his writings; and the repetitious, cumbersome manner in which he sets forth his theories has led many to criticize them without a thorough reading of his works. His style affects not only the opinions of others regarding his philosophy, but the philosophy itself; for he seems at times to get lost in the mazes of his own sentences, and the vagueness of his use of terms enables him to slip unintentionally from one position to another quite inconsistent with it. The most striking example of this is the confusion of "universal consciousness" with "consciousness in general".

In examining Green's epistemology we found that he repeatedly confuses epistemology with metaphysics and rests his idealism too largely on epistemological grounds. We noted also that he tends to confuse epistemological monism and dualism. In his criterion of truth, "unalterableness" is not synonymous with coherence, and is less satisfactory.

In his theory of relations we have an epistemological-metaphysical hybrid which is the most fallacious element of his philosophy. We have seen that its cardinal doctrines are inconsistent and that if rigidly applied it would destroy the reality of the self. It reduces the universe to a series of relations with nothing to relate, and affords no basis for causality or substance. It is open to most of the objections which can be urged against neo-realism.

However, the weakness which affects Green's philosophy as a whole most seriously is his vacillation between theism and pantheism. Several elements are involved in this. In relying so largely upon epistemological grounds in his proof of the eternal consciousness, he is guilty of the fallacy of abstraction and lays himself open to the charge of hypostasizing the logical unity of thought into a Unitary Thinker. In his conception of the finite self he ascribes to man a dual nature in which the temporal and timeless elemenst are never properly harmonized. While he says that the eternal consciousness makes the animal organism its vehicle, he makes no consistent attempt to solve the mind-body problem. Again while admitting the possibility of the evolutionary development of man's physical organism, he tends to confuse origin with value in his conception of the origin of consciousness.

Much of his unclearness regarding the relation between the finite self and ~~of~~ God arises from the fact that he fails to give

sufficient content to his conception of the self and the moral ideal. He speaks in negatives so largely that his critics have been able to read into his conception a content foreign to his intention and then to attack the interpretation ascribed to him. For example, his apparent denial of causality in God has laid him open to many charges, for he fails to explain adequately what he means by the statement. While he assumes over-confidently that the existence of God can be proved, he gives insufficient attention to the divine nature. Again, while he assumes that the existence of suffering is not inconsistent with the objectivity of value, he makes no definite attempt to show the relation of the problem to theistic belief.

In Green's ethics there is much less which is worthy of adverse criticism than in his metaphysics. The chief weakness of his ethics, aside from the lack of content in the moral ideal, is his failure to answer the question as to whether self-realization can be harmonized with self-sacrifice when intellectual and aesthetic, as well as moral values, are involved. His theory of the moral ideal fails also to take into account sufficiently the willful choice of evil. His conception of the moral motive is not satisfactory in his attempt to balance exactly the good in motive and consequence. In his defense of freedom, he tends to underestimate the extent to which inherited tendencies and environmental influences actually limit the exercise of free choice.

In Green's religious philosophy, we find again much less to criticize than in the case of his metaphysics. We have seen that he fails to draw definitely the distinction between morality and religion, and appears at the same time both to affirm and to deny the uniqueness of religious values. We have noted also that his conception of prayer is inadequate, for he fails to make any place for the prayer of petition; and that his conception of immortality at times appears to involve a pantheistic absorption in the Infinite. The only other point in his religious philosophy which is seriously open to criticism is his undervaluation of the historicity of Jesus, and with it his unwillingness to ascribe divinity in any unique sense to the historical Jesus.

2. The relations between Green's ethical theory and religious thought.

In examining the relations between morality and religion in Green's thought we find that he regards both as essential elements in a unitary experience, and as modes of expression through which man cooperates with God to realize his divine potentialities. The distinction between them most clearly suggested is that religion consists of the conscious quest for God, while in morality men may be striving to reproduce God without being conscious of their relation to the divine.

We find, furthermore, that both ethics and the philosophy of religion in Green's thought rest on a metaphysical basis, and that this metaphysical basis involves many common elements. Both require a unitary and abiding self as the foundation of experience. Without a unitary self there could be neither moral freedom and responsibility nor religious cooperation and communion; and without an abiding self we could have neither continued moral development nor the increase of religious values. While in Green's thought the unitary nature of the self is somewhat obscured by his conception of its relation to the eternal consciousness, it is nevertheless clearly implied as the basis of his ethical theory, and is especially prominent in his refutation of English empiricism, of which he shows the anti-ethical and anti-religious implications.

In Green's thought God is likewise fundamental both to ethics and religion. He shows that the existence of God is a necessary

postulate to explain man's moral and religious nature; to refute moral and religious scepticism and subjectivity; to provide for moral and religious progress; and to aid man in his moral and religious strivings. Ethics and religion unite in requiring a God who is personal, good, infinite, rational, and eternal.

Green's conception of freedom also has both ethical and religious implications, for freedom is necessary as the basis both of moral choice and of religious experience. When freedom is interpreted as the opportunity to develop one's highest capacities and to serve the common good, it is evident that both ethics and religion sanction this principle.

Green's conception of the moral ideal is likewise very significant both for ethics and the philosophy of religion; for the belief in the reality and eternal vitality of ideals supplies a dynamic and a goal for both moral and religious aspiration. Ethics and religion unite in demanding an objective ideal that is personal, social, teleological, and at the same time both changing and permanent.

Ethics and religion meet in the problem of evil. It is the chief function of religion to enable men to overcome moral evil and to triumph over the ills of life; while morality and religion alike impel men to remove, as far as possible, the causes of sin and suffering.

When we examine the religious implications of Green's ethical theory, we find that in many respects the teachings and spirit of Christianity involve the principles of self-realization. Both emphasize the sacredness of personality and the need of personal growth; and both challenge men to the altruistic service of society. Both recognize that man has within him possibilities divinely implanted in his nature, and both point to an objective standard of perfection for their realization. Both rate virtuous living above self-satisfaction, but recognize that satisfaction (though not always pleasure) follows as the result of virtuous living. Both recognize the presence of evil tendencies in man's nature, but recognize also man's power to overcome these evil tendencies.

Green in comparing Greek with Christian ethics points out their essential unity, yet recognizes the superiority of the latter in its broader conception of service to mankind. He likewise recognizes the identity of spirit of those who serve from exclusively moral and from religious motives, but regards the latter as more effective and more fundamental. He defends the view that moral duties may metaphorically be regarded as commands of God.

In Green's political philosophy we find that he not only regards political and social institutions as a spiritual revelation, but he regards the impulse which leads to their formation as identical with the religious impulse. He pays tribute to the influence of Christianity as a direct factor in civic reform. He rests

political and religious liberty on a common basis, and finds the justification and the limitations of each in the demands of the common welfare.

In Green's educational theory, we find him not only recognizing its spiritual basis, but warmly advocating the non-sectarian extension of religious education in the schools. In the relation of religion to science, Green emphasizes repeatedly their underlying unity, and we have seen that he rendered a great service to his times in placing religion on a philosophic basis which would harmonize with the demands of science. In the relation of religion to art, he likewise recognizes the unity of experience and commends the service of art as a stimulus to morality and faith.

In examining the ethical implications of Green's philosophy of religion , we find uppermost the inter-relation of religious experience and moral activity. Religion serves as a stimulus to morality through the moral incentive of religious mysticism and religious ideals, and a consistent theistic belief is essential to the vitality of the inner sources of morality (though not necessarily to its outward forms). Conversely morality affords a stimulus to religion through the evidence of God which is found in the voice of conscience, in the life of Christian love, and in the altruistic service of mankind.

The incarnation, while essentially a religious idea, has also an ethical significance, for through it Christ is presented to

the religious imagination not only as a matchless moral teacher and a perfect example of moral living, but as an immanent manifestation of God: and thereby men are impelled both to a deeper religious experience and to a higher standard of moral endeavor. Christianity, when placed side by side with the religions of other nations, reveals many common elements but a vast superiority in its moral and spiritual power.

Examining Green's conception of dogma and religious authority, we find him calling attention to the moral need of adapting faith to reason and of maintaining spiritual vitality and Christian activity in the midst of theological differences. He links man's moral nature with religion in making conscience the final ground of authority in Biblical interpretation. He pays a high tribute to the value of religious institutions and advocates the strengthening of the church, not in ecclesiastical authority, but in its moral and spiritual power over the lives of men.

Green makes immortality an essential element of both his ethical and his religious theory. He regards the future life as necessary to secure the permanent satisfaction of the abiding self and the possibility of continued development, and (to a less extent) he considers it necessary to secure the just distribution of rewards. His conception of the nature of the future life accords in general with the demands of both ethics and religion.

Green's thought affords a synthetic and many-sided approach to the problems of philosophy. While, as we have seen, it is far from perfect, the writer is convinced that its merits far outweigh its limitations. In showing the relation of ethics to the philosophy of religion he rendered a permanent contribution. He sums up the essence of this relation when he says, "'The word of God is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart'. It is the word that has been made man; that has been uttering itself in all the high endeavor, the long-suffering love, the devoted search for truth, which have so far moralised mankind, and that now speaks in your conscience. It is the God in you which strives for communication with God."[1]

[1] Works, vol. iii, p. 272

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May 28, 1923

Dr. A. W. Weysse,
588 Boylston Street,
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My dear Dr. Weysse:

In reply to your letter of May 25 I am pleased to send you the following data:

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I trust that this statement will furnish the information which you desire.

Very cordially yours,

Georgia E. Harkness

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SEP 17	1937		
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Fe 15 1949	EC		

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